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The scholarly tradition in urban policy analysis holds that a 
variety of economic, social and political background factors influence 
the nature and amount of output by the policymaking system. Here a 
number of these factors such as elections and parties, structure of 
the national economy and age and sex composition of the population are 
examined to determine their effect on public housing and local govern-
ment revenue policy in two Central American urban centers. 
2 
San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, El Salvador were chosen 
for the study because they are in the same size range, both a.re capital 
(and primate) cities and both have been growing rapidly in recent years. 
Moreover, the cities exist in radically different sociopolitical mi-
lieux. With such characteristics as size and primacy held constant, it 
was felt that variations in policy output could be linked to and at 
least partially explained by the political, social and economic differ-
ences. 
For a variety of systemic and historical reasons, urban public 
housing is provided in both countries by autonomous agencies of the 
national governments. Their operational policies and programs are com-
pared. 
Two major activities in the field of municipal revenue are traced 
through the policymaking process from their genesis: a successful ef-
fort to install parking meters in San Jose, and an unsuccessful attempt 
at overall tax reform in San Salvador. 
In neither policy area, public housing nor municipal revenue, was 
the original hypothesis sustained. No important differences in policy 
output between San Jose and San Salvador could be identified. Conse-
quently, there were no variations to be explained by the diversity in 
social, economic and political background factors. 
Nonetheless, these factors are considered in detail, along with 
the nature of the policymaking process in the two cities. Finally, 
some suggestions are offered as to why San Jose and San Salvador ex-
hibit these similarities in policy product in spite of their many 
social, political and economic dissimilarities. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I must, and wish to, acknowledge the assistanc~ of several or-
ganizations and individuals without whose help this dissertation could 
not have been completed. A large debt is owed to the Canada Council 
whose financial support made the field work possible. Among the fac-
ulty members at Portland State University special thanks are due Den-
nis West and Charles R. White who not only midwifed the paper through 
its interminable birthing but many times hauled me back from the brink 
of despair. Without the help of Margaret Lynch, my crude scribblings 
would never have become a readable draft. 
A student carrying out research in foreign lands and with an im-
perfect command of the local idiom owes more gratitude to more people 
than does one researching in familiar territory. Would a Central 
American student, speaking badly broken English who descended on gov-
ernment and business leaders; constantly requested interviews; de-
manded details of administrative structure, fiscal organization and 
the policymaking process; sought access to, and help in sorting 
through, long-buried records; and generally disrupted office procedure 
for weeks on end, be as well received in Portland as I was in San Jose 
and San Salvador-? Unfortunately, I think not. If this list of people 
whose help has proved invaluable is, then, longer than usual, it is 
still shorter than it might be. 
In San Jose, Ernesto and Roberta Macaya opened the first doors 
for me and, months later, were still opening doors for me. Dr. Samuel 
iv 
Stone at the University of Costa Rica suggested readings I otherwise 
would not have found. Licenciado Eduardo Longan at the Central Bank 
of Costa Rica, Georgina Salazar at Statistics and Census, and Olga 
Marta Mesen at the Comptroller General sought out the precise data I 
was after. At IFAM (Institute for Strengthening and Assisting Munici-
palities), two people went far out of their ways to help me. Lic. 
Edgar Munoz not only provided me with a desk, the run of the office 
and the opportunity to talk to his entire staff, he also gave me un-
precedented freedom to take materials home and shared his own research 
; 
with me. Lupita Rodriguez Mendez led me instantly to any l~aterial I 
was seeking, and knew of English versions of documents I had located 
only in Spanish. 
Deputy Oscar Saborio Alvarado took time not only from his busi-
ness but also from the harried last days of the Legislative Session to 
provide me with insights into the workings of the Assembly--insights I 
could have obtained nowhere else. Architect Jorge Crespo patiently 
explained the functioning and policies of INVU (National Institute of 
Housing and Urbanization). Lic. Mauricio Alvarado Cader and Ofelia 
Achong also assisted me greatly. 
I have no debt greater than that owed Elisa Perez Ruiz, Keeper 
of the San Jose Municipal Archives and her staff: Carmen Cabezas 
Soto, Victor Gerardo Gaitan and Rafael Angel Gutierrez Monge. She not 
only found all the information I asked for, but once she knew the na-
ture of my project, she unearthed information whose existence never 
would have occurred to me. Moreover she cut red tape to allow me to 
take out and photocopy the only existing copy of some archival material 
v 
and she arranged introductions to members of the Legislative Assembly. 
Finally, she interceded with the airline so I would not have to pay 
excess weight charges on the mounds of paper with which I left Costa 
Rica. Thank you, Dona Elisa. 
My debts in San Salvador are as many and as varied. Dr. Alfred 
Cuzan, doing his own research, graciously shared his thoughts and his 
contacts. At the Jose Simeon Canas University of Central America, Dr. 
Julio Sifontes, Engineer Hector Dada, and especially Architect Jose 
Manuel Murillo explained in great detail the actual, as opposed to the 
theoretical, relations among the various agencies involved in planning, 
housing and urban service delivery. Father Antonio Fernandez Ibanez, 
Executive Director of FUNDASAL (Salvadorean Foundation for Development 
and Minimum Housing), not only clarified the whole area of public 
housing but explained the political and community organizing that ac-
companied it. Dr. Victor Manuel Cuellar Ortiz, Manager of 'the Salva-
dorean Association of Industrialists provided me with otherwise unob-
tainable insights and viewpoints of the business community. 
Government officials were no less helpful. Lic. Mario Arnoldo 
Sanchez at CONAPLAN (National Council for Planning and Economic Devel-
opment), Architect Oscar Arrivillaga at IVU (Institute of Housing and 
Urbanization) and Engineer Eduardo Varaona of the Directorate of Ur-
banism and Architecture gave freely of their time and expertise as 
.-
did Dr. Jose Luis Ayala Garcia, Vice-Minister of the Interior. At the 
local level, Don Daniel Escobar, Municipal Secretary of San Salvador, 
patiently explained the administrative organization and procedures. 
A special debt is owed Dr. Fidel Chavez Mena. He explained how 
vi 
his seminal work "Organizaci'On Municipal" was developed, answered my 
myriad questions on policymaking in San Salvador and the political re-
lations between city and nation, and used his position as City Coun-
cillor to open some valuable doors for me. 
And speaking of myriad questions, no one endured more of them 
nor responded with better grace than Marie Brown in the Office of 
Graduate Studies and Research who is responsible for any consistency 
of form this paper may possess. 
Finally, there are many unnamed people whose help I acknowledge 
here. Some of these are unnamed through my negligence but the major-
ity, for a variety of very good reasons, requested anonymity. I ac-
cede to this request with appreciation for their assistance. 
With so many people having aided me in the preparation of this 
dissertation, there is abundant opportunity to spread the responsibil-
ity for any shortcomings. Tradition, however, requires the writer to 
assume such responsibility. I do so willingly: 
And if my poor talents, my little experience of the present 
and insufficient study of the past, should make the result of 
my labors defective and of little utility, I shall at least 
have shown the way to others, who will carry out my views 
with greater ability, eloquence and judgment, so that if I do 
not merit praise, I ought at least not to incur censure. 
(Machiavelli, Introduction to the Discourses.) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
CHAPTER 
I INTRODUCTION 
II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
III POLICY ANALYSIS . . . . . 
Nature of the Policy Process . 
A Model of the Policy Process 
Use of the Policy Approach . . 
The Policy Analysis Tradition 
The Comparative Approach . 
IV POLICY AREAS 
Municipal Revenue Raising 
Public Housing 
V BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Political Factors 
Structure of City Government 
Relations between Municipal and National 
Governments 
Role of Parties and Elections 
Importance of Non-governmental Groups 
Policy Preferences of Leaders of City 
Government 
PAGE 
iii 
x 
xiii 
1 
16 
47 
47 
57 
59 
61 
71 
77 
78 
92 
107 
107 
CHAPTER 
Economic Factors . . . 
Economic Structure 
Public-Private Mix 
Distributional Aspects 
National Government Revenue Patterns 
National Government Expenditure Patterns 
Social Factors 
Population and Trends 
Age and Sex Strudure~· _v..- ~ 
Internal Migration 
Educational Achievement 
Group Structure 
viii 
PAGE 
156 
183 
The General Plan . 200 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
THE POLICY PROCESS 
Housing Policy . 
General Municipal Revenue Policy . 
RESULTS 
San Salvador--Tax Reform and How It Failed 
The Parking Meter Comes to San Jose 
Public Housing 
INVU 
IVU 
FUNDASAL 
Sunnnary 
Municipal Revenue 
San Salvador 
San Jose 
Summary 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
207 
208 
214 
254 
254 
285 
305 
330 
349 
349 
ix 
PAGE 
Appendix B 352 
Appendix C . . . . 356 
Appendix D 359 
Appendix E 364 
Appendix F 367 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 
I Seats Held in San Jose and Costa Rica, By Party 
II Costa Rica and El Salvador: Structure of Gross 
Domestic Product at Current Prices 
III Costa Rica and El Salvador: Percentage Composition 
of Gross Domestic Product By Individual Sector 
IV Costa Rica and El Salvador: Structure of Gross 
Domestic Product at Fixed (1962) Prices 
V Costa Rica and El Salvador: Percentage Change ~.n 
Gross Domestic Product, 1967-1972 
VI Average Labor Force By Industrial Sector, and 
Unemployment (1972) 
VII Percentage Composition of Gross Domestic Product By 
Sector (Public-Private Mix) 
VIII Per Capita Gross Domestic Product and Changes, 1967-
1972 ...... . 
IX Per Capita Income, 1960 and 1970 
X Income Distribution, By Income Class, 1970 
XI Costa Rica--National Government Income, 1967 and 
1972 . . . . . . 
XII E1 Sa1vador--Nationa1 Government Income, 1967 and 
1972 ..... . 
PAGE 
140 
156 
158 
159 
160 
161 
163 
164 
164 
165 
168 
169 
TABLE 
XIII Costa Rica--National Government Expenditures, 1967 
and 1972 . . . . 
XIV E1 Sa1vador--Nationa1 Government Expenditures, 1967 
and 1972 . . 
XV Costa Rica and E1 Salvador: Population and 
Decennial Changes . . . . . . 
XVI Age and Sex Distribution of Population 
XVII Indices of Femininity, By Age . 
XVIII Net Inmigration to San Jos~ and San Salvador 
XIX Costa Rica and E1 Salvador: Educational 
XX 
XXI 
XXII 
XXIII 
Achievements 
Excerpt from San Salvador Tariff Structure 
Proceeds of Parking Meter Operations, 1971-1973 . 
Estimated Parking Meter Revenue, 1974 .... 
Housing Assistance Provided By INVU, 1967 to 1972 
XXIV Typical Payment Schedule, INVU Savings and Loan 
xi 
PAGE 
180 
181 
184 
186 
187 
190 
194 
222 
247 
247 
256 
Program ..... ........ 260 
XXV Housing Assistance Provided By lVU, 1967 to 1972 267 
XXVI Maximum Allowable Cost for IVU Housing 268 
XXVII Comparison of Housing Needs and Public Supply, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, 1965 and 1970 283 
XXVIII Municipality of San Salvador, Cash on Hand and 
Projected Revenue, 1973 287 
XXIX Proposed San Salvador Municipal Expenditures, 1973 288 
XXX Municipality of San Jose, Projected Revenue, 1974 .. 291 
TABLE 
XXXI Proposed San Jose Municipal Expenditures, 1974 
xii 
PAGE 
292 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Map of El Salvador 3 
2. Map of Costa Rica 5 
3. Model of the Policymaking Process 58 
4. Dawson-Robinson Policy Process Model 62 
5. Dye Policy Process Model 63 
6. Salisbury Policy Process Model 65 
7. Rakoff-Schaefer Policy Process Model. 67 
8. Evolutionary Model of the Municipal Tax System 90 
9. Analysis of Alternative Tax Practices 91 
10. San Salvador--Administrative Structure . 125 
11. San Jose--Administrative Structure. . 127 
12. Agencies Providing Municipal Services in San Jose and 
San Salvador . . . . . . . . . . 135 
13. Selected Financial Data for INVU, 31 December 1972 262 
14. Selected Financial Data for IVU, 30 June 1973 269 
15. Characteristics of Public Housing Agencies 281 
16. Sample Lorenz Curves . . . . . . . . . . . 352 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article Charles O. Jones pointed out that a review 
of the literature on state and local policy analysis indicates "that 
lots of things are related to lots of things, other things being 
I 
equal." The 'things' referred to are generally, on the one hand, 
economic, political, and sociarJoackground factors, and on the other, 
some policy outputs. It is the intent of this study to examine and 
compare the policy consequences of these factors in two Central Ameri-
can urban centers, San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, EI Salvador. 
The appropriate scholarly literature on these locations is reviewed in 
Chapter II. 
The policymaking process, with its attendant structure, both 
serves as nexus in the transformation of these background factors into 
policy outputs and is itself a variable. Models for the analysis of 
this process abound. Our model of choice is presented in Chapter III, 
along with its genesis in our particular needs and the policy analysis 
tradition. Here, too, will be found the rationale for our taking a 
comparative approach to the analysis of urban public policy. 
To try and examine the entire range of policy possibilities for 
these two municipalities would be to enmesh ourselves inextricably in 
a thicket of minutiae; the forest of significant relationships would 
be hidden by the trees of trivia. Consequently, we limit our study to 
2 
two substantive areas, revenue raising and the provision of public 
housing. Reasons for our choice of these fields and some of the gen-
eral principles thereof will be presented in Chapter IV. 
Various political, economic, and social factors for the two pol-
ities will be compared in Chapter V. Chapter VI will consider the pol-
~ icy process itself, both generally in San Jose and San Salvador and 
with particular examples from the revenue and housing fi~id5. In Chap-
ter VII the results of this process will be examined, and Chapter VIII 
wi 11 pres ent what we have concluded from all this. Th~;' remainder of 
this first chapter is devoted to a brief introduction to San Jos~ and 
San Salvador and their national milieux, and to a formal statement of 
our basic hypotheses. 
El Salvador is the smallest country on the American mainland. 
Occupying 8,259 square miles, it is about the size of Massachusetts. 
(Were the country square, it would be 91 miles on a side.) It lies be-
tween 13°08' and 14°24' North latitude and 87°39' and 90°08' West lon-
gitude. Bounded on the west by Guatemala, the south by the Pacific 
Ocean, the north and northeast by Honduras and the southeast by the 
Gulf of Fonseca, it is the only country north of Ecuador lacking an 
Atlantic (or Caribbean) coast. (See map, Figure 1, p. 3.) 
El Salvador is not only the smallest country in Central kmerica, 
it is also the most densely populated, with a population of 3,549,260 
2 
counted in the 1971 census, estimated at 4,180,000 in 1976 and pro-
3 
jected at 5,000,000 by 1981. In 1971, some 560,500 of these people 
4 
lived in San Salvador. Not only is the country densely populated, 
its rate of natural increase, 3.9 per cent annually, is the highest 
~~ 
~~ 
A..«; 
~~ 
" 
Departmental Boundaries 
National Boundaries 
EL 
/l J!j CIJ:IC 
S.AL VA DOR 
Sea Ie 1: 1,390,000 
oC~J!j", ~ 
"'0"'0 
lJliJ!j8 
Figure 1. Map of El Salvador. 
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in the world. 
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Gonzalo de Alvarado founde~ the city of San Salvador in the Zol-
coatitan Valley in 1525. Cuzcateclos Indians, annoyed by this Spanish 
effrontery, burned it in 1526. Rebuilt, the city served as capital of 
colony, federation and republic. It was destroyed a.gain, totally, by 
an earthquake in 1854. Consequently, few traces of the colonial era 
remain. During the late 19th and the 20th centuries San Salvador has 
been reconstructed. 
It is simplistic but not inaccurate to const!uct a stereotypical 
model of El Salvador as it exists today. It will contain a population 
about one-third literate and overwhelmingly mestizo but with a wealthy 
cap of whites. It will include a system of concentrated land owner-
ship with agricultural emphases on two major export crops, cotton and 
coffee. Moreover it will incorporate a recent political history of 
minimum government involvement in the society, a chronicle of govern-
ment as provider of control and regulation, not of services. 
The policymaking environment will be dominated by a patronage-
ridden bureaucracy, national single-party rule, and the dominance of 
the militaTY in this single party. Political power will be central-
ized, the national government barely acknowledging the existence of 
local government. In fact, we find the government of the capital city 
in complete, bitter, partisan, ideological and pragmatic conflict with 
the national government. This animus has existed openly for at least 
ten years; it shows no signs of abating. 
Costa Rica at 19,575 square miles is the second smallest nation 
in Central America, about the same size as West Virginia. (If square, 
5 
it would be about 140 miles on a side.) Lying between 08°02' and 11°13' 
North latitude and 82°34' and 85°58' West longitude, it is bounded on 
the north by Nicaragua, the northeast by the Caribbean Sea, the east by 
Panama and the west and southwest by the Pacific Ocean. (See map, Fig-
ure 2, p. 6.) 
Not only is Costa Rica larger than El Salvador, it is less densely 
populated. The 1973 census found 1,840,730 inhabitants of whom some 
419,000 lived in urban San Jose. National population is projected to 
reach 3.,682,000 in the year 2000. In the early 1960s Costa Rica had 
an annual rate of population increase of 3.8 per cent; in recent years 
6 
the figure has dropped below 2.0 per cent. 
Costa Rica, despite its name meaning rich coast, was a great dis-
appointment to the Spanish conquistadores. No mineral wealth was to 
be found and the Indians proved truculent and unsuited to indentured 
service in hacienda operations. San Jose is a relatively young city; 
it was not founded until 1737. Consequently it is the least Spanish 
in appearance of any Central American capital. Unlike San Salvador, 
San Jose was not a colonial capital. Cartago was the original capital 
of both colony and nation, losing its status to San Jose in 1823 fol-
lowing a factional dispute. 
As we did for El Salvador, we can construct a simple but repre-
sentative model of Costa Rica today. In it we will include a history 
of gradual expansion of public services such as education, insurance, 
social security and government guaranteed mortgages. To this we will 
add a highly literate (c. 80%) and, alone in Central America, a pre-
dominantly white population. (Little race mixing has occurred in Costa 
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r-.GUP-~\cr-.~ 
.... ~ ~ ~d:' 
PACIFIC OCEAN 
Provincial Boundaries 
National Boundaries 
RICA 
Scale 1:2,340,000 
C-41i188~ 
-411 S~-4 
Figure 2. Map of Costa Rica. 
-0 
1""1-
~ 
'V 
0\ 
7 
Rica. Until recently the black population was restricted to the Car-
ibbean littoral; the Indians are for the most part on isolated reser-
vations, effectively outside the national life.) The ownership of 
land we expect to be fairly evenly distributed by Latin American stand-
ards, with the economy based on foreign sales of coffee and bananas. 
Developing the model further, we will combine a strong tradition 
of administrative decentralization, a stable pattern of electoral com-
petition, a disbanded military and the presence of many active and po-
tent professional and economic associations. To complete the model, 
we incorporate a central government that, at least rhetorically, em-
braces local government as a partner in national development. The re-
suIt, then, is a model of polity and a policymaking process that is 
7 
"very open, stable, competitive and often indecisive." 
We have, therefore, two stereotypical models representing the 
traditional extremes in Latin American policymaking systems. The com-
parative importance lies in determining whether and to what extent 
quality and quantity of policy responses are determined, or at least 
influenced, by these apparently antipodal sociopolitical cultures. 
The two cities chosen, San Jose and San Salvador, were selected 
because they are in the same size range and because both are not only 
capitals but also primate cities. As a result they face many similar 
problems and prospects. At the same time, the two cities differ sig-
nificantly with respect to political milieux and population growth. 
An additional factor in their choice is proximity which enabled both 
localities to be visited more than once in the course of a single 
field investigation. 
8 
It was anticipated that the results of this comparative study 
would enable us to indicate the differing effects of political, social 
and economic factors on policymaking in the two cities. Our assumption 
was that the characteristics of each city would affect the range of 
policy alternatives considered, the nature of the policy process, and 
finally the policies selected. 
The following two areas were chosen as the foci of the research; 
revenue, i.e., policies designed to raise revenue, from whatever source, 
to support other public policies, and the public provision of housing. 
These problem areas were chosen because historically they have been 
prominent political issues in Latin American urban centers. With rapid 
urban growth, increased demands have been placed on all levels of gov-
ernment to supply urban services of all kinds, including housing. 
These demands have resulted in::he necessity of increasing revenue in 
order to finance this expansion. Within each of these issue areas, 
municipal governments have a constrained set of alternatives open to 
them. 
One question that has been raised and deserves an answer is, "Why, 
in nations as small as Costa Rica and EI Salvador, do you not ignore 
the cities and concentrate on the countries?" Although the Central 
American municipality is weak, constitutionally and politically, when 
compared to its counterpart in Anglo America or Western Europe, it is 
far from unimportant. Ma.ny of the services of immediate concern to 
the inhabitants aTe provided by or under the control of the municipal-
ity, alone or in concert with other agencies. 
Much of the scant attention paid Central America by North Amer-
9 
icans, including scholars, has been directed to the series of unstable 
national governments that have characterized some Central American na-
tions. It is usual to attribute at least part of this instability to 
the 'revolution of rising expect~tions. 1 Within these nations: these 
rising expectations have generally involved not national policies of 
global concern but matters of local service delivery, i.e., rising bus 
fares, deteriorating streets, inadequate fire protection. 
Urban politics thus lie at the heart of national politics. Latin 
American political systems, to whatever extent control and administra-
tion are centralized, are composed of local and regional systems. At 
the head of this is the political network of the capital city, a po-
litical entity in its own right. A capital city, particularly when it 
is, as San Salvador and San Jose are, also a primate city, is expected 
to be growing faster than the country as a whole and to possess a dis-
proportionate share of the nation's wealth, education, technical skill 
and culture. Much of the nation's public revenue is also generated 
here although, as will be demonstrated later, not as high a percentage 
as would be the case if taxation systems were reformed and modernized. 
The city will also contain most of the country's drunks, prostitutes, 
and political and administrative talent. While the majority of the 
political elite of the metropolis will be dealing with issues of na-
tional concern and actually working in national government institutions, 
it will be doing so within the political milieux of the capital city. 
In short, a great deal of what is characterized as national politics is 
based in and concerned with interests and problems of the capital city. 
Some of the research considerations that led to the choice of 
10 
Central American cities, and these two cities in particular, have been 
indicated above. Three others might be mentioned here. One is that 
neither San Jos~ nor San Salvador is a federal district as are, for 
example, Managua and Tegucigalpa. Thus both are involved in local pol-
itics and are not simply wards of the central government. Another is 
the fact that in Costa Rica the same broad range of political parties 
is found in both the council of the capital city and the national leg-
islature whereas in El Salvador the party in opposition nationally con-
troIs the government of the capital city. Moreover, there is the 
writer's personal idiosyncratic choice, based in part on earlier re-
search in Central America. 
8 
As a final research consideration, Gary Wynia has suggested that 
there exists a 'competitive' political culture in Costa Rica and a 
'bargaining' culture in El Salvador. If these are reflected in munici-
pal government, and we have shown below the extent to which they are, 
9 
we might expect to find, in the terminology of Robert Agger and asso-
ciates a 'consensual elite' situation in San Salvador and a 'competi-
/ 
tive mass' in San Jose. Again, we see below whether this hypothesis 
(guess) holds. 
There exists a general assumption, almost a consensus, in the 
policy analysis literature that a wide range of economic, social and 
political considerations constitute independent variables with policy 
decisions as dependent variables. The policymaking process itself is 
assigned roles of varying importance according to the view of the in-
dividual analyst. 
In this study we examine a number of these background factors, 
11 
both for San Jose and San Salvador and for their respective national 
settings. Under the general label of political we include such factors 
as the constitutional provisions relating to the municipalities, their 
legislative and administrative structures, the relationships between 
municipalities and national governments, the role of parties and elec-
tions in determining control of positions in the city government, the 
policy preferences of local government leaders and the importance of 
non-governmental groups in the policy process. Economic factors in-
economic structure of both cities and countries, labor force composi-
tion and employment rates, the public-private mix, income and its dis-
tribution, growtn rates and the patterns of revenues and expenditures 
for national governments. Among social factors to be studied are pop-
ulation, its age and sex structure and rate of increase, internal mi-
gration, educational levels and group structure. The appropriate data 
on these background factors are assembled and analyzed below in Chap-
ters V and VII. 
This inventory of background factors constitutes the traditonal 
list that analysts of state and local public policymaking in the Anglo-
American setting have suggested are important. For this study we have 
added one more, the existence of a comprehensive plan for metropolitan 
development in San Salvador and the absence of any such plan for San 
Jos~. 
With all of this in mind, it becomes possible to briefly define 
the current study in terms of two sets of formal hypotheses: 
1 Ho: There exist no significant differences in policy-
making and policy outcomes between San Salvador 
and San Jose. 
Ha: There do exist significant differences. 
2 Ho: Differences in (1) are not related to the ·social, 
political and economic differences between San 
Jose and San Salvador. 
Ha: Differences in (1) are related to such social, 
political and economic differences. 
12 
The main thrust of this study, then, is testing these hypotheses in the 
policy areas of urban revenue raising and the public provision of hous-
ing. 
However, the results of the study were not as anticipated. The 
alternative hypothesis in (1) was expected to hold. It did not hold. 
But even with the null hypothesis in (1) supported, our analysis in (2) 
need not be unnecessary or redundant. We found there to be no signifi-
cant policy differences between San Jose and San Salvador, and must 
ask, Why is this so? Are the background factors too similar, was our 
selection of them incorrect, did we in fact hold the ceteris too pari-
bus? Or are there factors tending to cancel one another? Is the basic 
assumption about the relationship between background factors and policy 
incorrectly stated or simply inapplicable in the Central American sit-
uation? Or need we consider other matters heretofore ignored? Regard-
less of the failure of our alternate hypothesis in (1) to hold, our 
analysis is carried through to determine what, in fact, are the rela-
tionships among the social, economic and political milieux, the nature 
and scope of the policy process, and the policy outcomes in the poli-
ties of San Jose, Costa Rica and San Salvador, El Salvador in the 
fields of public housing provision and urban public finance. 
The explanations for our findings are qualitative. They are 
based upon the historical, procedural and political analysis of the 
13 
policyrnaking process as we see it carried out. We seek the causes of 
a particular occurrence at a particular point in the process. An anal-
ysis of the interaction among the various policyrnakers, their policy 
preferences and resources, their. roles and constituencies, will, we 
hold, provide up with an explanation, insofar as an explanation is 
possible. 
The nature of the analysis carried out is influenced to some ex-
tent by the form of the data gathered. It is at times tempting to let 
the nature of the analysis be determined by the data, to simply gather 
whatever is available and later see what has been amassed and decide 
what to do with it. Tempting, yes, but such abstract empiricism is 
really not very satisfactory. 
Amassing great reams of often unrelated but seemingly important 
data can easily become an end in itself, burying the true intent of the 
study. Or, in systems theory terms: 
The information system, displaying the ingestive properties 
of a snake, swallows up the whole enterprise . . . The larger 
objectives of the system are obscured if not obliterated; the 
re~ources devoured; the total effort begins and ends with the 
dr-~a-gathering.lO 
The relationship between data and analysis is a two-way street. One 
lane has been mentioned above but in the other lane a conception as to 
how the data is to be used governs the amount and type to be gathered. 
Finally, there are two operational considerations involved in 
this study. One is determining the extent to which policy analysis ru1d 
the comparative approach are truly compatible and appropriate for an 
essay of this kind. We feel they are and explain why at some length in 
Chapter III. Nonetheless we realized there existed a possibility, how-
14 
iever slight, that this might not be the case. And to that ext~nt, 
this study involves a refining of technique. It is also an attempt to 
devise, through constant backing and filling, a nonculture-bound frame-
work for policy analysis, applicable in the developing as well as in 
the developed countries. Our particular choice of a model of the pol-
icy process was a first step in this direction; our concluding section 
suggests some modifications thereto. In any event, however, these con-
siderations are decidedly secondary. The prime purpose of the study is 
to examine and compare the effects of the political, social and eco-
nomic background factors on the policyrnaking process and its products 
in San Salvador and San Jose. 
15 
CHAPTER I NOTES 
1. Charles o. Jones, "State and Local Public Policy Analysis: A Re-
view of Progress," in PoE tical Science and State and Local Gov-
ernment (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 
1973), p. 34. 
2. El Salvador, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Censos 
Nacionales de 1971: Poblacion, San Salvador, p. 71. 
3. El Salvador, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Proyec-
ciones de Pob1acion, 1969-1981, San Salvador, p. 23. 
4. Population statistics, like many others, are not kept separately 
for the Municipali ty of San Salvador. These figures are for the 
urban area of San Salvador Department. 
5. San Jose (Costa Rica) La Nacion, 25 February 1974, p. 22A . 
.... 
6. Costa Rica, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, 1973 census, 
unpublish&d figures. 
'~~~"""'"'.," .... 7. Gary W. Wynia, "Policy and Bureaucracy in Central America: A Com-
parative Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1970), p. 88. 
8. Wynia, "Political Participation and Development Policy-Making: 
Latitudes and Disciplines in Five Central American Systems," (mim-
eographed). 
9. Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers 
and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communi-
ties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 73-78 passim. 
10. Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 12. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
North American and European scholars with interests in Latin 
America have traditionally confined their work to Mexico and South 
America. Central America, if considered at all, has been regarded 
simply as a narrow strip of land joining these and characterized by 
bananas, a dormant population and petty dictators. In fact it is 
about the size of California and contains over 12 million inhabitants. 
Moreover, there are six separate republics, each with its own history 
and sociopolitical structure, each worthy of investigation. Despite 
this overall pattern of neglect by scholars, there have been some ex-
ceptionsj some literature on ti1e area does exist. In this chapter we 
selectively sample the extant literature, both in English and in Span-
ish. 
It is perhaps symptomatic of this traditional neglect that there 
exists no up-to-date general scholarly work on Costa Rica. The classic 
I 
in this field, the Biesanz' Costa Rican Life, was written in 1944. As 
it thus antedates postwar economic developments and more importantly 
the 1948 Revolution--the event from which all modern Costa Rican pol-
2 
itical history is reckoned--this book's current utility is somewhat 
limited. Nonetheless, it is of sufficient importance that the Costa 
Rican Ministry of Culture translated the book into Spanish in 1975. 
(An earlier attempt at translation by Daniel Oduber, former President 
17 
of Costa Rica, and Rodrigo Facio, Rector of the University of Costa 
Rica, was aborted shortly after its initial publication due to wartime 
paper shortages.) The Biesanz' concern with Costa Rica was more than 
academic; some years ago they moved to that country. It is possible 
that Costa Rican Life will be replaced as the classic work by Tne 
Costa Ricans, the result of a six-year study by Richard and Karen Bie-
sanz that is scheduled for publication late in 1978. 
There exists no agreed-upon classic covering El Salvador the way 
Costa Rican Life has covered Costa Rica for the last thirty years. 
However, Alastair White's recent work El Salvador may well attain this 
s ta tus . The author is a British sociologis t but his writing is not 
characterized by the extreme narrowness of viewpoint and overreliance 
3 
on jargon that pervades the bulk of American sociological scholarship. 
No particular bias is noticeable in his comprehensive treatment of Sal-
vadorean history. He offers an interesting classification scheme for 
Salvadorean presidents of the last hundred years, characterizing them 
as pragmatic reformist, idealist liberal, pragmatic liberal, or con-
servative, and suggests that the prime difference between the two types 
of liberal is the economic emphasis of the pragmatist and the political 
concerns of the idealist. It might be enlightening to apply this 
scheme to other Central American presidencies within the same time 
frame. 
White's description of how the official party wins elections, 
presidential and legislative, is a valuable piece of political analysis 
at least as sophisticated as any published by political scientists. On 
the economic side, he suggests that current economic policies and prac-
18 
tices, including industrialization, are lopsided and benefit only a 
minority. He points out a number of ways in which the money received 
by the lower economic sector of the population escapes from that sec-
tor, and how the rate of escape increases with increasing industrial-
ization. In short, this is the most current, comprehensive and objec-
tive treatment of El Salvador available in English, albeit a certain 
4 
Fabian cast is detectable in some of White's observations. 
A recent short and very readable book on Costa Rican society and 
5 
politics is Charles Denton's Patterns of Costa Rican Politics. It has 
the merit of lacking the minutiae and turgidity of most books based on 
6 
Ph.D. dissertations. The book suffers, however, from being purely 
descriptive and in no sense analytic. The author concludes that: 
The "democracy" that the PLN [Partido Liberacion Nacional] 
has done so much to create has gradually given way to deadlock 
between administrative and political organizations, between 
agencies within the administration, between parties in the 
legislature, between the prestige and the working class, and 
between the president and his government. Costa Rica's much 
admired democracy has contributed major stumbling blocks on 
the country's road to economic and social development. 
He suggests that Costa Rica "could do much better if the political 
system was capable of exerting more control over its internal struc-
ture, its environment, and its resources and could tackle some of the 
7 
nation's more basic developmental problems." Despite its shortcomings, 
especially some unsupported quantum leaps from data to often subjective 
judgments and conclusions, Denton's work does provide the best current 
brief picture of the Costa Rican political scene. 
Another useful recent work on Costa Rican politics, although more 
limited in scope, -is historian John Bell's Crisis in Costa Rica, The 
8 
Revolution of 1948. Perhaps Bell's greatest contribution lies in 
19 
'" pointing out that Jose Figueres was actively engaged in organizing a 
revolutionary cadre prior to 1948. This is a particularly enlightening 
contrast to the generally held view that the 1948 Revolution was a 
spontaneous reaction to the refusal of President Teodoro Picado and the 
9 
calderonista -dominated National Assembly to permit President-elect 
Otilio Ulate Blanco to take office. In further contrast to the general 
view of the 1948 Revolution as a purely Costa Rican internal matter3 
Bell places the event in the context of the Cold War and especially the 
United States-inspired wave of hemispheric anti-communism. Bell is ob-
viously a supporter of Figueres and his National Liberation Movement 
and sometimes allows this enthusiasm to overcome dispassionate analysis 
of the Revolution and its immediate aftermath. 
Unfortunately, no parallel works on the political development of 
El Salvador are to be found. From a public finance viewpoint, however3 
it is worthwhile to mention Henry Wallich's Public Finance in a Devel-
10 
oping Country: El Salvador~ A Case Study. In this work Wallich de-
tails the increasing rationalization of the Salvadorean tax system~ the 
movement from dependence on excise taxes to greater use of income 
taxes. For the purposes of this essaY3 however~ Wallich's work suffers 
from two major shortcomings, The first of these is age; the work was 
done 25 years ago. The second is the virtual ignoring of pub-
lic finance in the municipal realm. "In view of the very limited im-
portance of municipal finances 3 a few observations will suffice. 
No comprehensive statistical information is available for the financial 
activities of the muniCipalities . . . It is believed, however3 that 
11 
this omissjon is not of great significance." It is instructive to 
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note the extent to which the national taxation system had been modified 
by the time the current study was carried out. 
A particularly useful book in that it is one of the very few to 
make cross-national comparisons within Central America is Wynia's Pol-
----rr 
itics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Central America. 
His purpose was the discovery of patterns of innovation and their con-
sequences for the policymaking process. He points out the general 
failure of planners in the five republics to achieve their public in-
vestment objectives and links this failure to the nature of their re-
lationship to politicians and administrators, espcially the presidents. 
In addition, he has compiled seven characteristics which he sug-
gests "appear to form what might be termed the policy-making structure 
of the Latin American countries." These are: 
1. Personalistic, and often charismatic, leadership juxta-
posed with a lack of institutional, especially constitutional, 
legitimacy; 
2. Expanding political participation, yet political underrepre-
sentation of the urban and rural masses; 
3. Administrative structures dominated by extensive patronage, 
intricate formal rules, and widespread informal disregard for 
formal rules; 
4. Obscured and obstructed communications within the public 
sector and between the public and private sectors produced by 
weak information as well as by distrust and personal rivalries. 
5. A heavy reliance on the private sector for managing but not 
not financing economic growth; 
6. Slow economic growth and modernization because of numerous 
structural and institutional rigidities; 
7. Economic dependence on foreign markets and, as a conse-
quence, vulnerability to external economic and financial con-
ditions. 
He suggests further that these combine to give as paradigms 
personalistic leaders who direct patronage-ridden bureaucra-
cies, enjoy weak communications with other power contenders, 
and receive inadequate information from government agencies 
and the private sector, yet must struggle to raise large rev-
e~ues to su~porf3programs to expand their vulnerable and slug-
gIsh economIes. 
Policyrnakers are likely to be found at the extremes of the pol-
icymaking continuum. At one end are the overly cautious and underin-
formed proceeding in a hesitant manner to expand only marginally and 
incrementally their policy initiatives, guided by the maxim 'small 
risk, small loss.' At the other end are found the policyrnakers whose 
21 
understanding of complex policy problems falls far short of their will 
to solve them, and who consequently grasp at thoroughly utopian and un-
realistic policy schemes. 
In the course of this essay we will determine whether or not the 
seven traits listed as national policyrnaking characteristics are mir-
rored in urban policymaking, and further, to see which of the ends of 
the policymaking continuum, if either, is occupied by the urban policy-
makers. 
Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies is of 
14 
more than average importance for two reasons. First, it provides cri-
teria which at least some segments of some 'developing' political in-
stitutions use to rate themselves, and second, it provides a broad 
cross-national view of various political phenomena such as praetorian-
ism. An example of the former may be found in Costa Rica where the In-
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stituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municipal (IFAM) specifically measured 
its own level of institutionalization in terms of Huntington's quar-
16 
tet--adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. 
Praetorianism, the deliberate and open intervention of the mili-
22 
tary in the political process, is often regarded, especially by observ-
ers in whose homeland this pheno'menon is rare, as being purely a mani-
festation of malevolence or perversity on the part of the military. 
Huntington suggests this is not necessarily so: 
Countries which have political armies also have political 
clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, pol-
itical labor unions and political corporations. Society as a 
whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. 17 
Praetorianism has been a continuing and dominant part of politics 
in E1 Salvador. Much of this military participation, it is suggested, 
has had a salutory effect, such as the radical programs of social re-
form pushed by officers in the period following World War II. Although 
military intervention is the defining characteristic of praetorianism, 
it is not the only one. As Huntington points out: "A high correlation 
exists between student participation in politics and military interven-
tion in politics. Both are distinctive characteristics of the radical 
18 
praetorian society." 
He observes further that a major difference, perhaps the major 
difference, between the military and other interest groups is capabil-
ity. Monks, priests, students, workers and campesinos can demonstrate 
and protest but usually cannot govern. The military can do both. The 
understanding of praetorianism in general, and Salvadorean praetorian-
ism in particular, provided by Huntington is of considerable utility to 
this essay. 
The most promising title discovered in the preliminary search of 
the literature, Municipal Government in Costa Rica: Its Characteris-
tics and Functions, turned out to be one of the more disappointing ref-
19 
erences. Data on characteristics of local government personnel, 
23 
types of demands made on local government and decisionmaking of coun-
cils in terms of these demands were gathered, mainly by Costa Rican and 
United States university students. Unfortunately the various sorts of 
data were not well correlated. This probably reflects the emphasis of 
the project which was designed primarily to give the students field ex-
perience in data gathering. 
A greater shortcoming from the viewpoint of this paper is the to-
tal ignoring of San Jose. (Interviews, perusal of council minutes and 
other data collection were carried out in and for 25 of the 76 cantons 
in Costa Rica.) This omission of San Jose, regrettably, characterizes 
20 
much of the work on Costa Rican municipalities. 
A genus of books generally valuable in the initial stages of re-
search for a paper such as this is the anthology of readings on indi-
vidual countries assembled in one volume. These readings may be by 
several authors, each dealing with one country, as in the collections 
21 
edited by Martin Needler, and Ben Burnett and Kenneth Johnson, 
22 
or all 
by one author as in the book by Harry Kantor. The selections may 
deal generally with politics and government in the separate countries, 
as in the works mentioned above, or the organization may be topical. 
The latter approach is adopted by Ronald McDonald who categorizes and 
23 
relates nations according to party systems. 
Of the three general works, the readings in Burnett and Johnson 
provide the most useful background, in part, at least, because they are 
the most recent. Paul Hoopes, writing on El Salvador, emphasizes the 
dynamism and inclination toward Central American regional integration 
that characterize the Salvadoreans, especially the economic and politi-
24 
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cally potent. He maintains that the middle class is genuinely re-
formist, unlike other Latin American middle classes who wish only to 
displace and replace the current elites. He suggests further that this 
reformism manifests itself through the administration of the ruling 
military regime, leading to the erroneous conclusion on the part of 
some analysts that the military is itself reformist. Robert Tomasek, 
writing in this voll.iJue, presents the standard view of Costa Rica as 
the one nation whose longstanding commitment to participatory democracy 
25 
distinguishes her from most of the rest of Latin America. He points 
out, as one facet of this, Costa Rica is virtually unique in that its 
Legislative Assembly has de facto as well as de jure control over the 
majority of the important political decisions. Presidents of Costa 
Rica do not rule by decree. 
The readings on Costa Rica in the other two books, by Kantor and 
James Busey, offer the same information but are given somewhat more to 
26 
praise and less to analysis than Tomasek is. The sections on El 
Salvador, by Kantor and Charles Anderson, point out the industriousness 
of the Salvadorean people and, unlike Hoopes, suggest that the military 
27 
itself is behind programs of social and economic reform. An indica-
tion of parallel approaches of these latter two sets of articles de-
serves mention, Busey subtitles his article on Costa Rica "A Meaning-
ful Democracy"; Kantor calls his chapter "A Progressing Democracy." 
Anderson's subheading for his article on El Salvador is "The Army as 
Reformer," while Kantor labels his "The Military as Reformists." Kan-
tor does include a 'Note on the Study of Comparative Government'; un-
fortunately his chapters are disjunct units with no attempt made at in-
25 
tegration or cross-national comparisons. He observes that his work is 
a snapshot at one point in time and concedes that it is impossible for 
himself or anyone else to "write a book describing Latin American gov-
ernrnent and politics and expect the description to be accurate for very 
28 
long." 
McDonald does not see either Costa Rica or El Salvador as loose 
multi-party systems of the anyone-has-a-chance-to-win variety. Costa 
Rica he characterizes as a multi-party dominant system. He points out 
that the Costa Rican Partido de Liberacion Naciona1 (PLN) has main-
tained its majority in the National Assembly since 1953 as opposition 
to it has united and fragmented and reunited in different patterns. 
The PLN has not, however, been able to succeed itself in the presidency 
29 
and hence is not characterized as single-party dominant. 
Although a variety of parties contest elections in E1 Salvador, 
the Partido de Conci1iacion Nacional (PCN) and its predecessor, the 
Partido Revolucionario de Unificaci6n Democratica (PRUD) have main-
tained control of the Assembly and the Presidency since 1950. Some op-
position parties have won seats in the Assembly since 1964 but they 
have not seriously challenged the hegemony of the official party. Mc-
Donald therefore classifies El Salvador as a single-party dominant sys-
tern. The party structures and electoral patterns of both nations will 
be more closely examined in a subsequent chapter. 
Costa Rica's PLN has itself been the topic of a number of works. 
Mbst often it is considered, as by Edward Williams for example, in the 
30 
larger context of Latin American Christian Democratic parties. The 
forerunner and model for these parties is of course the A1ianza Popular 
26 
Revolucionaria Americana CAPRA), founded by Victor Raul Haya de la 
Torre in Mexico in 1924 but which was imported into Peru in "1930 and 
has since been identified with the latter country. Costa Rica has not, 
however, been plagued with many of the problems usually attacked by re-
forrnist parties of this type. Williams suggests that this has been a 
drawback for the PLN, and there has been a tendency towards increased 
conservatism on the part of its leadership. 
Suzanne Bodenheimer puts the case even more strongly. She sug-
gests that the PLN's ideology is fixated in the 1940s and must surely 
prove inadequate in the 1960s and 1970s. She maintains that the PLN 
currently appeals to the "security and complacency of the middle 
32 
class" rather than being directed, as it was initially, towards the 
emerging middle and rising lower classes. It is her conclusion that 
poor performances of recent PLN governments have been rooted in ideo-
33 
logy rather than in administration. 
One of the earliest articles to compare and contrast Costa Rica 
wi th another Central American republic was Busey's "Foundations of Pol-
34 
itical Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua." He supports the classic 
explanation for Costa Rican egalitarianism vis-a-vis Nicaraguan class 
distinction--the absence of mineral wealth in Costa Rica and its pres-
ence in Nicaragua. Further, he suggests that differences in the two 
political systems might be based in physical, ethnic, cultural and so-
cia 1 integration or lack thereof, land tenure patterns, and even 
weather: "It can hardly be doubted that in some vague way the politics 
of Costa Rica may have benefited and that of Nicaragua may have suf-
35 
fered from climatic factors." 
It is often the case that articles of a broad philosophical na-
ture or articles covering a wide range of countries contain bits and 
pieces of insight or information that can be usefully extracted. An 
36 
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example of the former is Ebel's "Governing the City-State." He sus-
tains the argument here that one of the difficulties in the study; by 
Anglo-Americans (and some Europeans), of the governing of small Latin 
American nations, is the attempt by these outsiders to apply the poli-
tical experience of their own nations to the Central American micro-
states. A more fruitful approach might be to consider these nations 
cities with hinterlands, with resources flowing from the periphery to 
the center for redistribution and control flowing from the core out-
wards to the peripheries. Our standard 'republican-pluralist' model is 
therefore an inappropriate framework for analysis. Ebel argues that 
this is particularly true for countries in his Group V, the smallest 
countries and those most dominated by a primate city. In this group, 
along with the island-sharing nations of Haiti and the Dominican Repub-
lic, he includes Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
Ebel also authored the single most useful article found on the 
policymaking process in a Central American city. In addition to anal-
yzing decisions made in San Salvador, he provided one set of answers to 
the questions "Why study the urban centers in Central America?" and 
"Why not just get on with examining the national political systems?" 
For Juan Gomez it is in the community and not in the nation 
where things happen. The plaza, bordered by church, market, 
and town hall, competes only with the cantina, the soccer 
field, and the cemetery as the focus of his life. And while 
the better-educated urbanite enjoys a wider vista, for many 
city people the barrio or the barranco [shantytown] pretty 
largely fills their horizon. Ultimately, whether for a cosmo-
polite or a parochial, the services which lighten the day and 
enliven the night are largely local in character. Sewage and 
water, light and power, transportation, recreation and justice 
emanate from City Hall. 37 
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Torres' "Measurement of Political Power" fits in the second cate-
38 
gory of articles mentioned above. He obtained, by polling political 
scientists specializing in Latin America, estimates of the power, on a 
scale of 0-9, held by each of seven groups in each of the 20 Latin 
American republics. The seven groups were landed oligarchy, industri-
alists, campesinos, urban blue-collar workers, urban white-collar 
39 
workers, the military and the church. He then constructed Lorenz 
curves and calculated the Gini coefficients for each country. (Gini 
coefficients are discussed in Appendix S.) The higher the Gini ratio, 
the more concentrated was the political power in the country. Of the 
20 countries, El Salvador was ranked ninth with a Gini ratio of .846 
while Costa Rica ranked 18th with a value of .673. The extreme cases 
were Haiti with a Gini ratio of .929 and Cuba with a figure of .563. 
One final article to be mentioned here is Needler's "The Latin 
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American Military." He examined various military governments in 
Latin America to determine whether they were, as their detractors would 
have it, feudal and ruthless defenders of an oligarchical status quo 
or, as their advocates suggest, the one uncorrupted, technically com-
petent apolitical force for change and development. The conclusion 
most relevant to this paper is: "The only plausible example of a mod-
ernizing military in the recent history of Latin America that has actu-
41 
ally accomplished anything permanent is that of El Salvador." 
This survey of literature in English is, to repeat, not exhaus-
tive. Rather it indicates only some of the main pieces of scholarly 
29 
writing that have proved useful to date in the construction of this es-
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say. Many works consulted have not been included. A great many re-
ports, technical works and data sources have not been indicated here; 
they are cited in other sections of the paper where their utility is 
more immediate. The same is true of the literature in Spanish. 
One of the advantages in researching a highly literate and well-
educated Latin American country such as Costa Rica is that scholarly 
literature is available to the researcher in Spanish as well as in Eng-
lish. This is particularly useful when, as in the present case, the 
area has not received a great deal of attention from North American or 
British scholars. Unfortunately El Salvador possesses neither the tra-
dition of critical self-examination nor the potential readership of 
Costa Rica, hence there is much less literature in Spanish dealing with 
the Salvadorean situation. 
Two books that when read together provide a fairly complete back-
ground to the current political-legal situation in Costa Rica are Mario 
43 
Alberto Jimenez~ Desarollo Constitucional de Costa Rica 
44 
and Joaquin 
Garro's Veinte Allos de Historica Chica. Jimenez, one of his coun-
try's most noted jurists, traces the constitutional development of 
Costa Rica from independence through 14 fundamental documents to the 
45 
current constitution of 1949. He suggests that the differences be-
tween this document and previous constitutions are more profound than 
generally realized. Among these are a deliberate weakening of the 
power of the president, a redefinition of the role of the legislature 
with some weakening as a result, and a strengthening of the powers of 
the judiciary. In short, it takes a much more sanguine view of the na-
ture of man and his capacity to prosper and 1i ve in peace without ex-
cessive government. 
Garro examines essentially the 18 years between the revol-
ution of 1948 and the elections of 1966. Chronologically, then, he 
picks up roughly where Jimenez left off. Garro is a former deputy to 
the Natio:'19.1 Assembly and considers this time span from a political 
viewpoint, regarding campaigns, elections and interparty deals as the 
major happenings of the period. His loyalty to the PLN is unques-
tioned; however he does raise, at least obliquely, some of the doubts 
Williams mentioned. Garro concludes: 
We believe that the [electoral] fortune of the Party of Na-
tional Liberation depends in large part on the message it can 
give to or the impact that it can have on its old clientele: 
campesinos, inhabitants of rural areas and the lower-middle 
class, integrated with the professionals, small merchants, 
skilled or semi-skilled workers and white-collar workers. 
Neverthele,ss, if for these [groups] Calder6n Guardia should 
disappear, the political situation will be for National Liber-
ation more fluid and plastic: the Calderonistas will feel 
free to choose their party and many of these gould be inclined 
toward that party [PLN] as occurred in 1966. 4 
He turns out to be a reasonably accurate predictor of the 1970 elec-
tion. 
30 
A realistic look at important influences on policy formulation is 
47 
Oscar Arias Sanchez' Grupos de Presion en Costa Rica. In this work 
Arias uses a standard framework for defining and delimiting pressure 
groups. He lists the most active ones in Costa Rica and identifies 
their sources of strength. The actual role of some of these groups in 
influencing specific policies is traced. Arias regards pressure groups 
as intrinsically undesirable and worries that individual and isolated 
legislators may not be able to stand effectively against them. The 
31 
cure for this malady, he concludes, is an ongoing system of strong, 
disciplined, permanent, ideologically-based political parties in whose 
bosoms the legislators can find strength, reinforcement and guidance. 
Conventional wisdom about Costa Rica has it that because the 
land had no mineral riches or tractable Indian population no class of 
landed gentry developed. As a result the nation has a more equitable 
land tenure system, hence a fairer distribution of weaith, hence a very 
open political system with broad participation and wider distribution 
of power than is the case in most Latin American nations. Without dis-
puting the economic and historical preconditions, Samuel Stone Zemurray 
suggests major political offices are held by a much smaller and more 
interrelated group than is generally realized. In a provocative arti-
48 
cle, he argues for the importance of blood. He points out that 33 of 
the 44 presidents have come from only three families, those of Juan 
Vasquez de Coronado, Nicolas de Gonzalez y Oviedo and Antonio de Acosta 
49 
Arevalo. Together with the family of Jorge de Alvarado, these fami-
lies have provided 550 out of the 1,300 members who have been elected 
to the Legislative Assembly since 1821. Foremost among these families 
is that of Vasquez which has supplied no less than 19 presidents and 
50 
some 230 deputies of all ideological persuasions. 
Works in Spanish on Costa Rica and its municipal system are not 
limited to those printed in Costa Rica; a few articles are to be found 
in foreign journals. Examples of these are the articles by Jorge-
Enrique Romero Perez appearing in the Madrid-based Revista de Estudios 
51 
de- la Vida Local. In these pieces Romero outlines the principal pur-
poses, structure and financing of IFA.t\1 and indicates the background to 
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and some of the major provisions of Costa Rica1s first (1970) Municipal 
Code. Both of these articles are basically descriptive and generally 
laudatory rather than critical and analytical. 
A genre of literature that proved singularly useful was the grad-
uate thesis. These theses were primarily from the Faculties of Law and 
Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Costa Rica. Three of 
these deserve specific mention: Lilia Montero, Evoluci6n del Sistema 
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Tributaria de Costa Rica; Luis Ramirez, Investigacion de los Servi-
cios Publicos Brindados por las Municipalidades y Sus Lineas de Ac-
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cion; and Jose Vargas, Administraci6n del Sistema Municipal in Costa 
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Rica. 
Montero examines the taxes in force in 1969 and 1970, considering 
the various bases and tax rates, whether or not earmarked and their des-
tination--central government, autonomous agencies, municipalities or 
the private sector. She also indicates the statute or administrative 
directive establishing each particular tax, and the date enacted. By 
providing figures for 1950 through 1970 she makes it possible to deter-
mine shifts in emphasis on the various tax sources. At the end of this 
20-year period, for example, taxes on external commerce were only one-
half as important as they had been at the beginning, while taxes on in-
ternal economic activities became more important. She points out, more-
over, that the efficiency of collection has increased markedly; adrninis-
trative costs dropped from a high of 5.47% of total collection in 1963 
to a low of 1.67% in 1970, the last year for which figures are avail-
55 
able. The detailed tax data in her appendices are the most complete 
available from any single source. 
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Ramirez' work is an essentially empirical impressionistic examin-
ation of the actual administration of a number of small municipalities. 
He is highly critical of what he found. In one anecdote he relates how 
he asked to look at the books in one small town--a legal right--but 
found it impossible because an employee who was absent had the only set 
of keys to the desk in which the books were kept. Ramirez listed a 
number of problems, some administrative and some political, which beset 
the municipalities. Among the former were employees who routinely 
failed to show up at work and who did nothing while in the office, a 
constant changing of treasurers and accountants, too many different of-
fices to be visited by citizens with relatively simple business to con-
duct and an almost complete lack of coordination among various munici-
pal offices and between the municipalities and the central government 
and the various autonomous agencies. He listed 13 of these agencies 
with which the municipalities regularly dealt. 
Political problems included unwarranted interference in day-to-
day activities by the councillors and municipal executives, the lack of 
requirements for the office of municipal executive and a lack of both 
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long- and short-term planning. Ramirez maintained moreover that the 
councillors traditionally set charges that were too low to cover service 
costs. He offered two reasons for this: timidity, and the fact that 
many councillors would be looking for votes among the taxpayers when 
they were running for deputy or other higher elected office. As imme-
diate and pragmatic solutions for some of the more obvious problems, he 
suggested the hiring of more qualified people, paying them commensu-
rately and insisting they work full-time, the keeping of a complete set 
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of keys in the municipal office, and the use of bookkeeping machines. 
Vargas began his work with an appreciation of the steadily dimin-
ishing role of the municipality in the framework of government. He 
first thought, in fact, that he would be chronicling the liquidation of 
local government and indicated three major reasons for this: 
The loss of autonomy suffered by the Local Governments is 
directly related to three phenomena: I)Archaic legislation, 
2) lack of financing, and ~) the necessity of upgrading the 
quality of the personnel. S 
His findings as to the insufficiency of user charges and their nonpay-
ment through administrative ineptness closely parallel those of Rami-
rez. Vargas states: "We have never known [of a case] where a munici-
pality has charged excessive amounts for services rendered, or where 
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properties have been forfeited for failure to pay [taxes]. 
His own preference is for local government vastly strengthened at 
the expense of national government. He goes so far as to argue for the 
municipality as primary tax collector, with monies not needed locally 
made available for national government expenses. The actual situation 
in Costa Rica remains the reverse of this, however. Vargas sees a def-
inite strengthening of the municipality which he attributes to three 
acts of the National Government: Law 4340, which provides for the 
participation of municipalities in the sharing, to a known and expanded 
extent, of certain nationally collected taxes; the new Municipal Code 
(Costa Rica's first); and the creation of IFAM. He succinctly charac-
terizes the municipalities thus: 
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Economic situation 
Legal base 
Budget system 
Accounting system 
Control 
Insufficient 
Magnificent 
Good 
Bad 59, 60 
Acceptable 
The final Spanish language source to be considered here, dealing 
/ 
with Costa Rica, is Volume 20 (1972) of Revista de Ciencias Juridicas, 
a journal published by the University of Costa Rica School of Law. This 
entire volume is devoted to various legal aspects of the Costa Rican 
municipal system with emphasis on changes contained in the new (1970) 
Municipal Code. 
Municipal autonomy, the Municipal Code and subventions from the 
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national government are discussed in the first article, by Otto Rojas. 
The author, a lawyer like most of the other authors in the volume, is 
currently a member of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal for Costa 
Rica. He gives a very brief history of the Costa Rican municipality and 
considers whether municipal autonomy is mere administrative decentrali-
zation or something more. After a lengthy legalistic discussion, he 
suggests the autonomy possessed by the municipality in its sphere of ac-
tion is more than that granted to the autonomous agencies but less than 
that reserved to the central government. Autonomy is, in short, quite 
imprecisely defined. 
Rojas argues that the appropriate division of activity is for the 
national legislature to determine what, in fact, is local in nature and 
once this is done, each municipality is to deal with local matters as it 
deems fit. In this way diversity can be accommodated within the general 
policy aims of the central government. He concedes, however, that the 
municipality as currently constituted is ill-prepared to carry out such 
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responsibilities and recommends certain structural reforms, including 
fewer and larger municipalities, that will enable local government to 
play its rightful role. He suggests further that a complete examination 
of local financing is necessary to determine not only the proper level 
of national to local government transfer payments but also the correct 
sharing and distribution of revenue sources. 
In a brief essay, Manuel Castro deals with the taxing powers of 
the municipal and national governments and the relationships between 
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these. He indicates the limited types of levies the Municipal Code 
allows municipalities to collect--charges for paving sidewalks, lighting 
and cleaning of streets and the like. He emphasizes the severe restric-
tions on the power of the municipality to raise revenue, particularly 
the provision that any new municipal tax or change in tax rate requires 
the approval of the Comptroller General and/or the legislature. Castro 
concludes by pointing out that any cases not covered by the Municipal 
Code are covered by the Taxation Practices and Procedures Code. 
A very broad article by Eduardo Sancho, Chief of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Municipality of San Jos~, examines the relationships between 
municipal functions as laid out in the Municipal Code and what he terms 
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the Costa Rican municipal reality. He begins by viewing the munici-
pa1ity in three different ways--as a socio-historical entity, as a legal 
entity and as a political entity. This is followed by a chronological 
discussion of the Costa Rican municipality and its antecedents; from the 
Roman municipiurn through Visigoth settlements, the Spanish ayuntamIento 
of the 17th and 18th centuries, the municipality in colonial American 
and early independence to the present. Abruptly shifting gears, Sancho 
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considers short, medi~, and long term objectives of the municipality, 
and its duties and attributes, whether exclusive or concurrent. 
In an interesting aside he discusses the sticky issue of antinomy--
the conflicts, apparent and real, between two laws. In this particular 
case it refers to conflicts between provisions of the Municipal Code and 
those of other laws, especially regarding matters of concurrent respon-
sibility such as public health, tourism, education and socioeconomic de-
velopment. Sancho states: 
Repeatedly we observe that functions for which responsibil-
ity is shared remain moribund and do not produce the benefits 
the communities expect from them. Each institution transfers 
the problems to the co-responsible institution, without offer-
ing solutions and this~ of course, generates a mood of insecu-
ity in the citizenry.64 
As a solution he suggests the redefining of municipal and national ju-
risdictions to eliminate concurrence, along with adequate financing for 
the municipalities. With the new Municipal Code, Sancho concludes, 
things are getting better, the municipalities are being strengthened. 
This article did not delve deeply into any of the vast array of 
matters it addressed. Moreover, it did not engage in precise niceties 
of legal reasoning on technical points. It did provide probably the 
best introduction available to the multifaceted Costa Rican municipal 
system, whether it be considered from a historical, political, legal or 
administrative viewpoint. 
Mauro Murillo, Professor of Public Law at the University of Costa 
Rica and Parliamentary Counsel to the Legislative Assembly, addressed 
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his essay to neighborhood participation in local government. He 
points out that unlike national government, local government is suscep-
tible to direct as well as indirect participation. Any person at least 
38 
18 years of age, in possession of political rights, and a resident 
of the canton, has a variety of ways of affecting local government di-
rectly. Among these are the cabildo or open meeting which is oral and 
advisory; plebiscites, a yes or no vote written and binding upon the 
municipal council; and referenda, ratifying acts already passed by the 
council. 
To facilitate citizen participation in municipal policymaking, 
the Municipal Code, which Murillo helped draft, requires that all pro-
jected municipal acts be published in the Official Journal, and further, 
that no less than ten working days after such publication, a public 
hearing must be held. Any citizen-resident has the right to appear and 
speak at these hearings. Internal rules and procedures of the council 
are exempt from these requirements. Murillo points out, however, that 
all of these provisions are no guarantee that legislation unacceptable 
to the majority of the inhabitants will not be passed. One reason for 
this is that cabildos, plebiscites and referenda are called only by the 
council itself; the council may do this, it does not have to. Another 
is that the Official Journal, like journals of record in many countries 
including the United States, are often not readily accessible. Yet a 
third factor is the tendency of the residents, both in Costa Rica and 
internationally, towards apathy in matters of local government. 
The final article in this set deals with current and recommended 
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municipal revenue practices in Costa Rica. The author, Joao de Mo-
raes, is a Brazilian specialist in municipal administration who was on 
loan to IFAM. This will not be discussed further here; it is examined 
at some length in the section below dealing with public finance. 
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As mentioned above, the scholarly literature in Spanish dealing 
with municipal finance, government and policymaking in El Salvador is 
much less extensive than that dealing with similar concerns in Costa 
Rica. In fact, only two works will be considered here. The first of 
these, by Alberto Harth Deneke, is a fairly technical look at the de-
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velopment of city plans for San Salvador in the period 1954-1973. 
He notes the changes in them, the progressively greater comprehensive-
ness and the degree of their implementation or lack thereof. The cur-
rent plan itself will be examined below in Chapter v. 
Fidel Chavez Mena's Organizacion Municipal is much broader in 
68 
scope than the average doctoral thesis in law. It combines politi-
cal philosophy and partisan political ideology (Partido Dernocrata Cris-
tiano--PDC) with a legal and administrative analysis of the Salvadorean 
municipal system, concentrating on San Salvador. It accurately re-
flects Dr. Chavez' own career as practicing attorney, PDC stalwart and 
long-time San Salvador city councillor. As a philosophic viewpoint, 
Chavez maintains: "The State is no more than the result of the organic 
structure of the local communities" and immediately projects this view-
point into the Salvadorean situation: 
It is inconceivable to pretend to obtain efficacy in munici-
pal administration if the municipality finds itself limited in 
a centralist political order in which its activities are lim-
ited to the merely mechanical [ones] of providing services 
regulated by and dependent economically upon subsidies pro-
vided by the will of the central government. 69 
He maintains further that no state that deliberately weakens or at-
tempts to abolish the municipality can be called democratic. 
Not content with analyzing or philosophizing about the municipal-
ity and its relations with the nation, Chavez takes the central govern-
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ment to task for certain specific practices. He criticizes its limits 
on municipal spending as unrealistic, citing the fact that a municipal-
ity must solicit permission to buy a simple desk. He censures the na-
tional government for having allowed private enterprise to compete with 
the municipalities in the provision of user-chargeable municipal ser-
vices. Two further indictments charge that the central power plays 
partisan politics, favoring municipalities with a PCN government and 
that, despite enabling legislation, there exists no agency to provide 
either financial or technical assistance to the municipalities. (In 
Costa Rica IFAM carries out these activities.) In short, Ch~vez com-
bines a scholarly legal and administrative analysis with a partisan at-
tack on a central government and official party he feels ar~ deliber-
ately enervating his city. 
This review does not include all the literature in existence on 
Costa Rica and EI Salvador. It does not even encompass all the litera-
ture used in the preparation of this paper. It does, however, provide 
a broad and representative sample of what scholars have written concern-
ing these two countries. 
In summary, it presents a general description of the two poli-
ties. Costa Rica is indisputably more open politically, more advanced 
economically, and more thoroughly examined by scholars than is El Sal-
vador. It is with this general background in mind that Chapter V ex-
amines more specifically the political, economic and social conditions; 
Chapter VI considers the policy process; and Chapter VII describes the 
current programs in the fields of public housing and municipal finance 
in the two countries and their capital cities. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
As indicated in Chapter I, the two key research techniques 
adopted in this study are policy analysis and comparative examination. 
In this chapter the various elements thereof are more thoroughly expli-
cated. 
First, the nature of the policymaking process and frameworks for 
its analysis are considered. Second, our particular model of choice is 
presented. Third, following from the previous two sections, is an ex-
planation as to why the policy approach is used here. Fourth, the tra-
dition of scholarly examination of the policy process is traced. Fi-
nally, the nature and applicability of the comparative approach are 
discussed. . ~ In Chapter VI, specific policy developments ln San Jose and 
San Salvador will be analyzed and compared. 
NATURE OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
It is well at the outset to present our working definition of 
policy, for probably no word in current social science literature is 
more used or less defined. One prominent author in the field, however, 
holds this to be no bad thing. Ira Sharkansky has written, "It would 
be futile and misleading to work toward a clear definition of policy, 
I 
policy process, or policy-making." When it is defined, policy, like 
kachina, is as often defined in terms of what it is not as in terms of 
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what it is. Stuart Rakoff and Guenther Schaefer have pointed out that 
unless further specified, policy may describe 
the general or specific norms, goals, objectives or actions 
pursued by the political systems, or it may refer to the in-
struments or strategies devised to realize these goals, or to 
the actual actions and concrete steps of implementation. 2 
For the purposes of this study policy will be defined, following Rakoff 
and Schaefer, as "the action or nonaction of a political system in re-
3 
sponse to demands made upon it." Such action or nonaction can take a 
variety of forms, from simple statements of intent to actual implemen-
tation or termination of particular projects. 
Underlying all policy analysis is the concept that decisionmaking 
is a process, a process that can be traced. Thomas Dye suggests six 
perspectives from which public policy may be examined: systems theory, 
eli te theory, group theory) rational decisionmaking theory, inrremer;-
4 
talism, and institutionalism. The perspective adopted here is prima-
rily systems theory, although elements from some of the others do ap-
pear from time to time. In David Easton's terminology there is a pol-
itical system that receives inputs, demands and supports, and eventu-
5 
ally translates them into outputs. Policy analysis attempts to open 
the "black box" that is the political system and examine this transfor-
mation of inputs, particularly demands, into outputs. We are dealing 
here with public policymaking, studying demands on a governmental en-
tity or entities, and the way in which these demands are, or are not, 
translated into some sort of governmental response. 
Frameworks for the analysis of public policymaking abound. They 
vary in terminology, complexity and occasionally boundary definition 
but are essentially parallel. Almost all take as their input demands, 
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some include supports. Each of these frameworks is designed to enable 
the analyst to follow a demand from its genesis through a series of 
stages to either its emergence as a policy or its falling by the pol-
icymaking wayside. 
In a typical analytic framework, the first stages are the indiv-
idual perception of some environmental condition and the defining of 
this condition as an imperfection, a state wanting change. The indiv-
idual is faced at this point with three choices: he can, if possible, 
change it himself, privately; he can forget it; or he can seek public 
activity to change it. At this juncture the perceived problem is still 
outside the political system, only a small proportion of these poten-
tial demands ever enter thereunto. 
As John Dewey points out, the usual alternative to pTivate action 
is not public action but either inaction or "routine, impulsive and 
6 
other unreflected acts also performed by individuals." Daniel Elazar 
reinforces this position and says of public officials that they 
are normally not willing to initiate new programs or open up 
new areas of government activity on their own recognizance. 
They will do so when they perceive an overwhelming public de-
mand for them to act, but only then. 7 
This perceived condition, defined as a problem, is then often aggre-
gated with similar ones, at least this is held to be the case in 'de-
veloped' nations for which most policy analysis frameworks have been 
designed. 
Already some major difficulties with these frameworks appear. At 
what point does the the problem become a demand, before or after aggre-
gat ion? Does this aggregation take place inside or outside of the 
boundaries of the political system? What, in fact, are the boundaries 
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of the political system, and how are they chosen? Easton suggests that 
the system boundaries are determined heuristically by the analyst: 
Accordingly, what we choose to put inside our system to con-
sider within its boundaries, will depend upon what we wish to 
examine in detail; for scientific purposes we also expect that 
these variables will show considerably interrelationship and 
coherence. What we leave outside, as part of its environment, 
will be those factors that we can accept as givens. They re-
present the independent variables or parameters of the sys-
tem. 8 
At this point the agreement among the various schema for policy anal-
ysis begins to break down. Jones, for example, holds that the problem 
does not become a demand nor enter the political system until not only 
aggregation but organization and representation as well have taken 
9 
place. Rakoff and Schaefer, on the other hand, maintain that indiv-
idual needs enter the political system which may then process them into 
demands and, in order to avoid overloading itself, aggregate these de-
10 
mands. Demands, however, are not necessarily aggregated; some may be 
summarily dropped by the political system, a few others may be strong 
enough by themselves to warrant further consideration. William Riker 
posits that the usual course is for demands to aggregate until there 
are only two, conflicting demands, or more precisely, coalitions of de-
II 
mands between which the policymaking system will eventually choose. 
This stage of the policy process is far from neat but we attempt 
to summarize. Differing perceptions of the environment lead to differ-
ing definitions as to what sorts of activity, if any, the political 
system might undertake. Only a few of these perceived needs or prob-
lems ever formally enter the political system as demands, but even this 
small proportion are so different and in such conflict as to require 
the system, in self defense, to aggregate them. For the specific in-
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terest areas of this study a purely empirical approach is taken. That 
is, the formal government structure is examined to see at what point it 
first takes cognizance of the particular issues involved. 
Standard policy analysis frameworks encourage, and research in 
'developed' nations emphasizes, these inputs into the political system. 
And this is appropriate in those nations where well-developed political 
parties and interest groups engage in the articulation and aggregation 
of interests, whether seeking policy changes or in support of the sta-
tus quo. But as Thomas Smith points out, "in many African and Asian 
political systems interest groups and political parties may be weak, 
12 
inarticulate, or even abolished by action of the government. 1f This 
may not be the case in Costa Rica or El Salvador but it does raise by 
implication another major question, What happens when all important 
perceptions of problems and presentation of demands corne from within 
the political system? This, we maintain, is likely to be the case in 
the two polities under study here. Such an occurrence does not inval-
idate the policy approach but extra care must be taken to recognize it 
when it happens. 
If the political systems of developing nations may lack these 
specific inputs, they may possess, willingly or otherwise, extra inputs 
from without the system. We refer here, of course, to international 
influences. Consider for a moment the vast number of economic and so-
cial development programs undertaken by the United State alone, and the 
direct influence these can have on the policy processes of cooperating 
or client nations. Not only money but also technical personnel can in-
fluence policy choice. And it is not unknown for two foreign agencies, 
from the same nation, to be working at cross purposes within a single 
polity. For example, in a small country, the presence of financial 
and technical aid and influence from the Agency for International De-
velopment, the Peace Corps and the World Bank may indicate the magni-
tude of this intervention and the possible policy effects. With the 
simultaneous presence of multinational corporations the external con-
straints on internal policyrnaking in developing countries such as El 
Salvador and Costa Rica become even more important. 
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Returning to the standard framework for policy analysis, we find 
the perceived problem has become a formal demand and entered the poli-
tical system, there to be acted upon. The next stage in the process is 
policy formulation, the actual development of a plan for solving the 
problem, for responding to the demand. This stage is often regarded, 
particularly in the 'developed' nations, as the single most critical 
part of the policy process. At this point decisionmakers have essen-
tially three tasks--they must enumerate the alternatives available, 
they must evaluate these alternatives, and finally they must select, or 
adopt, one of these alternatives. 
Ideally, the policymakers will engage here in optimal decision-
making. That is, they will study and debate thoroughly every policy 
alternative until eventually one will emerge as the absolute best that 
can be achieved. It will not only be the optimal policy in and of it-
self but will also reflect the allocation of precisely the right share 
of resources in relation to all other policy alternatives of whatever 
kind being considered during the same time frame by the political sys-
tem. More likely, however, the policymaking will be of the type termed 
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by Yehezkel Dror satisfying and by Herbert Simon satisficing. That 
is, the policymakers will determine beforehand what will be a satis-
factory level of response to the demand with which they have been pre-
sented and will adopt the first alternative which satisfies that cri-
terion, regardless of whether or not it is the best response. This 
practice is much more amenable to the omnipresent scarcity of resources, 
including the time available to the decisionmakers and their lack of 
perfect knowledge. 
A policy has been adopted. In the usual framework it now under-
goes legitimation. Legitimation is a dual process. On the one hand 
the policy must be examined to determine that it is in accord with ac-
cepted standards; in United States' parlance, Is it constitutional? 
And in the case where the policymaking unit is a subnational govern-
ment, e.g., the Municipality of San Jos~ or San Salvador, the policy 
must be in agreement with the wishes, expressed or implied, of the na-
tional government. In addition, if implementation of the policy is 
going to require funds from a foreign source, e.g., funding to build 
public housing, the policy must also meet the guidelines of the funding 
agency. On the other hand, the policy must be legitimated to the pub-
lic at large. The people, or at least a large and influential enough 
segment of them to ensure the political feasibility of the program, 
must be prepared to accept it. 
Not every member of a polity plays an equal part in public pol-
icyrnaking. In authoritarian systems most of the public is involun-
tarily excluded from the process. In the more open systems, the public 
15 
is generally content, for a number of good reasons, to choose the 
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proximate policymakers, give them some sort of vague mandate, and let 
them go about their business. The most formal of the policy analysis 
models assume that specific roles in the process will be played by 
specific actors. The separation of powers model to which decisionrnak-
ing in the United States is supposed to adhere gives to the 1egis1a-
tive branch the formulation and adoption stages, to the judiciary the 
legitimation stage (in the legal sense) and to the executive the im-
p1ementation stage. 
Inputs at these stages from other than the proximate po1icymakers 
appropriate to each stage are often frowned upon. Aldermen are not to 
interfere with municipal civil servants in the implementation of policy 
nor are the courts to engage in policy formulation. But this strict 
legalistic approach to the policy process does not mirror political re-
a1ity; informal operations do take place and are important. These in-
formal operations are of two types; they may involve a proximate pol-
icyrnaker acting outside of his assigned role to influence policy or 
they may involve a party who is not formally a proximate policymaker 
taking an active and direct part in decisionrnaking. These informal 
operations may in some cases be even more important than many of the 
formal operations. Unfortunately for the policy analyst, they are 
also more difficult to locate and evaluate. But this must be done to 
achieve a thorough analysis of any policy, perhaps through the hunches 
and intuitive judgments that form part of what Dror terms the 'extra-
16 
rational subphases' of policy analysis. 
"When a Western political system makes a policy, it is assumed 
that the policy will be implemented and the results will be somewhere 
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near those expected." This statement is perhaps less accepted today 
than it would have been a few years ago; nonetheless it points up one 
of the differences between developed (Western) and developing policy-
making systems. In the latter, the implementation phase is most often 
the weak link in the policy chain. The reasons are many. One could be 
cynical and ascribe all shortcomings in implementation to corruption, 
and it is not to be denied that the mordida can be an important factor. 
There may also exist a simple shortage of trained, goal-oriented per-
sonnel in the bureaucracy, especially in one staffed through patronage. 
Futhermore, many groups and interests find it more effective and effi-
cient to have policies modified to suit their purposes in the implemen-
tation phase than in any other. This is particularly true of groups 
that may have been denied access to the earlier stages of the policy-
making process. In terms used above, informal operations are likely to 
reach their maximum effectiveness in this stage. 
Politically, public response to perceived shortcomings in policy 
application is somewhat different in developing than in developed na-
tions. Where a public has not been conditioned to expect prompt and 
efficient policy implementation, the political consequences to a gov-
ernment in the absence of such implementation may be quite minimal. 
This is especially the case where electoral politics are oriented more 
toward personality or ideology than toward issues and performance. For 
all of these reasons this study pays particular attention to the policy 
implementation stage. 
Policy analysis can be pushed beth forward and backward from the 
stages included here. Pushing backward we enter the realm of metapol-
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icyrnaking, policymaking about policyrnaking. Included here are such 
aspects as the processing of values, reality, problems and resources, 
the designing of the policyrnaking system so as to allocate these, and 
the determining of a policyrnaking strategy. This realm will not be ex-
plored further; we will take the policyrnaking system as we find it and 
work from there. Pushing forward we enter the phases of reaction, eval-
uation and finally termination. Reaction, the response to the imple-
mentation of policy, is examined only to the extent that reaction to a 
previous, similar policy has become an input into subsequent policyrnak-
ing or has influenced the political environment. Evaluation of policy 
comes from two major sources: in-house evaluation by the system that 
has created the policy, and evaluation unsought but freely offered 
from the outside, primarily from journalistic and academic sources. 
The first type of evaluation is not ~specially prevalent in the parti-
cular polities and policy areas under examination here; the second 
type is one product of this research. The needs of the populace for 
housing, and governmental response thereto, did not come to an end dur-
ing the course of this study, nor did the municipalities cease to re-
quire additional revenues. The termination phase, then, drops from 
further consideration. 
As Rakoff and Schaefer point out, there is no definitive, broadly 
19 
accepted term for the end product of the policyrnaking process. Pub-
lic policy, policy choices, policy decisions, policy outputs, and pol-
icy outcomes are among the terms used. Sharkansky, for examples, chides 
Dye for failure to differentiate 'policy' from 'outcomes'. Sharkansky 
himself abjures the term 'outcomes' and speaks of public policy, policy 
outputs and policy impacts as three 
important dimensions of the policy process . . • public pol-
icy represents actions taken by the government; policy output 
represents the service levels which are affected by these ac-
tions; and policy impacts represent the effect which the ser-
vice has on a population. 20 
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A good deal of policy analysis literature is devoted to the difference 
between policy outputs and policy outcomes. There is not always a one-
to-one correlation between these. Policies may have final effects very 
different from those intended. For example, urban freeways were con-
structed in United States' metropolitan areas, a policy output, to end 
urban traffic congestion. But the policy outcome has not, in fact, 
been the end of such congestion. It is not intended in this study to 
probe deeply into outcomes vis-a-vis outputs but it is worthwhile tak-
ing cognizance of the discrepancy, noting with Mr. Dooley that "Results 
is what you expects, consequences is what you gets." 
A MODEL OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
A simple but useful model of the policy process is presented be-
low (Figure 3, page 58). It contains a number of conditions constitut-
ing the social, political and economic environments. Individuals may 
regard these conditions, or some of them, as imperfect and define prob-
lems or perceive needs as arising out of these imperfections. If pri-
vate actions avail nothing and the needs are regarded as too important 
to ignore, the affected individuals may make demands on the political 
system for change. (These demands or other anticipated changes may 
also lead to demands for maintenance of the status quo.) 
These demands may be made separately, or several like demands may 
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be clustered together. Once inside the political system they may be 
considered on their own merits, or aggregated. Next, some of these 
demands are formulated as policy statements and adopted. Of those 
adopted, some successfully go through the implementation/application 
phase and ultimately impact upon one or all of the political system, 
the individual perceived needs or the environment itself. It should 
be noted that to have effect, policy outputs do not have to reach back 
as far as the environment. 
This model indicates clearly the filtering nature of the politi-
cal system in the policy process. Each phase may be conceptualized as 
a screen of successively finer mesh. The mixed bag of demands enters 
the system. Some are screened out in the aggregation phase. The re-
mainder, either strong enough to stand alone or strategically aggre-
gated with others of their kind pass through to the adoption phase. 
More are screened out here. Of this select group still others fail to 
pass through the application phase. The proportion of needs that actu-
ally result in some public policy impact is very small. 
The genesis of this model in the policy analysis tradition in 
general and in the work of Rakoff and Schaefer in particular, is docu-
mented in the next section. In Chapter I it was pointed out that im-
proving and refining our model is one of the subsidiary concerns of 
this study. Suggested modifications resulting from empirical testing 
on our specific policy areas appear in Chapter VIII. 
USE OF THE POLICY APPROACH 
Implicit in the above description of the policy process and of 
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our model thereof are some of the reasons why the policy approach was 
chosen for this study. These reasons will be more fully explicated 
here. Policy analysis is more generally applicable than many other re-
search techniques. Of particular importance to this study, it is not 
disciplinary bound. Nor is it limited in its application to a particu-
1ar political milieu. Admittedly, as we have shown above, many of the 
traditional frameworks do have a bias toward developed, Western po1iti-
can systems but these can be modified to reduce, if not eliminate, this 
bias. 
The policy approach provides a logical framework for longitudinal 
analysis, enhanced by the consideration of feedback loops. Policy for-
mu1ation and implementation require time, and during this time actors, 
roles, demands, and responses CQTI change. This approach allows such 
changes to be taken into account. It also allows for the disaggrega-
tion of the decisionmaking process into its component parts for closer 
examination. It can thus be determined whether some sections are more 
or less important than others in a particular case, and what relation-
ships exist among them. Moreover, this disaggregation indicates what 
stages of the process are likely to provide the most effective access 
to those seeking to influence the policy. 
Policy analysis avoids some of the assumptions of the organic-
functional or consensual-homeostatic model and of the deve1opmental-
21 
continuum model often used in comparative research. For example it 
does not posit that any formal interest articulation structures will be 
found in the polities under comparison. As a result many of the diffi-
cu1ties encountered using those models can also be avoided. This prop-
erty is likely to prove particularly useful in a study such as this 
where a number of important informal operations are to be considered. 
In addition, policy can be measured in many terms, financial and sym-
bolic to mention but two. Or, given the specific foci of this study, 
it may be expressed in actual construction of housing and raising of 
revenue. 
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Finally, policy analysis is singularly appropriate to the scope 
of this particular dissertation. It is capable of being carried out 
by a single researcher. It does not require extensive and expensive 
survey research. Nor does it require a vast array of complex elec-
tronic equipment or highly exotic mathematical techniques. When all is 
said and done the choice of an approach depends to a large extent on 
the individual researcher's intuition as to what is likely to work. 
En fin, the selection of a methodology is a matter of epistemology, as 
are the criticisms levelled against the selection. And there are fora 
eminently more suited to epistemological debate than this paper. 
THE POLICY ANALYSIS TRft~ITION 
It would be difficult to put an accurate starting date on public 
policy analysis as an intellectual exercise. In the last decade, how-
ever, much literature has appeared attempting to examine the connec-
tions between environmental factors such as socioeconomic conditions, 
the nature of the political system, and public policy. This literature 
has dealt predominantly with subnationa1 governmental units in the 
United States; however, its concern with environment-political struc-
ture and process-policy linkages makes it relevant to the study at 
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hand. A total review of this literature would be both prohibitively 
time-consuming and inappropriate for our current purposes. Jones, for 
example, in a recent paper examined only five journals for the period 
1963-1972 and found 67 articles classifiable as state and local public 
22 
policy analysis. Nonetheless this section will look briefly at some 
of the more important ones in this tradition. 
Most of this literature derives from a 1963 article by Richard 
23 
Dawson and James Robinson. They attempted to combine economic and 
political science approaches by considering both political and socio-
economic variables as they related to public policy and by using a com-
parative rather than a case-study approach. The model of their choice, 
pictured below, was an adaptation of David Easton's flow model of the 
political system and the policy process. 
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Policy, in their view consisted of 
the goals (objectives of or commitments made by the politi-
cal system), the means by which they may be implemented and 
the consequences of those means . . . the chief output of the 
political system and the allocation of values for the society 
. . . the outcome of activity or interaction among external 
conditions, political system and political process. 24 
They considered the relationship of a political variable, extent of 
party competition, and a number of economic factors in determining nine 
public welfare policies in the American states. 
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Much the same approach was taken by Dye. He modified the above 
model somewhat by collapsing process and system variables into a single 
category which he called the political system. 
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Figure 5. Dye model of the policy process. 
In this work he also considered several political factors and dealt 
with a wide range of state expenditure patterns as the policy outcomes. 
He concluded that the political system characteristics--division of the 
two-party vote, level of interparty competition, level of voter parti-
cipation, and degree of malapportionment--had little independent effect 
on policy outcomes. He also provided for the possibility that socio-
economic development variables may bypass the political system alto-
gether (c) and be transformed directly into policy outcomes: 
Economic development shapes both political systems and pol-
icy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between 
system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed 
to the influence of economic development. Differences in the 
policy choices of states with different types of political 
systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socio-
economic levels, rather than a direct product of political 
variables. 26 
Economic development was measured by levels of urbanization, industri-
alization, income and education. 
Dye's simple model was adopted by most of the policy analysts who 
followed. No doubt associated with this, their findings continued to 
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show an almost preordained policy response to the socioeconomic envi-
ronment. Lewis Froman in a study at the city level found that certain 
political structures were associated with 'areal' policies while others 
were associated with 'segmental' policies, but these structural differ-
ences he traced back to the socioeconomic characteristics of 'homoge-
27 
neous' as opposed to 'heterogeneous' communities. Sharkansky did 
find, examining groupings of states, that "the regional location of 
states has a relationship with political characteristics that is inde-
28 
pendent of state economic characteristics" but again this may be re-
garded as a geographical rather than a political factor. For the most 
part, however, the social and economic considerations continued to be 
assigned preeminence over political structure and process in the shap-
29 
ing of public policy outputs. 
These findings led Robert Salisbury to be overwhelmed by the 
possible irrelevance of politics in the American states: 
Wealth, urbanization, perhaps settlement patterns, and other 
such factors account for both political-system characteristics 
and decisional outputs .... This, I submit is a devastating 
set of findings and cannot be dismissed as not meaning what it 
plainly says--that analysis of political systems will not ex-
plain policy decisions made by those systems. 30 
The political system, then, seemed to play no major role in determining 
the quantity of policy output. At best, it was responsible for incre-
mental changes. If incrementalism was its only function, it would soon 
be rendered obsolete and immaterial. To avoid this fate, a new job had 
to be found for the political system. Salisbury developed the model 
below and posited that the true role of the political system was not to 
determine amount of policy output but types of policy. In other words, 
politically-oriented policy analysis could be used to determine the 
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situations in which policy would be distributive, redistributive, reg-
ulative or self-regulative, depending upon the interactions between 
31 
patterns of demand and the structure of the decisional system. 
Figure 6. Salisbury model of the policy process. 
Interestingly enough he did not address extractive policies, policies 
designed to obtain the wherewithal for distribution or redistribution. 
Not all political scientists and policy analysts agreed with 
these conclusions as to the reduced importance of political factors in 
the determination of public policy. Some, perhaps out of self-preser-
vation, argued that these findings were the results of problems in 
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measurement and analysis. This line of reasoning held that more pre-
cision and discrimination in selection of political, economic and so-
cial variables and greater sophistication in analysis and in evaluation 
would surely restore politics to its rightful place at the center of 
the policymaking stage. The basic assumptions as to the appropriate-
ness of the Dye process model, however, seem not to have been seriously 
questioned. 
In a quantum leap, Rakoff and Schaefer did attack this basic as-
33 
sumption. They maintained that the models of the policy process used 
were insufficient, the underlying theory was inadequate and the vari-
ables, both dependent and independent, were chosen more for their avail-
ability than for their policy relevance. Census data were used uncriti-
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cally 'because they were there.' It was these shortcomings, they sug-
gested, that led to the common finding that politics was not very im-
portant in determining policy outcomes. It was not that politics was, 
in fact, unimportant. 
They established the following criteria in an attempt to construct 
a more valid and realistic approach to such studies whose elements in-
cluded political, social and economic variables: 
The theory must specify the relationships between the in-
dependent variables and the dependent variable, policy, as 
well as deal with the relationships among the independent var-
iables. It must possess closure--that is, include among its 
elements all the variables which might explain the variation 
in the dependent variable. It must be precise, that is, the 
elements themselves must be clearly and unambiguously defined. 
Finally, the model chosen must be appropriate: it must lead us 
to useful statements of the relationships involved, statements 
which are empirically verifiable by clear-cut standards. 34 
,Using these criteria, they concluded that the various adaptations 
of the Eastonian flow model of the political system and the policy pro-
cess used by most researchers were not sufficient. They found, agree-
ing with Sharkansky, that 
the conversion of environmental conditions into demands re-
quires the intervention of the attitudes, perceptions, and be-
liefs of the participants in the system, and also depends upon 
the operations of both formal and informal means of decision-
making. 35 
In other words, the level of urbanization itself makes no demands on 
the decisionmaking system. Rakoff and Schaefer also felt that some re-
definition of the boundaries of the political system was necessary. The 
end result of their work was the model shown below (Figure 7, p. 67). 
The Rakoff and Schaefer model of the policymaking process, then, 
represents an improvement over many of the earlier models, although 
its kinship to them can be recognized. Nonetheless it is not entirely 
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suited in an unmodified form to this study. A number of changes were 
made to convert this model to our model of choice (Figure 3). Some of 
these were designed to strengthen the model generally, others are par-
ticular adaptations for examining policymaking in developing nations. 
According to Rakoff and Schaefer, the 'ecological condition' of 
the environment refers to the "location of rivers and ports and moun-
tains, the occurence of natural disasters such as hurricanes or bliz-
zards, or such contemporary events and conditions as the pollution of 
36 
atmosphere and water." Ecological conditions, so defined, are not of 
the same class as economic and social conditions. True, rivers and 
mountains and ports are not to be ignored but neither do they play any 
direct role in the policy process. They can affect social or economic 
factors in the environment and thus be subsumed thereunder. Hurricanes 
and blizzards are unique events and not ongoing characteristics of the 
environment. And while policy may be made to replace housing in or 
provide money to refugees from devastated areas, the policies so made 
are housing or relief policies, not hurricane or blizzard policies. 
Pollution, again, we see as acting on and through the social and eco-
nomic aspects of the environment. For all these reasons our adapted 
model does not contain the environmental category 'ecological condi-
tions. ' 
In its place is the category 'political conditions.' It appears 
that these are insufficiently considered in the Rakoff and Schaefer 
model. In their model the existing political milieu is vaguely re-
garded as something through which perceived needs become demands and 
enter the political system. We contend, however, it is more than this. 
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Perceived needs arise from the political conditions of the environment 
as well as from the social and economic conditions. Moreover, the pol-
itical environment is also the result of a seri.es of policy outcomes 
from the decisionmaking system. And certain important considerations 
such as the condition of political dependence found in developing na-
tions are most appropriately included here. In summary, the boxes la-
beled 'social,' 'economic,' and 'political' conditions will be filled 
with the appropriate elements, listed above on page 11. 
In earlier discussion of the policy process it was indicated that 
one of the truly difficult conceptual problems was dealing with bound-
ary conditions and this problem arises again here. At what point do 
perceived needs become demands? The Rakoff and Schaefer model assumes 
that the political system is faced with needs and that these needs are 
are translated into demands either at the system boundary or within the 
system. It is our contention, however, that needs are most often con-
verted into demands outside the political system and it is demands that 
the political system encounters. In any event, policymaking is a pro-
cess, not merely a series of discrete actions, so the emphasis of pol-
icy analysis must be on the linkages, and boundaries are to be treated 
as interfaces, not as blockades. 
The usual frameworks for policy analysis assume that needs are 
perceived and problems identified outside of the political system. If 
this is the case in developed policymaking systems, a debatable propo-
sition, it is certainly not the universal situation in developing na-
tions. It was suggested earlier that the governments, national and 
subnational, in Costa Rica and El Salvador may well play the role of 
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patron. In this case, the needs would be perceived and the problems 
identified almost completely within the political system. This is not 
to suggest that adoption and application of policy would thus become 
automatic and analysis of decisionrnaking trivial, but it would affect 
the shape of the policy process. 
For one thing, the aggregation phase could assume less importance 
than it is customarily assigned. This would be the case particularly 
where political parties were primarily ideological and/or personalistic 
in nature and were not brokerage agencies as the United States' politi-
cal parties are often regarded. As a result, nonaggregation of demands 
would not necessarily disqualify these from further consideration in 
the formulation-adoption stage. 
One final modification of the Rakoff-Schaefer model seemed desir-
able to adapt it for this particular study. In their model, incipient 
policies that are aborted in the aggregation, adoption or application 
phases, re-enter the political system as demands. This mayor may not 
be the case; we must be prepared to accept the possibility that such 
potential policies, not acted upon, might simply fall into policyrnaking 
limbo. 
Our debts to Rakoff and Schaefer in particular and to the earlier 
policy analysts in general are nonetheless considerable. Hopefully, our 
model, as tested in the field and suitably modified, will be another 
incremental step in the development of a nonculturebound framework for 
policy analysis, applicable in the developing as well as in the devel-
oped countries. 
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THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
One integrative stream can be found running through all of the 
studies cited above. This is the comparative approach. The diverse 
authors have made broad and all-compassing statements on the desirabil-
ity of comparison in public policy analysis. Dye, for example, main-
tains that 
the development of an explanatory model of public policy, 
whether in international politics or American state politics, 
requires comparative analysis. Comparative anal~sis occupies 
a distinguished place in all political inquiry.3 
Froman states flatly, "If we are to develop theory in the public policy 
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field, comparative research is needed." Nonetheless, we feel it is 
useful here to iterate the case for comparative analysis both in gen-
eral and for this essay in particular. 
Perhaps the primary reason for comparing is that at the moment 
there exists no absolute standard of performance by which to measure or 
evaluate a policymaking system; a result, perhaps, of insufficient meta-
policymaking. We must, then, satisfice, go to second best and measure 
systems by comparing them one against the other. It might be possible, 
knowing the inputs into two political systems to calculate net policy 
outputs and examine the relative efficiencies of the two systems. Dror 
includes comparative surveys as important means of examining know al-
ternatives, one of his rational subphases of the preparation of major 
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alternatives phase. 
A second important reason for comparing is to distinguish a com-
mon class of urban phenomena. One end of all research is the discovery 
of empirical generalizations that can be verified and eventually become 
72 
part of an overall explanatory structure. It is possible in a compara-
tive study to approach the ceteris paribus by choosing subjects of 
study in such a manner that the appropriate number of variables are 
held constant. Of course care must be taken to ensure that the ceteris 
does not become so paribus as to render the results trivial. 
Comparative research may show that certain variables tend to occur 
in association, knowledge that could have some explanatory or predic-
tive value. In fact, we seek covariation among variables with as much 
scope of verification as possible. The usual three caveats must be ob-
served: assure that the relationship discovered is not spurious, re-
member that statistical association is only an identity and not an ex-
planation, and avoid tautologies. 
Harold Lasswell has pointed out that the development of political 
science has been hindered by a tendency to view the political process 
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in each territorial unit as unique. We maintain here, following Wil-
liam Hanna, that the comparative method can lead to the dissolution of 
these separate frames of reference, providing opportunities to "extend 
generalizations, specify conditions, develop new hypotheses and en-
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lighten specific cases." In short, then, comparative research is un-
dertaken to find explanations for urban phenomena and to separate com-
mon from particular explicans. 
The comparative method is applicable to policy analysis in general 
and to urban research in general. Again, it is not disciplinary bound. 
Further, it is singularly appropriate to the study of the policy process 
in developing nations. Smith lists four reasons why this is so. First, 
[the] comparative perspective is essential if social scien-
tists expect to evaluate public policies or to offer advice to 
policymakers. Second, the examination of non-Western policy 
processes can provide insights regarding neglected aspects of 
the policy process in Western nations. Third, while it is 
useful to study policy in terms of "outputs" in Western coun-
tries (often operationalized in public expenditure figures) 
such an endeavor in'llany developing countries may result in 
misleading explanations. Last, the literature of comparative 
politics and comparative administration is a fruitful source 
of insights, concepts, and models of policy processes. 42 
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In Chapter VI our model and the comparative approach are used in 
an examination of the actual policymaking process in San Salvador and 
San Jose. Chapter VIII presents the conclusions reached as a result 
of this examination, and the modifications suggested as useful by our 
empirical testing. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICY AREAS 
Chapter I indicated the particular policy areas examined in this 
paper are municipal revenue and public provision of low-cost housing. 
It is important to choose areas of substantive value for the analysis. 
As Cliff Kaufman has pointed out, policy relevance is a necessary if 
not sufficient consideration in the determination of research priori-
1 
ties. 
One set of reasons, then, for the choice of these areas, lies in 
their intrinsic importance. 
The other set of reasons is procedural; a great deal of informa-
tion is available on public finance and public housing. The policy 
outputs may be determined, making it possible to go back and trace the 
process through which these outputs were generated. Moreover, there 
exists a set of generally accepted principles against which the actual 
/ policies of San Jose and San Salvador are analyzed. 
This chapter treats these two policy fields, urban finance and 
public housing. Each will be examined from the viewpoints of their im-
portance to the community and their basic principles. The specific 
processes that lead to their formation will be considered in Chapter VI 
and the results of these processes in Chapter VII. We look first at 
urban finance and later at public housing. 
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MUNICIPAL REVENUE RAISING 
Public finance may in some ways be regarded as the single most 
important policy area, for without funds most other policy decisions 
made by a municipal or other government agency may well be rendered 
moot. 
Rudolf Goldschied regarded the field of public finance as so im-
portant that he suggested the development of an entirely new science of 
'Fiscal Sociology' to "examine the impact of revenue raising as well as 
spending policies to the total society in its internal and external re-
lationships." He went so far as to argue that "public finances repre-
sent the driving motor of the total societal development." And the two 
faces of the Janus of public finance were not to be considered as sep-
arate entities: 
Tell me how and whence you acquire your revenue and I shall 
tell you what your expenditure budget must look like. The 
same applies in reverse: Tell me what you want to spend your 
money on, and I shall tell you by what means you will get the 
required revenue, what class of society you must draw upon and 
the size and kind of administrative apparatus you will need 
therefore. 2 
Budgets, then, are not only accounting ledgers of income and expenses 
but are also overall indicators of policy responses and provide in-
sights as to the general mindsets of the agencies preparing them. 
This holds just as true for urban areas of Latin America as for 
the general case. Further, in the case of comparative urban studies in 
Latin America, "Research on the causes and consequences of urban growth 
has focused on demographic, sociological, and physical aspects of the 
3 
topic far more than on economic and political dimensions." Public 
finance, manifestly, contains both economic and political dimensions, 
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and a study such as this should serve as one small particle in filling 
the research hiatus suggested above. 
Pragmatically, public finance as a policy field lends itself to 
the researcher's needs. Even in jurisdictions with rather primitive 
data gathering and handling procedures, government revenues and expend-
itures, by class, are among the first data to be quantified and tabu-
lated and made more or less readily accessible to the public. More-
over, there exists a corpus of public finance, or at least revenue 
raising, theory as to what are the 'right' ways to go about raising 
money in certain places at certain times for certain purposes. Such 
theory suggests, for example, where taxes are to be preferred to user 
charges. Comparisons of the public finance policies of the two poli-
ties can be more meaningfully made against such a background. 
It is appropriate at this point to describe briefly the princi-
pIes of public finance and more specifically, of tax policy. Follow-
ing this some particularly urban applications will be examined along 
with some considerations of taxes vis-a-vis user charges. Finally, 
we will look at the developmental paradigm of Luiz de Moraes, a model 
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designed especially for municipal finances in Latin America. It is 
this model that will serve as our norm in the light of which the rev-
enue systems of San Jos~ and San Salvador will be compared. 
There exists, at least at some level of generalization, agree-
ment as the the bases of taxation of practical postulates of tax pol-
icy. The outline below was suggested by Wagner some 90 years ago, 
but remains a useful general statement as to what 'good' taxation 
should involve. Each of the nine criteria will be commented upon 
briefly. In considering these it must be remembered that the choice 
of tax or other revenue policy is ultimately a political choice. 
A. Financial Principles: 
1. Adequacy of yield. 
2. Flexibility of taxation. 
B. Economic principles: 
3. Choice of correct sources of taxation, i.e., especially 
examination of the question whether taxes should be 
levied on individual and national income only or also 
on individual and national wealth (capital), and whether 
and how far a distinction must be made between the in-
terests of the individual and the national economy. 
4. Choice of the kind of tax, in the light of the effect 
of taxation and of different kinds of taxes on the tax-
payers, and general examination of the problem of tax 
shifting. 
C. Principles of justice, or of the equitable distribution of 
taxation: 
5. Universality, and 
6. Equality of taxation. 
D. Principles of tax administration (or principles of the ad-
ministrative efficiency of the tax system: 
7. Determinacy of taxation. 
8. Convenience. 
9. Effort to ensure the lowest possible collection costs. S 
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The first principle, adequacy of yield, requires little explana-
tion. There is no point in levying a tax if it is not going to bring 
in sufficient revenue to justify itself. This principle is, unfortun-
ately, widely violated in certain jurisdictions that attempt to regul-
ate morality by taxing such commodities as tobacco, liquor and commer-
6 
cial sex. Insofar as these taxes are designed to raise revenue, they 
are legitimate. Insofar as they are designed to uplift morals, they 
are illegitimate. This latter activity may be an appropriate role for 
churches and ministeries of culture, but not for tax policy. 
A good tax must also be flexible. It should be designed so as 
to increase quickly when necessary, and to be lowered or discontinued 
when the needs for revenue decrease or are better met from some other 
source. Income taxes are relatively flexible taxes; as income rises 
81 
so do taxes therefrom, and rates are relatively easily changed by the 
appropriate legislative bodies. Examples of inflexible taxes are fixed 
amount head or poll taxes. 
The choice of correct sources of taxation is very important, and 
regrettably, seems to receive insufficient consideration in many juris-
dictions. The question of whether income only should be taxed, or also 
capital, is only one of these issues. It can be argued that if income 
as return to capital is taxed, capital should not be taxed. Capital 
diminished by taxation cannot generate as much income, hence, not as 
much income tax. It must also be remembered that whatever the ostensi-
ble tax base, income and capital are the only sources of taxes. Prop-
erty taxes are not paid in land nor mining taxes with ore; all taxes 
are paid with money and money comes from capital or income. 
The kinds of taxes selected should also take into account effects 
other than just revenue raising. Will a capital gains tax, for example, 
discourage investment in the economy, with a consequent loss of current 
or potential jobs, hurting not only the individuals involved but per-
haps jeopardizing future income tax revenue? Tax policy need also be 
formulated in such a way as to ensure, as far as possible, that those 
upon whom the tax is levied actually pay it. If a payroll tax is im-
posed on an employer for example, how much of the cost does the em-
ployer actually absorb, how much is shifted forward to his customers, 
and how much is shifted backward onto his employees? An additional con-
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sideration, in the case of export taxes, is whether or not the ultimate 
tax burden can be shifted totally out of the country. 
Justice in taxation involves considerations of universality and 
equality. Today the terms horizontal and vertical equity are commonly 
used, and it is worthwhile to consider these concepts in somewhat more 
7 
detail. Of these, horizontal equity is the clearer and more unambig-
uous. Once the criteria for equality are chosen, all individuals 
equal in these criteria should pay equal taxes. The problem lies in 
the choice of criteria. In the realm of personal income for example, 
should income itself be chosen, or is consumption expenditure more 
equitable? And how is income, including nonmonetary income, to be de-
fined? Although the principle is precise, the difficulties in opera-
tionalizing it are legion. 
Horizontal equity, then, demands that equals be taxed equally. 
Its corollary, vertical equity, calls for unequals to be treated un-
equally. But how unequally are they to be treated? Should the wealth-
ier, however defined, pay the same proportion of their income in taxes 
as the poor, with their greater dollar sacrifice regarded as sufficient 
inequality? Or should those with higher incomes also pay a higher pro-
portion of their income in taxes? Some of the arguments for this lat-
ter viewpoint have been presented above in the discussion of the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of money. 
Some economists cite the principle of vertical equity as the 
ability-to-pay approach. Musgrave has identified three schools of 
8 
thought in this genre. In the first of these, the expenditure side 
of the budget is ignored and only the tax burden is considered. The 
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state is to impose tax shares in an equitable manner. The nature of 
this equity is to be determined by non-economic, non-political factors. 
A wide variety of viewpoints is thus encompassed in this school; the 
specific concept of equity depending on the ethical, philosophical, 
and/or religious proclivities of the individual advocate. The second 
school, of which John Stuart Mill is the leading spokesman, also ig-
nores the expenditure side. Here the distribution of the tax burden is 
a matter of welfare economics. The burden is to be distributed so as 
to minimize total societal sacrifice and this can be achieved only by 
taxing each taxpayer up to the point where the marginal sacrifices of 
all taxpayers are equal. The third view kept the welfare approach in 
determining tax shares but expanded the argument to include the expend-
iture side of the budget: "Thus the budget came to be seen as a more 
9 
or less general plan to maximize welfare." Under this third view, it 
was possible to increase the tax share of the poor and still maintain 
vertical equity on the grounds that if the poor benefited dispropor-
tionately from public sector expenditures, it was equitable to ask them 
to pay more. 
It may be argued, of policies in general as well as tax policies 
in particular, that no policy can be better than its administration. 
One of the factors to be considered is determinacy of yield. An inher-
itance tax in a jurisdiction composed of a few large, wealthy landhold-
ings, where the oldest child by law inherited the family estate, might 
well, in a 50-year averaging period, yield adequate revenues but 
there would be no guarantee that in anyone-year period the government 
would have sufficient funds to operate. An income tax, however, with 
monthly or weekly withholding provisions, would yield a determined 
amount of revenue. 
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Convenience is a two-sided coin. On the one face there is the 
matter of convenience to the taxpayer. A tax payable a little each 
payday is for most taxpayers more convenient than one to be paid in a 
lump sum once each year. Convenience to the tax collector means the 
minimum effort exerted for each dollar in revenue obtained. The prop-
erty tax, which requires the taxing unit to assess and reassess and 
maintain extensive and elaborate records, and which the taxpayer must 
pay in a lump sum once each year an amount generally unknown until the 
bill arrives, is about as inconvenient a tax as one could devise. 
Finally, the taxing unit wishes to obtain its revenue at the low-
est possible cost. A tax in which cost of collection is a large per-
centage of the yield is to be avoided. The most common way of minimi-
zing tax collection costs is to pass them on to someone else. This is 
part of the reason why income and payroll taxes, in which the employer 
has to do the bookkeeping, and sales taxes, where the merchant absorbs 
the collection costs, are so attractive to tax administrators. 
In examining the above principles of taxation as a whole, two ap-
parently dichotomous strains can be determined. In one, a certain mu-
tuality can be found. Some of these principles fit naturally together; 
one implies the other. But in different cases, two or more of the 
principles seem to be almost mutually exclusive. It is unlikely that 
a single tax or tax system scoring high on each of these principles can 
be devised. At least, however, it should be possible to design tax 
policy that violates as few of them as possible. Again, tradeoffs need 
85 
be made and for all the guidance of economic principles, the determina-
tion of tax policy is in the final analysis a matter of politics. 
The tax and revenue principles discussed above apply to all 
levels of government. Each level, however, has specific considerations 
of its own. Discussed below are some of the considerations that are 
particular to local government. Urban jurisdictions have three special 
pecularities that need be taken into account: first, the presence of 
spillover effects; second, the need for an appropriate mix of taxes and 
user charges for local services; and third, the existence of legal and 
political restraints on local revenue raising. 
In most urban areas there are a number of services providing bene-
fits to non-residents of the local government jurisdiction. These bene-
ficiaries consume these services at no cost to themselves but at the ex-
pense of the taxpaying resident. Consequently the residents are often, 
reasonably, unwilling to tax themselves heavily to provide these ser-
vices. As a result, adequate levels of these services are often not 
10 
provided. 
One strategy commonly adopted in the attempt to internalize these 
externalities is the areal expansion of the urban government jurisdic-
tion to make it, as far as possible, coincident with the area in which 
the services it provides are enjoyed. It can readily be seen, however, 
that there are finite limits on the extent to which this can be done. 
Another possible solution is to shift the cost of financing these par-
ticular services to a higher level of government whose jurisdiction 
contains all the beneficiaries. This solution is seldom attractive to 
the level of government expected to absorb these costs. Moreover, the 
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lower level of government is more often than not reluctant to transfer 
any of its functions, as opposed to the costs, to the higher level. A 
third possibility is the financing of the specific services involved 
through user charges rather than taxes. If this is done, there is far 
less likelihood of a serious undersupply. 
The benefit principle, then, is the basic philosophical underpin-
ning for user charges, just as the ability-to-pay principle, discussed 
above, forms the basis of much of the decisionmaking process in the 
realm of taxation. The questions are often raised as to why a govern-
ment should engage in supplying anything but those public goods whose 
free provision benefits the society in general, and why might govern-
ments take part in various quasi-business activities designed to serve 
a myriad of special ends. One answer has been suggested above. An-
other is that many of these goods are not pure public goods but quasi-
public goods. The exclusion principle still holds, at least in part. 
This being the case, it is appropriate for a government to levy some 
kind of charge rather than paying for the good completely out of gen-
eral tax revenue. 
It has been suggested by the Tax Foundation that 
four major reasons underlie government provision of goods 
and services for a fee. These are: (1) the expectation of 
undesirable by-products if produced privately; (2) low prof-
itability of the enterprise; (3) cost advantages related to 
joint products, one of which must £e government provided; (4) 
tradition or historical accident. l 
The nature of urban governments is such that more of the services they 
provide fit these categories than is the case with national governments. 
Consequently, user charges playa more important role in municipal fi-
nances than in national finances. In the United States, for example, 
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about 15 percent of local government revenue is derived from user 
charges while the federal government receives some two percent of its 
12 
revenue from this source. It will be shown that this difference is 
not as great in the Central American countries where the national gov-
ernments provide many of the chargeable services rendered by local 
governments in Anglo America. 
A brief listing of some of the commonly provided urban services 
indicates their amenability to user charges. Among these are urban 
mass transit, water, sewage, on-street parking, hospitals, bridges and 
tunnels, garbage pick-up, public housing rental, operation of sanitary 
landfills, and vector control. A major difficulty with these is deter-
mining the proper rate of charge and the proportion of service cost to 
be user-charged rather than financed out of general tax revenue. The 
general view is that user charges need not cover the entire cost of 
the service provided, that a partial subsidy from general tax revenues 
is appropriate. Some economists, however, hold that if user charges 
are to be applied they should pay the entire cost of the service. Alan 
Prest, speaking specifically of developing nations such as Costa Rica 
and El Salvador, maintains the user charges 
must cover all current operating costs, appropriate depre-
ciation allowances (a replacement value basis for renewable 
assets, an alternative use value for non-renewable assets), a 
contribution towards capital costs of expansion and a contri-
bution towards the costs of public overhead expenditures. 13 
In addition to the problems attendant upon revenue raising per se, 
municipalities must also deal with legal and political restrictions, 
to which higher levels of government are not subject. Municipal gov-
ernments, wherever found, are creatures of superior governments and 
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have only such freedom in revenue raising as these superior governments 
are prepared to grant. In practice this generally means that the most 
lucrative sources, income and excise taxes for example, are appropri-
ated by national or state governments, leaving the municipalities only 
such purely local sources as property taxes and user charges on urban 
services. Moreover, the higher level of government often places formal 
limits on the amount of the local levy or requires that any change in 
rate or new charge or tax be submitted for its approval before going 
into effect. 
The second major set of restrictions on local government revenue 
raising is political rather than legal. In many jurisdictions certain 
sets of revenue measures are submitted to the electorate for its direct 
approval in plebiscites or referenda. The governing body then must not 
only decide on a revenue policy but also sell it to the voters. And 
experience has shown that electors often adopt some criterion other 
than general societal welfare when voting on money matters. Even if 
not consulted directly on revenue measures, voters often express their 
opinions, usually negative, when those officials who have introduced 
these measures seek reelection. Local government officials are far 
more vulnerable in this respect than those at higher levels. It has 
been suggested, in fact, that city councilmen are often voted out of 
office in a form of indirect protest against, or at least frustration 
with, tax increases at higher levels of government. Municipal offi-
cials, particularly those with aspirations to higher office, may be 
understandably reluctant to adopt revenue policies calling for higher 
taxes or user charges even when they are convinced that such increases 
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would be in the city's best interests. 
Finally, municipal revenue raising in Latin America, where the 
municipalities are even weaker than in Anglo America, has some charac-
teristics and problems of its own. De Moraes lists some of these: the 
patrimonial base of much of the municipal levy, the determination of 
many rates ad speciem rather than ad valorem, and a revenue raising 
system based generally on medieval criteria. 
In the majority of cases there is no direct relationship 
with a justified base for taxation and the only important ar-
gument in favor of maintaining [this system] is that it pro-
duces income (albeit in insufficient amounts).14 
He sees the consequences of this as "a static economy, deficient public 
services and a strong tendency to centralization" and suggests an over-
all long-run scheme for improvement. This plan is summarized in Figures 
8 and 9, pages 90 and 91. Chapter VII below will detail the extent to 
which his criticisms are accurate with respect to San Jose and San Sal-
vador, and indicate the extent to which progress is being made toward 
fulfillment of his developmental paradigm. 
As shown in Figure 8, de Moraes suggests that municipal tax sys-
terns can also evolve from the current systems, which he characterizes 
as medieval, to a future system in which the economy is fully understood 
and the tax system can be fine tuned to both generate adequate revenue 
and encourage economic development. In actuality, individual municipal 
tax systems are more likely to be located somewhere along a continuum 
than contained totally within one of his three boxes. We see, for ex-
ample, tax systems using both ad valorem and ad speciem impositions. 
We will however, determine which of his models San Jos~ and San Salva-
dor most closely resemble. 
System Base ___ _ Characterj.~tics_ Consequences 
Current Patrimonial 
Transitional Financial 
Future Economic 
Utilization of patrimonial natural 
resources 
Taxes and charges based on things 
and persons 
Imposition ad speciem 
Prevalence of taxes and user 
charges 
Income according to the concepts 
of increased rates and 
earmarking 
Some cases of double imposition 
Imposition ad valorem 
Adequate levy on existing eco-
nomic bases 
Perfect distinction between 
charges and prices 
Utilization of extrafiscal 
aspects of taxation 
Static economy 
Deficient services 
Tendency to centralization 
Augmentation of financial 
capacity 
Improvement of service delivery 
Tendency to decentralization 
Dynamic economy 
Establishment of developmental 
fiscal policies 
Tendency of cooperation 
Figure 8. Evolutionary model of the municipal tax system, from de Moraes, "En Busca de una Teoria," p. 
123. 
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Figure 9 suggests some alternative strategies for modifying tax 
systems, and the likely financial effects of these on various levels of 
government. De Moraes shows an appreciation for the redistribution of 
costs and benefits--and the actual increase, in some cases, of costs. 
His alternatives do not--as in fact his theory generally does not--
consider the political nature of the tax structure. Nonetheless, it is 
the best, and only, effort of its kind undertaken to date and will be 
used as a standard against which to evaluate the tax systems of San 
Salvador and San Jose. 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
As was the case with revenue, public housing policy is both im-
portant qua policy and an intriguing if complex field of investigation 
for the policy analyst. The housing shortage, it is said, is no more 
than an ugly rumor circulated by people who have no place to live. 
Joseph Fried, however, has stated: 
So far as the housing situation in the developing countries 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America is concerned, the only word 
that can possibly describe it is catastrophic. 15 
Various figures are given to supply a quantitative dimension to this 
catastrophe. A number of these will be considered below but as one 
example Marcia Keith and colleagues calculated the minimum number of 
new dwellings that would need to be built in 1975 alone as 19,360 in 
Costa Rica and 35,991 in El Salvador. Of these 11,334 of the Costa 
Rican units and 24,825 of the Salvadorean would be required in urban 
16 
areas. 
The most visible evidence of the housing crisis in Latin America, 
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and in most of the developing world, is the existence of shanty towns 
or squatter settlements on the margins of the larger cities, or on va-
17 
cant land within them. Inhabitants have constructed makeshift shel-
ters of plywood, cardboard, flattened tin cans and oil drums and any-
thing else they have been able to assemble. These settlements may reach 
considerable size; over 1,000,000 people are said to inhabit horne-made 
shantytowns on the outskirts of Calcutta and more than 600,000 squatters 
occupy the barriadas of Lima. 
These squatters, mainly recent migrants, have exhibited a surpris-
ing degree of organizational skill in their construction of their col-
onies. Alan Paton gives this account of the process of creating a shan-
tytown in Capetown from the squatters' viewpoint. 
-Do you hear what Dubula says? That We must put up our own 
houses here in Orlando? 
-And where do we put up the houses? 
-On the open ground by the railway line, Dubula says. 
-And of what do we build the houses? 
-Anything you can find. Sacks and planks and grass from the 
veldt and poles from the plantations. 
-And when it rains? 
-Siyafa. Then we die. 
*** 
There is the open ground by the railway line, but what of the 
rain and the winter? They say we must go there, all go to-
gether, fourteen days from today. They say we must get to-
gether the planks and the sacks and the tins and the poles, 
and all move together. They say we must all pay a shilling 
a week to the committee, and they will move all our rubbish 
and put up lavatories for us, so that there is no sickness. 
But what of the rain and the winter? 
*** 
Two weeks from today, that is the day of the moving. Corne my 
husband, let us get the planks and the tins and the sacks and 
the poles. I do not like the place where we are. There are 
planks at the Bragwanath Hospital, left there by the builders. 
Let us go tonight and carry them away. There is corrugated 
iron at the Reformatory, they use it to cover the bricks. Let 
us go tonight and carry it away. There are sacks at the 
Nancefield Station, lying neatly packed in bundles. Let us 
go tonight and carry them away. There are trees at the Crown 
Mines. Let us go tonight and cut a few poles quietly. 
*** 
This night they are busy in Orlando. At one house after an-
other the lights are burning. I shall carry the iron, and 
and you my wife the child, and you my son two poles, and you 
small one, bring as many sacks as you are able, down to the 
land by the railway lines. Many people are moving there, you 
can hear the sound of digging and hammering already. It is 
good that the night is warm and there is no rain. Thank you, 
Mr. Dubula, we are satisfied with this piece of ground. Thank 
you, Mr. Dubula, here is our shilling for the committee. 
*** 
Shantytown is up overnight. What a surprise for the people 
when they wake up in the morning. Smoke comes up through the 
sacks, and one or two have a chimney already. There was a 
nice chimney-pipe lying there at the Kliptown Police Station, 
but I was not such a fool as to take it.18 
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Although these settlements are better than no housing at all, it 
is obvious that they are not regarded by either the inhabitants or the 
government as satisfactory long-term solutions to the housing problem. 
It is equally obvious that the squatters, and many others, do not have 
the financial resources to successfully compete in the private housing 
market, especially in rapidly growing cities. Public housing policies 
arise, at least In part, as responses to situations of this sort and it 
is with these policies, the actors involved, the uses to which public 
housing may be put, and the motives involved that the housing sections 
of this essay are concerned. It is this great variety in possible per-
mutations and combinations of responses, actors, uses and motives that 
make the housing policy field in Costa Rica and El Salvador so attrac-
tive to the analyst. 
One possible policy response suggested from time to time is the 
simple transfer of funds to the ill-housed, enabling them to compete in 
the private housing market. This might work in areas where there was 
available a large amount of vacant if expensive housing. In rapidly 
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growing areas such as San Salvador and San Jose, however, this practice 
would do no more than inflate the price of an already scarce commodity. 
Moreover, it is difficult for the granting agency to ensure the money 
is spent for housing. Some economists argue that this transfer payment 
approach would have the advantage of not distorting consumer prefer-
ences, but on the whole this is not a practical approach to alleviatlng 
the lot of the poorly housed. 
Netzer has pointed out that in market economies, governments 
have equipped themselves with a large number of policy tools 
designed to increase the accessible supply of good quality 
housing, either in general or for selected income groups, by 
lowering the price at which housing is offered to consumers 
or offering gpecial incentives for public and private builders 
of housing. 1 
He divides these policies into four major types according to their prin-
cipal effects, viz. 
1. Subsidizing the initial outlay for land and construction 
of housing. 
2. Making mortgage credit cheaper and more readily available. 
3. Changing factors that affect the costs of construction and 
land and, thereby, the price at which a newly completed, un-
subsidized housing unit can be sold or rented. 
4. Affecting the tax burdens borne by housing occupants and 
investors in housing. 20 
The idea of subsidizing land and construction developed in Europe 
and was imported into the Americas. Agencies were created, either 
autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies of the national government or 
local public authorities, which issued bonds to raise the funds required 
for new housing. Rents, scaled to income, were collected from the ten-
ants (in some cases the public housing clients purchased rather than 
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rented, but rental is more common) and subsidies from the national gov-
ernment were used to make up the difference between revenue collected 
and costs. Tenancy in this kind of housing has, in the United States 
generally, been restricted to the very poor. 
It is worth noting that some of the problems which have severely 
hampered this type of program in the United States have been weaker or 
absent in much of Latin America. The supposed stigma of living in a 
'project' is missing. Despite the accelerating pace of suburbanization 
on the Anglo-American model, the outskirts of the city where land for 
subsidized housing is available are not necessarily the preserve of 
middle-income homeowners. In addition, the poor are usually not as 
ethnically distinct and distinguishable from their middle-class neigh-
bors as is the case in many U.S. cities; hence there is not the same 
degree of antipathy toward them. We might expect to see, therefore, 
greater success with this sort of operation in San Jose and San Salva-
dor than in Los Angeles or Detroit. 
The making of mortgage credit cheaper and more available gener-
ally takes one of three forms. Of these, the most widespread is the 
provision of national government guarantees or insurance of conven-
tional mortgages. Lenders, their losses covered, can then afford to 
offer mortgages at lower rates over longer terms with a smaller down 
payment. This scheme has benefited primarily lower middle- to middle-
class families that may have been short on cash but had adequate long-
term income prospects; it did little to help the truly poor. 
The second credit policy involves the borrowing of funds by gov-
ernment at the lower rates it can command and the relending, at these 
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lower rates, to individual builders and house buyers. The third credit 
policy is actually an expansion of the second. Here government pro-
vides mortgage credit at rates even below its own cost of borrowing. 
In effect it subsidizes the individual borrowers. While these policies 
reach farther into the low-income ranks than the first credit policy, 
once again they do not benefit the poorest. Often they are used to 
provide favored treatment to select groups; in the U.S., veterans, and 
in Latin America, public employees. It is worth speculating on the 
possible policy implications in this field of a totally nationalized 
banking system such as is found in Costa Rica. 
Policies designed to actually decrease the costs of land assembly 
and housing construction are to be preferred, economically and politi-
cally, to the provision of subsidies. A difficulty here is that even if 
massive construction cost savings were achieved, the savings to the ten-
ant would be small. If, for example, a reduction of one-quarter in ma-
terials costs and one-third in on-site labor costs were realized, 
monthly housing costs to consumers would decrease by less than ten per-
21 
cent. 
Nonetheless, there are possibilities for savings here. One way 
would be to replace outdated material standards for construction with 
performance standards. Other options include experimentation, more 
widespread abroad than in the U.S., with such concepts as cooperative 
housing construction and various forms of self-help. It would seem that 
the organizational skills and spirit of cooperation manifested by the 
squatters in their construction of tugurios could be channeled, with 
some governmental aid, into the construction of adequate permanent hous-
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ing. The extent to which this can be done will be examined below in 
our specific discussion of housing policies in Costa Rica and EI Sal-
vador. 
The final policy tool to be considered here is the adoption of 
policies to reduce taxes on housing. Local property taxes cannot be 
passed on, either by homeowners or by landlords to tenants already 
spending the maximum they can possibly afford on housing. As a result, 
landlords either evict their poorest tenants where this is feasible or 
cut other costs such as maintenance. Once-adequate housing may thus 
deteriorate to the point where it is no longer habitable. The nature 
of the depreciation allowance under income tax regulations may affect, 
usually adversely, the quality of rental housing constructed. In this 
respect, as in so many cases, central government policy is often at 
odds with local government wishes. Where the landlord is an agency of 
the central government, it not only does not pay local property tax it-
self but removes from the rolls land that could be used for tax-paying 
private activities. Moreover, most local governments depend so heavily 
on the property tax that major reductions would severely restrict their 
ability to provide essential services. Useful policy tools here will 
arise only from expanded intergovernmental cooperation. 
The actors in the field of provision of low-cost public housing 
are many and varied. The largest group is, of course, the clientele or 
potential clientele of the housing. In closest contact with the clients 
is the proximate supplier of the housing, generally a local or national 
governmental agency. Closely related to this agency are the other 
agencies providing such support services as water and electricity. Un-
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derlying all of this is the funding agency. In the U.S. this is most 
often the federal government. In Latin America, the national govern-
ments are usually unable to undertake the full funding of public hous-
ing; thus extranational actors come into the policy picture. These may 
be foreign governments such as the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID) or international bodies such as the Banco Interamericano 
de Desarollo (BID) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). Private extranational actors such as the Ford Foun-
dation may also be involved. In addition to external funding agencies, 
outside actors providing technical expertise and aid may play a part in 
the policy process as well. Finally, nationally based private agencies 
may also be involved in the provision of low-cost housing. They will 
be considered here primarily in order to compare them with governmental 
agencies in terms of performance, efficiency, choice of client groups, 
motives and the nature of the decisionmaking process. 
Public housing policy may have many uses in addition to the ob-
vious one of providing lower-income people with a place to live. The 
22 
government may use it for social experimentation. For example, it 
may wish to see if providing housing units of a certain size affects 
the birth rate or encourages the nuclear vis-a-vis the extended family. 
Housing policy may also be used to generate employment, both directly 
in the construction of housing units and indirectly in that workers en-
gaged in this construction may develop or upgrade skills that are mar-
ketable in other sectors. In addition, housing policy may have a 
breeder effect, as for example encouraging the development of a local 
building materials industry. 
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Sean Elliott suggests still another use, increasing productivity. 
He reports that the study of Vicos in Peru showed that housing per se 
was strongly related to worker productivity, enough so to justify the 
capital outlay. Elliott concluded that "low cost housing construction 
in Latin America is justified on economic as well as political and 
23 
social grounds." This being the case, housing can be regarded as a 
capital good as well as a consumer good and occupy a whole different 
place in the development expenditure hierarchy. Finally, public hous-
ing may be used to influence migration and settlement patterns. This 
may be done locally to guide land use within the municipality or on a 
national scale to locate settlement appropriately in relation to 
planned employment opportunities and service delivery networks. 
As varied as the uses to which public housing policy may be put 
are the motives that inspire its creation. The political system may 
simply be responding to a manifest need for shelter. Or it may see 
certain housing provisions as fitting into a general plan. The elimin-
ation of tugurios may be regarded as good housekeeping. Perhaps the 
government wishes to neutralize negative externalities from the ill-
housed sector of the populace such as the spread of fire, crime or vice 
into middle-class neighborhoods. It could be that the authorities wish 
to obviate the possibility of a cholera epidemic. The motives underly-
ing the provision of low-cost public housing may be purely political; 
the system may be trading housing for votes, support, or overt recog-
nition of its legitimacy. Or it may be necessary to pacify a citizenry 
on the verge of rebellion. Most likely, no one motive underlies all 
public housing policy but it is worth investigating to see which ones 
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tend to be the strongest instigating forces in which polity under what 
conditions. 
There does not exist a pure theory of public housing provision 
applicable in all situations as there exists a set of taxation princi-
pIes. Nonetheless, there do exist criteria for the efficient operation 
of a low-cost, money-losing public housing scheme as well as a fairly 
generally usable set of objectives for housing policy in developing 
areas. Musgrave offers the following observation on efficiency from a 
public finance viewpoint: 
In the efficient system, a loss operation in low-cost hous-
ing involves (1) a policy of distributional adjustment in 
favor of low incomes, since only low-cost housing is involved; 
(2) a recognition of housing as a merit want, since the dis-
tributional adjustment is not made in cash; and (3) a prefer-
ence for public production management, since otherwise 10w-
cost housing might have been provided by subsidies to private 
firms. 24 
Charles Abrams recognizes that housing objectives in developing 
countries must by their very nature be situational, varying with such 
factors as financial resources, housing shortfall, level of economic 
development, state of the current housing supply, geographical consider-
ations, and a myriad of social and political pressures. With this 
caveat in mind, he offers a set of policy objectives that "are probably 
appropriate for most countries." These thirteen objectives are: 
1. Priority in Housing Production for Lower-Income Families 
2. Opportunity for Homeownership by Low-Income Families at Low 
Costs 
3. A Housing Program Offering Reasonable Choices of Environ-
ment 
4. A Sound Financing Policy Enabling Low- and Moderate-Income 
Families to Buy Homes 
5. Encouragement of Savings 
6. A Sound System of Subsidies 
7. A More Effective Building Industry 
8. Reduction of Home Construction Costs 
9. The Placement of Industry Where a Minimum of Housing Has 
to Be Built 
10. A Reasonable Program for Rehousing Squatters 
11. Prevention of Squatting 
12. Encouragement of Cooperation 
25 
13. Sensible Rent Controls or Their Repeal. 
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Many of these objectives have already been considered in our dis-
cussion of the sorts of policy tools governments have adopted to aid in 
the provision of accessible housing. These objectives will be examined 
in more detail as we consider which of them are particularly appropriate 
in San Jose and San Salvador, and the degree of success in meeting them 
in these urban areas. Two of the objectives, however, a sound system 
of subsidies and a reasonable program for rehousing squatters, merit 
further discussion here. 
Whatever the precise nature of the subsidy, whether it takes the 
form of cash subsidy, deficit subsidy, interest rebate, writedown of 
land or building costs or some other form, four general rules guide the 
dispensation of subsidies. In the first place, a subsidy should serve 
a public purpose and be part of a defined, long-term objective. The 
legislative authorization should be clear and unambiguous, and not allow 
excessive administrative discretion. To this end the appropriation 
should be made periodically and not renewed without careful scrutiny 
of the agency's operations. 
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Secondly, if there is a necessary choice to be made between sin-
gle and multiple purpose subsidies, the multiple service subsidy is to 
be preferred. Subsidies for low-cost housing are rated high here be-
cause the same dollar not only provides housing but also, it is claimed, 
stimulates employment, reduces social tensions caused by squatting and 
cuts down on the whole variety of negative externalities associated 
with the housing shortage. 
Third, the subsidy should be defined and certain, open and not 
hidden. It must be realized, however, that there are occasions upon 
which political realities will require that the subsidy be kept out of 
sight. 
Finally, subsidies should be distributed equitably and without 
favoritism within the group they are designed to serve. That is, if 
subsidies are destined for members of a certain income class, each mem-
ber of that class should have equal access to the subsidy. Subsidies 
should not be used, for example, to reward the politically faithful who 
meet income criteria. Again, it should be remembered that these are 
ideal principles of subsidization and political realities could cause 
to last two especially to be honored primarily in the breach. 
A program for rehousing squatters must contain two major elements: 
a fixed, known date for their removal from the squatter settlement and 
someplace for them to move at this time. The primary concern, there-
fore, is with the provision of housing, without which there can be no 
successful relocation. As far as possible, relocation of squatters 
should be carried out en masse, mcving whole colonies if possible rather 
than one household at a time. The government should not dismiss the 
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possibility that certain shantytowns might best be turned over to the 
squatters, with aid provided to help them upgrade their on-site housing 
and appropriate compensation paid to the owners of the appropriated 
property. It is worth noting that the problems facing governments in 
the relocation of squatters in the developing nations parallel closely 
those of the U.S. in its Urban Renewal programs. Had the public au-
thorities in the U.S. heeded these basic relocation principles, it is 
possible that much of the citizen disenchantment with the 'Federal Bull-
dozer' could have been averted. 
In the section above we have noted briefly some of the factors in-
volved in public housing policy. Possible actors, motives, uses and 
policy responses have been considered. Some basic principles of effi-
ciency in low-cost housing and objectives of housing policy for develop-
ing countries have been mentioned. It is with this tableau as backdrop 
/ that the housing policies affecting the urban areas of San Jose and San 
Salvador will be examined in Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER V 
BACKGROUND FACTORS 
It has been stated that we assume a number of political, social 
and economic background factors affect both the policymaking process 
and the policy products in San Jos~ and San Salvador. These factors 
have been listed above, page 11. In this chapter these specific fac-
tors are examined with a view to both assessing their individual im-
pacts and determining which ones vary sufficiently between the two 
cities as to possibly account for differences in policy. 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
The political considerations, again, are 
1. Structure of city government 
2. Relations between municipal and national governments 
3. Role of parties and elections 
4. Importance of non-governmental groups in the policy 
process 
5. Policy preferences of leaders of city governments 
These categories are not all mutually exclusive; certain elements might 
as well be considered in one as in another. Nonetheless an attempt 
will be made here to examine the various data under the most logically 
appropriate headings. 
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Structure of City Government 
Under the structure of city government the following are in-
cluded: constitutional provisions, legal duties and obligations, leg-
islative and administrative organization. A reasonable argument could 
be made for treating the constitutional milieux of the cities in the 
section on national-local relations. However, we have decided that be-
cause of the preeminence of this topic and its function as a base for 
examination of other political factors it merits discussion prior to 
any of the others. The sections of the constitutions dealing with mu-
nicipal governments are as brief as they are important. Consequently, 
they are reproduced here in their entirety. 
In the Costa Rican Constitution, the eight articles dealing most 
directly with municipal government are compiled into one chapter as 
shown below. 
Article 168. For purposes of public administration, the na-
tional territory is divided into provinces; these are divided 
into cantons and the cantons into districts. The law may es-
tablish special circwnscriptions. 
The Legislative Assembly, by observing the requirements for 
the partial amendment of this Constitution, may create new 
provinces,' provided that the respective proposal is previously 
approved by a plebiscite which the Assembly shall order to be 
held in the province or provinces which are to be divided. 
The creation of new cantons must be approved by the Legisla-
tive Assembly by a vote of not less than two thirds of the 
entire membership. 
Article 169. The administration of local interests and ser-
vices in each canton shall be entrusted to a municipal gov-
ernment, consisting of a deliberative body composed of munic-
ipal regidores selected by popular election and such execu-
tive official as the law may determine. 
Article 170. Municipal corporations are autonomous. 
Article 171. Munic~pal regidores shall be elected for a term 
of four years and the position shall be compulsory. 
The law shall specify the number of regidores and the manner 
in which they shall serve. However, the municipalities of 
the central cantons of provinces shall consist of not less 
that five titular regidores and a like number of alternates. 
The municipal officials shall be installed on July first of 
the corresponding year. 
Article 172. Each district shall be represented in the munic-
ipality of the respective canton by a titular sindico and al-
ternate, with the right to speak but not to vote. 
Article 173. Municipal ordinances may be: 
1) Objected to by the official whom the law designates, by a 
veto with explanation; 
2) Appealed by any interested party. 
In either case, if the municipality does not revoke or amend 
the ordinance objected to or appealed, the case shall be re-
ferred to such court of the judicial power as the law may 
specify, for final decision. 
Article 174. The law shall specify those cases which the 
municipalities require legislative authorization to contract 
loans, encumber their properties or revenues, or alienate 
movable or immovable property. 
Article 175. The municipalities shall fix their ordinary and 
extraordinary budgets which, in order to take effect, must be 
approv~d by the comptroller general, who shall supervise their 
executlon. 1 
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Additional constitutional provisions affecting municipalities in 
Costa Rica provide that: the ordinary budget include all probable rev-
enues and authorized expenditures for the fiscal year, expenditures may 
not exceed probable revenues and the fiscal year is the calendar year 
(Article 176); contracts for execution of public works, purchases and 
sales or leases of property must be through bids (Article 182); the 
comptroller general is to examine and approve or disapprove the munic-
pal budgets, their execution and liquidation (Article l84[2J). 
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In the Salvadorean Constitution, Chapter One of the section on the 
Administrative System contains the seven articles specifically ad-
dressed to local government. These are: 
Article 101. For purposes of political administration, the 
territory of the republic is divided into departments, the 
number and boundaries of which shall be fixed by law. Each 
department shall have a governor and a substitute governor, 
appointed by the executive power. 
Article 102. To be a governor the following qualifications 
are required: to be a Salvadorian, a layman, over twenty-
five years of age, to be in exercise of the rights of citi-
zenship, having been so for three years immediately preced-
ing his appointment, to be of well-known morality and educa-
tion, and a native or resident of the department. In the 
latter case, two years' residence immediately preceding ap-
pointment is necessary. 
Article 103. For purposes of local government, the depart-
ments are divided into municipalities, which are governed by 
municipal councils consisting of a mayor (alcalde), a syndic 
(sindico) and two or more aldermen (regidores), the number of 
whom shall be in proportion to the population. 
The members of the municipal council shall be elected for a 
term of two years, may be reelected, and their qualifications 
shall be determined by law. 
Article 104. Municipal funds may not be centralized in the 
general funds of the state and may not be used except for mu-
nicipal services. 
The municipal councils shall administer their resources for 
the benefit of the community, and shall submit detailed and 
documented accounts of their administration to the appropriate 
court. 
Article 105. The law shall specify the powers of the munlCl-
pal councils, which shall be purely economic and administra-
tive. 
The municipal councils are autonomous in the exercise of their 
functions. As juridical persons, they are liable for their 
acts as a body, or their individual members may be so liable, 
as the law may prescribe. 
They shall prepare their schedules of local taxes, to be sub-
mitted to the Legislative Assembly for enactment as laws, and 
that body may make any changes deemed necessary. 
Article 106. Municipal councils may appoint their own officials 
and employ~es without the intervention of any other authority. 
Article 107. The executive power shall see that municipal 
councils comply with the laws, but he shall always respect 
municipal independence. 2 
Further provisions of the Salvadorean Constitution relating to 
municipalities provide that: the National Assembly is to authorize 
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the executive power, by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the dep-
uties, to guarantee obligations of public interest contracted by munic-
ipal entities (Article 47-16); all rules governing conduct of public 
employees, the establishment of a career administrative service, and 
the prohibition of strikes by public employees, extend to municipal 
employees (Article 111); contracts for public works or the acquisition 
of personal property for which public funds are to be expended must be 
submitted to public bids (Article 127); neither the legislative nor 
the executive branch may relieve officials and employees who manage 
municipal funds of the obligation to pay sums of money retained by 
them, nor dispense with the payment of debts due the municipalities 
(Article 133). 
A number of similarities, and differences, between the two con-
stitutions as they relate to municipalities are immediately evident. 
Among the similarities, both begin by describing the subnational terri-
torial system, of which the municipalities constitute an important 
part. Legal and political linkages between these and the intermediate 
units, termed departments in El Salvador and provinces in Costa Rica, 
will be examined below in the section on intergovernmental relations. 
Nonetheless a brief description of the structure is appropriate here. 
Costa Rica is divided into seven provinces. The province of San 
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/ Jose contains about ten percent of the land area and 30 percent of 
the inhabitants of the country. This province is in turn divided into 
20 cantons, the central one of which is also named San Jose. The 
canton is in its turn composed of 11 districts, four of ~lich have 
the rank of city and seven the rank of barrio. Minor subdivisions, 
some of which are also called barrios and others poblados also exist. 
These, however, have no legal standing and may be regarded as neighbor-
hoods. The four districts mentioned above with the rank of city--
Carmen, Merced, Hospital and Catedral--together constitute the City of 
San Jose. This, however, is not the unit with which we are here con-
c~rned; our concern is with the municipality, which includes all 11 
districts. Its formal title is the Municipality of the Central Canton 
of San Jose. Unless otherwise specified all legal or political refer-
ences to San Jos~ are to this municipality. 
El Salvador, although much smaller than Costa Rica, is divided 
into 14 departments located in three zones: West, Central and 
East. The departments are composed of districts which are in turn sub-
divided into municipalities. Municipalities are classed according to 
size as cities, villas or pueblos. This ranking is merely a 'hierachy 
3 
of honor'; there are no differences in powers or duties among the var-
ious classes of municipalities. The Department of San Salvador con-
tains the District of San Salvador in which is located the Municipality 
(or City) of San Salvador, the legal entity with which we are most con-
cerned. There exist within the municipalities smaller divisions called 
cantons which are analagous to barrios (second meaning) and poblados in 
Costa Rica. These will not be considered further for two reasons: 
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they have no legal-political standing and the differing use of the 
term canton in the two countries could lead to confusion on the part of 
the reader. A complication arises in that certain statistics are col-
lected for, and the general plan encompasses, Metropolitan San Salvador 
(Metro) which includes the entire District of San Salvador and part of 
the District of Nueva San Salvador in the adjacent department, La Li-
bertad, but does not include the rest of the Department of San Salva-
dor. This complication will be dealt with as it arises in the course 
of this essay. 
In each country the co~stitution provides that local government 
shall exist to look after local interests and, moreover, that such lo-
cal government is to be elected by the citizenry it serves. El Salva-
dor and Costa Rica both require the size of the governing body to be 
related to the size of the population governed. Each constitution im-
poses severe constraints upon the municipality's fiscal freedom; bud-
gets and tax structures must be approved by agencies of the national 
government. Furthermore, the municipality in each country is consti-
tutionally required to let public works and purchase contracts only 
through open competitive bids. 
Municipal autonomy is referred to in both constitutions; on this 
topic there are some similarities and some differences. The Costa 
Rican Constitution provides that "the municipal councils are autonomous 
in the exercise of their functions" and that they "may appoint their 
own officials and employees without the intervention of any other au-
thority" but their powers are limited to the "purely economic and ad-
ministrative," revealing apparent antimony within the constitution it-
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self. 
At this point some divergence in the two constitutions, in their 
provisions respecting municipalities, may be noted. Costa Rican munic-
ipal officials are to be elected for four years, Salvadorean for two 
years. EI Salvador provides for the separate election of an alcalde 
(mayor) and sindico (legal officer) along with the regidores (council-
lors); Costa Rica provides for the election of only the regidores, who 
as a body are to select and appoint the executive officers. It is 
worth noting here, to avoid further confusion, the difference in the 
term sindico as used in the two countries. In EI Salvador the term 
refers, as mentioned above, to the municipality's chief legal officer. 
In this he combines the roles of counsel, solicitor, attorney, auditor 
and bill collector, and is second only to the alcalde in power and 
prestige. The Costa Rican sindico is chosen by a neighborhood to be 
its spokesman. He is nothing more. He attends council meetings with 
the right, as the Constitution puts it, "to speak but not to vote." To 
avoid difficulties the term sindico will not be used further in this 
essay. The English term syndic is dismissed as vague and imprecise. 
Sindico in the Salvadorean sense will be rendered as legal officer; in 
the Costa Rican sense, as neighborhood representative. 
The very existence of the office of sindico in the Costa Rican 
sense points up another constitutional difference. While this sort of 
popular participation in municipal decisionmaking is mandated in the 
Costa Rican Constitution, it is nowhere mentioned in the Salvadorean. 
The latter does, however, contain two provisions not found in the for-
mer. One requires that municipal funds held in trust not be comingled 
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with general national funds; the other that city councillors are lia-
ble severally as well as jointly for their acts. 
Apparent differences in constitutions may not mean actual differ-
ences in law or practice. One country's constitution may speak to an 
issue which the other ignores, but statutes may make up for the omis-
sion. Costa Rica, for example, constitutionally compels acceptance of 
the office of regidor by any person elected thereto while the Salvador-
ean Constitution is silent on this point. However, the Salvadorean 
Law of Municipal Concern (hereafter referred to as the Municipal Act) 
does make acceptance of the office mandatory. Likewise in El Salvador 
the Constitution allows for the reelection of regidores; in Costa Rica 
the Constitution says nothing on this point but the Municipal Code pro-
vides for such reelection. Further, the Constitution of El Salvador 
mandates a career civil service system for municipal employees. The 
Constitution of Costa Rica does not but this nation's Labor and Munic-
ipal Codes effectively set one up. 
These, then, are the important constitutional provisions relating 
to municipalities in E1 Salvador and Costa Rica. But as basic as the 
constitutions are to an understanding of municipal operations they are 
only necessary and not sufficient. Constitutional rights and duties 
provide the skeleton for the municipal system. It remains now for us 
to examine the muscles and sinews and blood. 
The duties and obligations of municipalities in the two Central 
American republics include the usual ones familiar to those students 
acquaint~d with the Anglo-American municipality as well as a number 
that are less familiar. Municipal corporations in El Salvador, like 
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many in North America, are responsible for, among other concerns: 
maintaining public order; construction and repair of streets; compil-
ing vehicle and pedestrian statistics; promotion of institutions to 
improve public morality; maintenance of public transportation; regula-
tion of usage of roads, streets and bridges, with respect to subsurface 
drains, powerlines, and automobiles; setting up public health authori-
ties; maintaining both a civil register (births, deaths, marriages and 
divorces) and a voter's list; and establishing libraries and elementary 
schools. Unlike most North American cities, those in El Salvador are 
also required to: conserve fish in rivers and lakes; guard the water-
sheds; insure twenty-four hour pharmacy service; publish books and 
monographs diffusing useful knowledge; regulate both transactions in 
the municipal market and weights and measures; and protect against for-
est fires. This last requirement, in fact, is specified to the extent 
that Article 17 of the Municipal Act requires each municipality, at its 
first session of the year, to appoint a forest ranger paid out of mu-
nicipal funds. This same Article levies a fine on any property owner 
who allows the destruction of any tree or bush on his property, if this 
plant cover is deemed necessary for the well being of the city's water-
shed. 
In those matters of particular concern to this study, municipal-
ities are obligated to collect all monies owing them, keep assessments 
up to date, and pay their own bills each month. No mention is made of 
any municipal responsibility for the provision of publicly funded or 
assisted housing. 
Costa Rican municipalities are broadly charged with "the admin-
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istration of local services and interests toward the end of promoting 
the integral development of the cantons in harmony with national devel-
5 
opment." More precisely, they are to: promote the progress of cul-
ture, science and art; establish public libraries; hold seminars and 
conferences, give energetic impulses to education by, among other prac-
tices, awarding scholarships to low-income students; guard the physi-
cal and mental health of the inhabitants; and establish an integrated 
policy of urban planning. This last is to guarantee, at least, elec-
tricity, communications, water, sewers, streetlighting, construction 
and repair of streets and a program of parks, gardens and open spaces. 
Among other duties of municipalities are: economic development, 
including agricultural; promotion of full employment; conservation of 
natural resources; maintenance of public order and security; and the 
encouragement of internal and external tourism. Finally, the cities 
are to: 
promote the C1V1C conscience of the population to the end 
of [creating] citizens exercising the principles of demo-
cratic self determination, participating opportunely and con-
scientiously in the activity of municipal government. 6 
The municipalities of Costa Rica are also required to cooperate with 
one another in the provision of works or services when this would lead 
to better public service. Any agreements signed by municipalities in 
this sphere are legally binding upon them and must be approved before-
hand by the Comptroller General. 
Two separate sections of the Municipal Code address the matter of 
public housing. In Article 41-5 the municipalities are required to 
"establish . . . housing programs of social interest" in the urban area 
and in Article 41-6 are ordered to "formulate . . . an adequate plan 
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for the construction and upgrading of rural housing." Provisions of 
the Municipal Code dealing with revenue specify that municipalities 
are to collect their revenues every quarter, levying a two percent 
monthly service charge on any amount overdue, and that tax rates are 
to be revised periodically. Municipalities are given the right to 
adopt any tax, charge or other form of revenue except those used by 
the national government. More details are provided in the section be-
below on national and municipal tax structures. 
Legislative organization varies considerably between the two 
cities. In North American terms, San Salvador has a strong mayor sys-
tem with the council elected at large, while San Jose has a council 
manager form, also with at-large elections. In both cities elections 
are on a partisan basis but there exist important differences. Each 
contending party in San Salvador offers an entire slate--mayor, legal 
officer and councillors--and the entire slate is elected or defeated. 
Councillors in San Jose are elected according to the proportion of the 
popular vote their party receives, using the quotient or modified 
7 
d'Hondt system. This is discussed more fully in the section on elec-
tions, and in Appendix C. 
/ More precisely, San Jose is governed by a legislative body of 13 
councillors and 13 alternates. Alternates serve in the case of ab-
sence of a councillor from a meeting for any reason whatsoever. The 
party composition of the councillors and the alternates is the same. 
If, for example, one PLN councillor is absent, the PLN alternate on 
top of the list substitutes for him. Thus the representation of the 
various parties remains the same, even if all councillors should be 
119 
absent and replaced by alternates. Municipal elections take place 
every four years on the same date as presidential and national ass em-
bly elections. There is also a neighborhood representative~ with an 
alternate, from each of the 11 districts. They have the right, as ex-
plained above, to speak but not to vote. The council elects its own 
president by secret ballot for a renewable one-year term. Both coun-
cillors and alternates vote but only regular councillors are eligible 
to hold the office. A majority of the votes cast is necessary for 
election. 
Each district, 11 in San Jos~, also has a five-member district 
council. One member must be the elected district representative; 
usually the alternate is also a member. Th.e remaining district coun-
cillors are appointed by the municipal council from among the inhab-
itants of the district for a two-year term. They may be reappointed. 
Article 64 of the Municipal Code assigns district councils six func-
tions: 
a) serving as organs linking the municipality and the com-
munities 
b) being organs of collaboration with the municipality 
c) controlling the municipal works carried out in the dis-
trict and informing the municipal executive as to how 
well they are being done 
d) preparing annually a list of the public works most 
needed in the district 
e) receiving contributions or raising other funds and im-
mediately turning them over to the municipality, with 
the funds earmarked for purposes agreed upon by the 
district council 
f) whatever else falls under the care of the council, con-
gruent with its nature and ends. 
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The Comptroller General has determined that district councils, like 
municipal corporations, are juridical persons. In practice, however, 
their role seems to be purely advisory. 
The legislative structure of San Salvador is much simpler than 
that of San Jose. A mayor, a legal officer, 12 councillors and 
two alternates are elected for two-year terms. Municipal and national 
assembly elections, may not, by law, coincide with presidential elec-
tions. As both a member of the council and chief executive officer, 
the mayor is the preeminent political figure in the city. No neighbor-
hood representatives are elected, nor is there any equivalent of the 
district councils found in Costa Rican municipalities. 
Committees are to be set up in both municipal councils. Four 
standing committees are in fact mandated by the Salvadorean Municipal 
Act. These are: 
a) Public instruction, police, jails and public works 
b) Roads, streets, plazas and sanitation 
c) Streetlighting, street cleaning and public decoration 
d) Markets, s~aughterhouses, water services, weights, monies 
and measures. 
Other committees established by the San Salvador council include: ser-
vices, community action, finance, administration and personnel, and 
planning. The four required committees are to be made up of council-
lors; individuals may be asked to serve on the other committees if the 
council feels this is necessary. Individuals are free to refuse these 
requests. Committees have the power to oversee municipal services in 
their purview and to demand data and reports from administrative per-
sonnel but cannot issue orders or spend funds independent of the council 
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as a whole. 
San Jos~ has established eight standing committees and may from 
time to time augment these with interim committees as the council feels 
appropriate. The eight standing committees are: finance and budget-
ing, public works, juridical matters and police, public health and dec-
o?ation, transit and urbanization, social work and scholarships, cul-
ture and sport, and protocol and public relations. Members are named 
to all of these by the president of the council. Finance and public 
works are to have seven members, of whom four must be councillors or 
alternates. The other standing committees are made up of five members 
of whom three must be councillors, alternates, or neighborhood repre-
sentatives. Interim committees may contain any number of councillors 
not less than three. No councillor or alternate may be named to more 
than two standing committees nor head more than one. 
Each committee at its first meeting, which must be held within 
15 days of its creation, is to name a president and a vice presi-
dent and hire a secretary. The secretary is to be a municipal employee, 
paid a salary determined by the committee. If the council president 
deems it necessary he may appoint a municipal employee from the area of 
concern to serve as coordinator between the committee and the municipal-
ity. Although it is not required, make up of the committees usually 
parallels the political composition of the council as a whole. If the 
committee cannot agree on a report or recommendation to the council, 
majority and minority reports may be presented for the council's consi-
deration. 
One final aspect of the legislative organization of the municipal-
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ities of San Salvador and San Jos~ is the frequency with which the re-
spective councils meet and the parliamentary procedures at the meet-
ings. Article 68 of the Salvadorean Municipal Act requires one meet-
ing of the municipal council each month, between the first and the 
fifth. Extraordinary sessions may be called by the mayor or a major-
ity of the councillors, with 24 hours l~dtten notice. Such sessions 
are seldom called. The agenda for meetings, again specified by stat-
ute, consists of: 
1) the mayor gives an account of how the policies and di-
rectives of the previous meetings are being carried out 
and mentions any important happenings since that meet-
ing 
2) the municipal secretary gives an account of all corre-
spondence received, resolutions and other business that 
the council ought to be cognizant of, or requiring its 
resolution 
3) the standing committees report on their work 
4) the interim committees report on their work 
5) the council considers, discusses and resolves any new 
business arising from the above. 
The council is to resolve every issue raised at the meeting at which 
it is raised. A majority of the councillors are necessary for a quo-
rum, and passage of any act or resolution requires a majority of the 
votes cast. In case of a tie the mayor gets a second vote to break 
the tie. Councillors may be fined up to ten colones for absenting 
themselves from a council meeting without due cause. 
In San Jose the municipal council schedules three regular rneet-
a week: on Monday, Thursday and Friday. Extraordinary sessions may 
be called; however, since the per diem is paid for only 12 (or fewer) 
meetings a month, these sessions seldom occur. On Mondays and Fridays 
the agenda consists of: 
1) Reading of the minutes of the previous meeting 
2) Correspondence 
3) Accounts 
4) Committee reports 
5) Matters of urgent concern, as defined by the council 
president 
6) New business. 
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The chiefs of the various city departments are required to attend these 
meetings. 
Thursday meetings are designed to serve a different purpose. 
Consequently their agenda appears thus: 
1) Reading of the minutes 
2) Matters of urgent concern 
3) Audiences 
4) Correspondence (if time allows) 
5) New business. 
The audiences consist of 
receiving individuals, groups of neighbors, representatives 
of communities or associations, with an interest in treating 
matters of canton or district character, and whom, having pre-
viously solicited, the council president has fixed an audience 
for that day.9 
Department heads are not required to attend this meeting unless a mat-
ter to be raised during the audiences concerns their departments. 
A quorum consists of eight councillors in their chairs and ready 
to begin within 15 minutes of the time for which the meeting is 
scheduled. A majority of those present and voting are necessary to 
pass most resolutions. Certain matters, however, such as the firing or 
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suspension of the auditor or municipal executive, require a vote of 
two-thirds of all regular councillors. Councillors absent from a meet-
ing, excused or not, do not receive the 150 colones (¢150) per diem. 
An alternate taking a regular councillor's place receives the per diem; 
other alternates do not. The neighborhood representatives in attend-
ance at sessions receive a per diem of ¢li2.50. 
Although the legislative structure of San Salvador is much sim-
pIer than that of San Jose, the former municipality has a vastly more 
10 
complex administrative structure. Organograms of the two structures 
may be found on pages 125 and 127. An expanded table of the structure 
for each city is located in the Appendices. It is appropriate at this 
point however to examine very briefly the organizations in the two mu-
nicipalities and to note some of the important differences between them. 
San Salvador is considered first, because it has the more complex 
structure. It is worth recalling here that the chief executive officer 
(alcalde) is elected in San Salvador and thus serves as both adminis-
trative and political leader. The same is true of the legal officer, 
the number two person in both political and administrative hierarchies. 
The legal officer not only runs the legal office but also provides such 
services to the other entities as may be necessary. As shown in the 
chart, three areas are directly under the alcalde--police, public rela-
tions, and secretary. The secretary is the highest ranking appointee; 
although not protected by civil service he usually serves through sev-
eral administrations. Chief concerns of the secretary are correspond-
ence, petitions and other communications with the council, and mainten-
ance of the municipal archives. 
Figure 10. Municipality of San Salvador administrative structure. 
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Other than the four areas mentioned above, municipal services 
and employees are directed by the general office of administrative man-
agement. The office is technically headed by the secretary. Imme-
diately below this office are the five support services: physical 
plant, intendancy, purchasing, auditor and personnel office. Included 
as parts of the physical plant are motor pool and general stores. Most 
of these units serve the same functions as their counterparts in Anglo-
American municipalities; the intendancy however has no perfect, or even 
approximate, counterpart. It is responsible for: providing uniforms 
for drivers, porters, messengers and police; looking after cleaning 
supplies; provision of meals to certain municipal employees; cleanli-
ness of public toilets and baths; and maintenance and repair of office 
equipment and parking meters. 
Below the five support services are the 12 line functions 
described in more detail in Appendix D. 
The administative organization of San Jos~ is somewhat simpler 
than that of San Salvador. Here it will be examined from a functional 
viewpoint, rather than according to administrative unit. Both the bud-
get and the assignment of personnel are organized in this way; thus it 
seems the more appropriate approach. A detailed breakdown of the mu-
nicipal bureaucracy is found in Appendix E. 
Heading the administration of San Jos~, however viewed, is the 
municipal executive. Unlike the case in San Salvador, he is appointed 
by majority vote of the council and not elected by the voters. The 
appointment runs four years, roughly concurrent with the term of the 
11 
municipal council, and may be renewed. A vote of two-thirds of the 
Figure 11. 
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total membership of the council, nine out of the 13 councillors, is 
required for removal from office. 
Generally the powers and duties of the municipal executive are 
similar to those of the manager in a North American city with a counci1-
manager form of government. Article 57 a) of the Municipal Code en-
titles and requires the executive to 
exercise the functions inherent in the role of general ad-
ministrator and chief of the municipal departments. over-
seeing their organization, functioning and coordination 
and insuring the faithful fulfillment of municipal ordi-
nances and laws and rules in general. 
The executive is a 'pure' city manager; there are no municipal employ-
ees, save the auditor, outside his jurisdiction. 
Immediately beneath the municipal executive are the five offices 
which together constitute the Directorate General of Municipal Develop-
ment Policy. These offices are secretary, auditor, legal office, pub-
lie relations and municipal planning. The secretary, as in San Salva-
dor, basically serves the council and runs the municipal archives. The 
auditing and public relations functions are the usual. The legal of-
fice provides comprehensive services, filling the roles of counsel, so-
licitor, and in some cases, prosecutor. All municipal legal work is 
centralized here. The planning office carries out such urban planning, 
12 
primarily physical, as the Municipal Code requires. The seven line 
functions are presented more completely in Appendix E. 
General organization of the two municipal governments, then, is 
as described above. Briefly, some of the more significant differences 
between San Salvador and San Jos~ are: 
1) greater complexity of the administrative organization 
in San Salvador 
2) executive as elected politician in San Salvador and ap-
pointed administrator in San Jose 
3) existence of a planning function at the municipal level 
in San Jose but not in San Salvador 
4) municipal provision of police services in San Salvador 
5) collection of vital statistics at the municipal level 
in San Salvador 
6) financial contributions to education in San Jose 
7) essentially agricultural services such as extension 
programs and livestock handling in San Salvador 
8) issuance of cedu1as by the municipality in San Salva-
dor 
9) presence of a formal community development function in 
San Salvador. 
These differences are not only important as contrasts between 
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the two municipalities per se, they also represent variations in re-
lations between national and municipal governments in the two coun-
tries. These are examined in greater detail in the next section. 
Services provided by the Municipality of San Salvador but not by San 
Jose are generally undertaken in Costa Rica by the central government, 
and vice versa. In EI Salvador, for example, municipal planning in 
general and preparation of the Metropolitan Development Plan for San 
Salvador in particular are the responsibility of the Ministry of Pub-
lic Works and the National Council for Economic Planning (CONAPLAN). 
In Costa Rica, police services are provided by the Ministry of Public 
Security, cedulas are issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 
and community development is the responsibility of the National Di-
rectorate for Community Development (DINADECO). 
It should be noted that a number of what are regarded as essen-
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tially municipal services in Anglo America are not provided by either 
municipality. Neither San Salvador nor San Jos~ provides the public 
water supply or constructs sewers; these are central government func-
tions. Streetlighting is provided by private companies in both cases. 
Fire protection is provided by volunteers in San Salvador and by the 
National Insurance Institute (INS) in San Jos~. All of these things 
point to a vastly different set of relationships between municipalities 
and superior governments in the two Central American nations than those 
existing in North America. 
Relations Between Municipal And National Governments 
Generally, relations between the municipalities and the national 
governments are of three broad types: direct fiscal and administrative 
relations; service area relations, usually between the local government 
and autonomous agencies; and political relationships. A number of 
these have been discussed in the previous section; they will be re-
called only briefly here. 
Both countries, it was noted, are subdivided into political divi-
sions, called provinces in Costa Rica and departments in EI Salvador. 
Each subdivision has a governor appointed by the national executive. 
In Costa Rica this is a ceremonial position with little power and no 
direct connection with local government. 
In EI Salvador, however, the governor has a good deal of direct 
control over the municipality. He is to inspect the general operation 
of the municipalities and can hold the responsible mayors answerable 
for any shortcomings he finds. Legal officers are to report any infrac-
tions to him. He is in charge of the national police in his jurisdic-
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tion and can take control of the municipal police when he deems it 
necessary. Moreover, he can even fine mayors for failing to comply 
with his orders. In case of the governor's absence or incapacity, 
his place is taken by the mayor of the chief city within the depart-
ment. 
The importance of fiscal relations between mlmicipal and central 
governments cannot be exaggerated. Central controls, it will be re-
membered, are similar in the two countries. In El Salvador, the na-
tional Court of Accounts must approve the municipal budget before it 
comes into effect; in Costa Rica the Comptroller General has this re-
sponsibility. Municipal expenditures over a certain amount also re-
quire central approval. In San Salvador the Vo.Bo. of the Ministry of 
the Interior is required for all expenditures over ¢5,000. Only San 
Salvador has a limit this high; other municipalities, depending on 
their population, have limits of ¢100 to ¢3,OOO. ($1.00 U.S. = ¢2.50 
E.S.) The limits mean that 
the municipalities are obliged to solicit permission for the 
purchase of a simple desk, perhaps because it is considered 
that this act of the municipalities could compromise the na-
tional sovereignty.13 
In Costa Rica the Comptroller General has the power to modify 
any municipal budgets as he sees fit. Central government approval is 
required for any ordinance encumbering funds in the amount of ¢5,000 
or over, any contract involving ¢lO,OOO or over and any real estate 
transaction for more than ¢50,000. ($1.00 U.S. = ¢8.45 C.R.) Addi-
tional fiscal controls over the Municipality of San Jose include the 
requirements that expenditures and revenues balance each month and 
that any funds raised in a certain district of the city be expended 
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in that district. 
In both Costa Rica and El Salvador all municipal taxes--and 
changes in municipal tax rates--must be approved by the national leg-
islature become coming into effect, and both countries are singularly 
reluctant to approve new taxes for their capitals. In our discussion 
of specific issues we will examine the attempts by San Salvador to re-
form its tax structure, and the blocking of this attempt at the na-
tional level. For San Jose we will chronicle the difficulties faced 
by the municipality in its ultimately successful effort to install 
parking meters. It should be noted, moreover, that although most 
Costa Rican municipalities have their requests for new taxes and rate 
changes rather routinely approved, San Jose has not been allowed a 
tax increase since 1935. 
If these fiscal relations appear one-sided, control-oriented 
and, from the municipal point of view, obstructionist, there is in 
Costa Rica a balancing factor. The national government does provide 
money for the municipal treasuries, and more, proportionately, for 
San Jos~ than for other cities. Specifics will be examined in the 
section on taxes. No such subventions benefit San Salvador. In fact, 
the central government does provide some funding for other cities but 
none at all for the capital. Control, then, characterizes the central 
government's role in the financial affairs of San Salvador. 
"If strict fiscal controls are one side of the coin of munici-
pal dependency, the role of the central government in many of the 
14 
city services is the other." Ebel investigated 21 services 
generally regarded as municipal and found only two, street cleaning 
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and street nomenclature, completely under the control of the Munici-
pality of San Salvador. (Garbage collection is also a totally munic-
ipal function; it is not one of the services he examined.) The munic-
ipality, however, played some role, albeit usually a secondary one, in 
the provision of ten other services. 
A variety of non-municipal actors take part. Water and sewage, 
for example, are totally outside municipal control, being provided by 
the semi-autonomous National Administration of Aqueducts and Sewers 
(ANDA). Traffic control is completely in the hands of the Ministry of 
Public Works and Transport (MOPT). Street construction and mainte-
nance is the function of the Directorate of Urbanism and Architecture 
(DUA), another semi-autonomous agency, but there is some participation 
by the municipality. Policing is provided by the Ministry of the In-
terior (MI) and the municipality. Streets are lighted by the private, 
Canadian-owned, San Salvador Illumination Company (CAESS) under munic-
ipal regulation. Building permits require the Vo.Bo. of IVU, DUA and 
the municipality. The hand of the central government is found in even 
the most unlikely places. MOPT, for example, has a role in the munic-
ipal markets while CONAPLAN takes part in the planning of the munici-
pal fair. 
Chavez Mena has levelled criticism at yet another aspect of na-
tional government interference with municipal concerns of San Salva-
15 
dor. He charges it with franchising private corporations to carry 
on profitable activities that might well otherwise be carried on by 
municipal enterprises. One example of this is the provision of public 
transportation. As alien as the thought may be to a North American 
l~ 
mind, bus service in San Salvador, and for that matter in San Jose, 
does make money. 
Functional relations between the Municipality of San Jose and 
the Costa Rican government resemble the Salvadorean situation. Again 
we find both new and used water being carried about by an autonomous 
agency, the National Service of Aqueducts and Sewers (SNAA), which 
also has veto power over housing developments. All policing, except 
the guards at the municipal markets, is provided by the central gov-
ernment. Street lighting and mass transit services come from private 
corporations. There are some services, however, in which the Costa 
Rican municipality plays a greater role than its Salvadorean counter-
part. Among these are traffic control, road maintenance, and urban 
planning. Figure 12 below compares the participation of central and 
local governments in the provision of selected services generally re-
garded as municipal. When more than one agency has a significant 
part, they are listed in order of degree of participation. 
Generally speaking, the municipalities are not happy with the 
assumption of what they regard as their prerogatives by agencies of 
the central government. Active response, however, has been quite 
different in the two municipalities. San Salvador, making the best of 
what it considers a bad situation, cooperates readily with the agen-
cies. ~ San Jose, on the other hand, engages in constant bickering, 
16 
espcially with SNAA. 
It is worthwhile here to speculate as to possible reasons for 
this difference. One might be the greater openness of the Costa Rican 
political system--San Jose can 'get away with it'; San Salvador is not 
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Figure 12. Agencies providing municipal services. 
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permitted to. Another possible explanation is that many other munic-
ipalities also oppose some of the agencies in Costa Rica; few, if any, 
do openly in E1 Salvador. 
Some differences in the institutional settings of the agencies 
within the national government structure might also account for the 
difference. In Costa Rica these agencies are autonomous, not part of 
or subject to the control of any ministry. They are creatures of, 
have budgets approved by and are responsible to the Legislature. This 
gives them a great deal of internal administrative freedom. It also 
renders them subject to greater political pressures by legislators. 
And Costa Rican legislators are, in turn, subject to more political 
pressure from their constituents. 
In El Salvador, on the other hand, these agencies are semi-
autOTIOlti0US. Each is attached to a ministry of the central government. 
The agency must subordinate its aims and activities to the larger ob-
jectives of the ministry. The agency gains, however, the advantage of 
being a part of the national executive. It is insulated from any 
possible legislative political pressure and is responsible, through 
its minister, only to the president. And the President of E1 Salvador 
is much less susceptible to political pressure from his constituents 
than is the member of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly. 
One other peripheral but related difference may be noted here. 
A citizen, particularly one without political clout, who is unhappy 
with his water supply (most fit in this category) will approach his 
city councillor about it in San Jose. This is not the case in San 
Salvador. It is unclear whether the councillor in San Jos~ is ap-
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proached because prior to SNAA's formation in 1961 the municipality 
looked after its own water supply, or because the citizen perceives 
the councillor as more accessible than the SNAA bureaucracy, or if the 
councillor is viewed as actually being able to correct the situation. 
To this point our discussion of the relationships between munic-
ipalities and the autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies has stressed 
the negative. In both countries, however, there exist agencies spe-
cifically designed to assist the municipalities. In El Salvador this 
agency, attached to the Ministry of the Interior, is the Municipal De-
17 
velopment Bank (FINAMUN), and in Costa Rica it is the Institute for 
Municipal Development and Assistance (IFAM). 
The Municipal Development Bank was set up by the Legislature in 
1966 and was assigned as its functions: 
a) To make loans to the Municipalities in order that they be 
able to realize their works and services 
b) To give technical assistance to the Municipalities when 
this is necessary, being able to recommend sound financial 
and administrative practices in the following cases 
1) In the programming, budgeting, financing, and construction 
of municipal public works and services 
2) In the improvement of the internal administrative organiza-
tion and systems for collecting, accounting, auditing and fi-
nancial administration, in order to obtain an increase in mu-
nicipal income 
3) In whatever other type of technical assistance that the 
Bank can provide through its nature and aims and which does 
not contravene the provisions of this law. 18 
Eight years later, however, in 1974, there was still no sign of 
any financing. The explanation offered by the municipalities was pre-
dictable--central government obstructionism. Critics claim the bank 
was set up so that only the four largest municipalities could possibly 
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take advantage of it, and, further, that any municipality not having 
the official party (PCN) in power could forget about any assistance. 
There was a faint glimmer of optimism, however. Rumors abounded that 
FINAMUN was going to be, at long last, funded and staffed. Nonethe-
less, one Salvadorean municipal official was able to accurately com-
plain: 
To date there exists no institution charged with the mission 
of augmenting the financial resources of the Municipalities, 
much less of providing technical assistance. 19 
The same cannot be said of Costa Rica, where IFAM, in existence 
since 1971, is taking definite, concrete steps to aid the municipali-
ties. IFAM's two grand objectives are to 1) strengthen the municipal 
regime from a legal-political point of view, and 2) convert the munic-
20 
ipalities into true enterprises of local and regional development. 
More pragmatically, IFAM makes loans to the municipalities and 
guarantees those they obtain elsewhere, conducts seminars for munici-
pal officials both appointed and elected, serves as an instrument for 
inter-municipal cooperation, provides various forms of technical as-
sistance, carries out feasibility studies and issues monographs on 
various topics of municipal interest. IFAM also coordinates the work 
of international experts assisting the municipalities. A typical case 
occurred when IFAM provided a small municipality with a Peace Corps 
Volunteer civil engineer to design and oversee the construction of a 
21 
local water system. 
The governing board of IFAM is appointed by the Council of Gov-
22 
ernment. Of the seven members, two must be the Minister of Govern-
ment and the Minister of Public Works. Three must be chosen from a 
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list provided by the political party whose candidate ran second in the 
preceding presidential election. In only two cases, then, does the 
Council have a free choice. There is no requirement that appointees 
have any municipal experience or affiliation to serve their four-year 
terms. IFAM has, however, been on the whole very well staffed. 
The final point to be considered in re relations between local 
and national government is the partisan political factor. Here again 
the situation is very different in the two countries. In San Salvador, 
the city council is engaged in open political warfare with the national 
government. Since 1950 the official party (PRUD-PCN) has controlled 
both the National Assembly and the presidency; since 1961 it has heen 
out of power in San Salvador. 
Not only has the single-party municipal council been in partisan 
opposition to the national government, it has been the most powerful, 
perhaps the only, source of real opposition. Next to the presidency, 
the alcaldia of San Salvador is certainly the most visible and prob-
ably the most powerful political position in the country. The alcalde 
of the capital city is usually viewed as the single most likely oppo-
sition candidate in the next presidential election. Napoleon Duarte, 
for example, two-term PDC alcalde of San Salvador, did run for presi-
dent against Arturo Molina in 1972. Duarte was implicated in a bloody 
abortive coup that followed his unsuccessful candidacy. 
The situation is very different in Costa Rica where the presi-
dent of the San Jos~ municipal council is virtually invisible, even in 
San Jose, and where the same spectrum of parties is to be found in the 
council are in the National Assembly. Consider the following table: 
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TABLE I 
SEATS HELD IN SAN JOSE AND COSTA RICA, BY PARTY 
Year Party National Assembly San Jose Council 
Number Percent Nwnber Percent 
of seats of seats 
1962 PLN 29 51 5 45 
PUN 9 16 1 10 
PRN 18 32 5 45 
AD 1 2 
1966 PLN 29 51 5 42 
PUN 26 46 2 17 
PRN 4 33 
PUCR 2 4 1 8 
1970 PLN 32 56 6 55 
PUN 22 39 4 36 
PASO 2 4 1 10 
CD 1 2 
1974 PLN 25 44 5 38 
PUN 17 30 3 23 
PASO 1 2 1 8 
PRD 4 7 2 15 
PRN 1 2 1 8 
PNI 7 12 1 8 
PUAC 1 2 
PD 1 2 
SOURCE: Costa Rica, Tribuna Suprema de Elecciones, Computo de Votos. 
(1972, 1966, 1970 and 1974 issues). 
It can be readily seen that in every case the PLN held the 
largest number of seats in both the assembly and the council. More-
over, in every case except the period 1966 to 1970, the party having 
the second largest representation in the assembly also had the second 
largest representation on the council. It was anticipated, therefore, 
that municipal tax legislation, especially when passed unanimously, 
would have much less difficulty being approved by the national govern-
ment than in El Salvador. It was expected this would be a major dif-
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ference in the policy process between the two polities. There turned 
out to be no difference at all in the legislative assemblies' actions; 
tax increases were routinely denied to both San Salvador and San Jose. 
Parties And Elections 
As shown above, parties and elections playa major role in de-
termining control of the municipal governments in both San Jose and 
San Salvador. However, there are substantial differences between the 
practices of the two cities. We consider first the nature of the par-
ties and then of the electoral process. 
Both El Salvador and Costa Rica have a broad spectrum of parties 
operating at the municipal level. However, those in San Salvador are 
far more ideological and less personalistic than those in Costa Rica. 
This is particularly true of the Salvadorean PDC. It offers the 
voters a detailed platform of mutually supportive planks all based in 
the tenets of Christian Democracy as found in many Latin American 
countries. Its pre-election appeals to the electorate are couched in 
terms of this Christian Democratic philosophy. Primarily, it empha-
sizes the role of the community in the nation state and two sets of 
policy offerings. To the small urban middle class it offers adminis-
trative reform and expanded municipal services. To the mass of the 
urban poor and near poor it offers a chance to participate in the pol-
itical life of the city through neighborhood action programs, primar-
ily under the auspices of the local offices of the Department of Com-
munity Action. 
The PCN, the official party, does not go into such detail. It 
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emphasizes the integrity of its candidates, and alludes to the bene-
fits the urban dwellers will realize in having their city governed by 
the party in power nationally. As the central governing party, it 
places much less emphasis on the city. PCN's primary loyalties are to 
maintenance of the status quo, economic development, and 'Los Catorces 
Grandes,' the fourteen extended families who are said to control the 
Salvadorean economy. 
These two parties occupy the broad center of the political spec-
trum in El Salvador: PDC on the center-left and PCN on the center-
right. To the left of the PDC is the National Revolutionary Movement 
(MNR). To the right of the PCN are the Salvadorean Popular Party 
(PPS) and the United Democratic Independent Front (FUDI). The latter 
is primarily an ad hoc vehicle for the personal political ambition of 
General Jos~ Alberto 'Chele' Medrano. Medrano was dismissed from his 
post as Chief of the National Guard and from the official party as a 
political liability; he was identified in the public mind with an ap-
parent policy of occasional police murders in the late 1960s. FUDI is 
the only recognized political party that is totally personalistic. 
One more party might be mentioned, the Democratic Nationalist 
Union (UDN). It occupied a reformist position between MNR and PDC. 
Primarily, it was the party of the intellectuals. In the 1972 elec-
tion it banded together with MNR and PDC to form an United Opposition 
Front (UNO). In 1972 and subsequent municipal elections it has been 
UNO that has challenged the other parties--PCN, PPS, FUDI--at the 
polls. The PDC dominates this coalition, MNR maintains its identity 
except at election time, but UDN does not seem to have survived the 
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merger with its larger erstwhile partners. 
As indicated above in Table I, from four to eight parties gener-
23 
ally contest municipal elections in San Jose. Currently six parties 
are represented on the municipal council. While these parties are 
more personalistic than, and do not fit into ideological slots as 
neatly as, Salvadorean parties, some identification as to their broad 
general viewpoints may be attempted. From left to right, then, these 
parties may be generally arrayed thus. Indisputedly anchoring the 
left wing is the Socialist Action Party (PASO). In Western Europe 
PASO would be known as the Communist Party, but the Communist Party is 
illegal in Costa Rica. No party currently fills the generic social 
democratic slot on the moderate left. In left center, the PLN occu-
pies the same Christian Democratic position as PDC in San Salvador. 
The National Unification Party (PUN) is roughly in the center and the 
Party of Democratic Renovation (PRD), a business-oriented group es-
pousing efficient administration over all else, is slightly to the 
right. The National Republican Party (PNR) and National Independence 
Party (PNI) occupy the same sort of ideological territory on the mod-
erate right. 
It has been noted that the parties in San Jose are not as ideo-
logically distinguishable as are those in San Salvador--this does not 
mean their adherents' sense of party identification is any weaker. 
The voters in an election determine the number of seats each party will 
have, but the party has ranked its candidates on the ballot, essen-
tially determining in what order individuals will fill the seats it 
wins. Choice of an individual councillor is, therefore, effectively 
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out of the hands of the electorate but the voters do have the choice 
of party. The voters lack the opportunity to support an individual 
for a particular office. Such empathy as the voter feels, then, is 
with the party and not with anyone candidate. The party is the en-
tity for which votes are cast. 
In both cities the party composition of the governing body is 
determined by elections. In each case the electorate includes all 
residents of the municipality over 18 years of age who are citi-
zens of their respective countries. There is no voter registration 
procedure--citizens are automatically added to the voting rolls when 
they obtain, at age eighteen, their cedulas--the ubiquitous identity 
cards without which one has no civil status. 
Elections are governed by electoral boards which oversee all as-
pects including registration of parties, campaign practices and vote 
counting. Initial rulings and judgments are made by the municipal 
juntas; they can be overruled by the central boards which appoint 
them. The Costa Rican ultimate authority in electoral matters is the 
Supreme Election Tribunal (TSE). The three members of this tribunal, 
expanded to five during election years, are Justices of the Supreme 
Court. They are universally regarded as being as free from corruption 
and partisan political pressure as is humanly possible. 
No such kudos are directed to the Salvadorean Central Electoral 
Council (CCE). Its members are selected by the National Assembly. 
CCE is allegedly independent and unbiased but is generally believed to 
be yet another arm of the official party. 
To participate in an election, national or municipal, in Costa 
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Rica or EI Salvador, political parties must be registered with the ap-
propriate electoral board. Not only the party itself must be approved 
but also its slate of candidates for a particular office. Slates for 
municipal offices may be rejected by local juntas; this decision may 
be appealed to the central authority. In fact, most claims of fraud--
and they are legion--Ieveled in connection with Salvadorean municipal 
elections involve alleged improper disqualification of slates of can-
didates. Slates are generally disqualified for one of two reasons; 
either the slate was improperly selected or one or more individual 
candidates may be ruled ineligible for the position sought. In the 
latter case, in Costa Rica, the offending candidate may be replaced 
and the slate reinstated; no such second chance is usually available 
in EI Salvador. 
Party slates serve quite different purposes in the two cities. 
In EI Salvador slates are offered to the voters on an all-or-nothing, 
takes-us-or-Ieave-us basis. The party winning the greatest number of 
votes in the municipal election wins all the offices: mayor, legal 
officer and 100 percent of the councillors. 
By contrast, in Costa Rica the slate is an indication to the 
voters of the order in which the party's seats on the municipal coun-
cil will be filled. (Elections to the National Assembly are carried 
out the same way; each party has a slate of candidates in each prov-
ince.) The order of appearance of the candidates on the ballots, 
then, is not a matter of chance but of party preference. The individ-
ual on top of the party's list of candidates is the most important, 
the one on the bottom the most expendable. 
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Elections in Costa Rica, both municipal and national, are carried 
out under the quotient or modified d'Hondt system of proportional re-
24 
presentation. This system is explained in more detail below, Appen-
dix C. For present purposes, however, two significant political re-
suIts of this system need be mentioned. First, like most proportional 
representation systems, it favors small minority parties. Second, it 
makes position on the party's slate very important to the individual 
candidate. The election determines how many of a party's candidates 
are elected but position on the ballot determines which candidates. 
If the party wins two seats, they are filled by the first two persons 
listed on the ballot. 
Selection of candidates is a very important matter, and very 
different concerns are involved in the two polities. In San Salvador, 
the candidate for mayor is chosen by a national party caucus. The 
rest of the slate is chosen by the candidate for mayor in consultation 
with local and national party leaders. Disaffected members of all 
parties save the PCN often claim that meetings for this purpose occur 
at a time and place different than that announced, for the purpose of 
allowing a small cabal rather than the general party leadership to 
choose the candidates. Needless to say, the official party is quick to 
publicize this lack of candor and unity on the part of its opposition. 
Balancing the municipal ticket is regarded as critical. Each 
party selects a couple of women, a smattering of professionals--
lawyers, physicians, dentists--and representatives from laboT, educa-
tion and the small merchant class. Every effort is made to promote 
these candidates as individuals and as advocates of the interests of 
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a specific group. 
Candidates for municipal office in San Jose are chosen by the 
party faithful of the canton with the advice and consent of the na-
tional party leadership. Unlike San Salvador, little attempt is made 
to promote the candidates as individuals. The one personality ac-
tively publicized by the party is its presidential candidate. Can-
didates for municipal office, then, are neither seen as individuals 
nor as representatives of certain groups or interests, but as members 
of the party. Consequently no attempt whatever is made to balance 
the ticket occupationally. Almost as critical as the selection of 
candidates for the slate is their positioning thereon. The top can-
didate of virtually any party is assured a seat; the bottom candi-
dates of even an overwhelming majority party are unlikely to be se-
lected. Candidates who accept the limbo of a low position on the 
ticket in one election are usually rewarded by being moved up in a 
subsequent election, as those above them move on to seek national 
office. New candidates for the bottom slots are then chosen, gen-
erally from those who have served as alternates or neighborhood re-
presentatives. 
Open campaigning for office usually begins about two months be-
fore the election. It will be remembered that in Costa Rica presiden-
tial, legislative and municipal elections are held concurrently while 
in El Salvador presidential elections are separated. Partly as a re-
sult of this campaign styles differ markedly. In Costa Rica emphasis 
is upon the presidential candidate and the party. City council hope-
fuls and even candidates for the National Assembly to some extent are 
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just along for the ride. Explicit platforms or policy statements are 
few. If enunciated, they come from the mouths of the presidential 
candidates. 
Each party has its banner, its own distinctive colors. These 
are plastered about the country. Massive advertising blitzes are car-
ried on via the newspapers and on radio. The heart of the campaign, 
however, is the parade. These parades occur with greater and greater 
frequency as the election nears. During the last two weeks they are 
daily events. The general aura ranges from chaos in small towns and 
villages to pandemonium in San Jos~. Not only does each party have 
its own colors, it also has its own distinctive automobile horn sound. 
A typical evening in San Jose shortly before the election finds sev-
eral caravans of party adherents each honking out the party signal or 
waving the party banner as they surge through narrow downtown streets. 
To the foreigner it seems as though the contest is between the beeeep-
beeeep-beeeeps and the be-be-be-beep-beeps. Issues are not allowed to 
intrude. 
Styles are much different in San Salvador. UNO, dominated by 
PDC, publishes and distributes carefully thought out and prepared 
leaflets laying out past accomplishments of the municipal government 
and outlining its future plans. The background and competence of each 
candidate for office is explained. There are no continuous parades 
analagous to those in San Jose but occasionally well-publicized mass 
rallies are held. PPS activities generally parallel those of UNO but 
are more subdued, while PCN festoons the streets with banners pro-
claiming their candidates to be men of integrity. 
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Relationships among parties are quite dissimilar in San Salvador 
and San Jos~. In Costa Rica parties virtually ignore one another's 
existence and campaign as in a vacuum--only if some faux pas leaves 
the party holding the presidency momentarily open to criticism or em-
barrassment will one party refer or allude to another. Salvadorean 
parties on the other hand constantly compare programs and candidates, 
position for position. As soon as the members of the oppositions' 
slates are known, the parties attempt to discredit them personally and 
professionally. Advertisements appear regularly in the San Salvador 
dailies, paid for by Party X, alleging that Party Y's labor-affiliated 
candidate for councillor sold out the workers to some malevolent en-
tity in exchange for personal enrichment. As election day nears the 
attacks grow more vitriolic. By the last week the tone of the cam-
paign can turn outright nasty. One party rushes into print with docu-
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mentation showing another party's candidate to be a bastard. This 
party responds with material of its own and says in effect, "Our man 
may be a bastard but at least he's a Salvadorean bastard. Your man is 
a Honduran bastard, and moreover, a Honduran bastard with forged pa-
27 
peTs." 
Eventually the campaign comes to an end, the election is held 
and the municipal council takes office. Questions are often raised as 
to the openness and honesty of Salvadorean elections. Most of these 
doubts, however, relate primarily to the presidential election. UNO-
PDC, in opposition to the official party, has been in power in San 
Salvador for over 15 years. No such doubts as to freedom or hon-
esty plague the Costa Rican elections. At all levels they are among 
the most fairly conducted in the world. On the other side of the 
coin, they are also probably the world's most expensive elections. 
Expenditures per vote cast are estimated to be three times the cost 
per vote in the United States. 
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Methods of candidate selection, campaign strategies, rhetoric 
and voting procedures may seem strange, perhaps even suspect, to North 
American observers. Nonetheless, it is popular elections, contested 
by recognizable political parties, that determine control of the ma-
chinery of municipal government in both San Salvador and San Jose. 
Non-governmental Actors 
Among the basic assumptions of most models of the policy process 
is the supposition that policy is made, at least within the boundaries 
of the political system, by formal policymakers. In San Jos~ and San 
Salvador, as in many other polities, additional, informal actors may 
be found playing roles not formally ascribed them. In a subsequent 
section dealing with muncipal public finance policy we will look at 
some specific sorts of informal actors; it will suffice here to look 
at such actors generally, their points of access to the policy process 
and the causes and effects of their intervention. 
Outsiders attempting to influence the policy process usually do 
so at the legitimation phase, for a variety of very good reasons. Ac-
tors who feel themselves potent enough to influence the course of 
legislation usually wish to preserve the status quo, to prevent the 
municipality making some change such as raising a tax rate. Gener-
ally, such outside actors do not first press their case with the munic-
ipality. Often they first hear of this legislation they feel will ad-
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versely affect them after it has passed and become fait accompli as 
far as the municipal council is concerned. As a consequence, the af-
fected individual or group has no other recourse but to try and dis-
suade the central authorities from approving the unwanted ordinance. 
A number of factors make this approach quite convenient. Both 
San Jose and San Salvador are capital cities. As such, members of 
the legislative assembly, cabinet ministers and other high national 
government officials are close at hand. Moreover, those seeking to 
block the legitimation of the muniCipal legislation are usually' com-
munity influentials,' used to dealing with upper-echelon national gov-
ernment officials and in many cases are personally or professionally 
acquainted with them. Central government officials are also easier to 
locate than municipal officials, being both more readily identified 
and more likely to be in or about their offices. 
One reason national legislators are often inclined to disallow 
muniCipal legislation, especially tax bills, is that political costs 
to them are likely to be less than the political benefits. They can 
appear to the voters as fiscally responsible, always an attractive 
posture. A municipal councillor has to balance any anti-tax position 
with the demands of the canton's voters, or their leaders, for in-
creased spending on municipal services. Opposition to such demands 
could lead to a councillor's being dropped by the party at the next 
election, if the party perceived this opposition as likely to cost it 
votes. A Member of the Assembly, with a province-wide constituency, 
would obviously be under less direct and less one-sided pressure, even 
were he elected from San Jose Province. A legislator from an outlying 
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corner of the country would be viewed positively as standing up to the 
profligate capital's attempt to raise taxes, some portion of which 
would ultimately be paid by his constituents but which they would view 
as benefiting only the capital city residents. 
Pursuing the capital city syndrome further, certain acts of the 
capital municipality could be regarded as matters of national or even 
international concern. Capital cities are usually the locales for 
home offices of national corporations and country headquarters of 
multinational corporations. Should municipal actions negatively im-
pact on these corporate heartlands, the case for national counterac-
tion would be buttressed. 
The outright animosity between municipal and central governments 
in San Salvador may be mentioned again. Often the mere fact that the 
Municipality of San Salvador has passed an ordinance, particularly a 
tax ordinance, is sufficient reason for the central government to con-
sider vetoing it. Adversely affected members of the business commun-
ity in particular are well aware of this and do not hesitate to argue 
their position, usually with some success, before the Minister of the 
Interior and, if necessary, the assembly. 
Outside actors attempt to influence the policy process, then, in 
both cities. Usually the method of choice is the seeking of national 
government intervention at the legitimation stage. These informal 
policy participants are usually community influentials, and are usu-
ally successful. Animosity between city and nation in EI Salvador ex-
acerbates the situation there but any resultant differences between 
San Jos~ and San Salvador in this respect are differences of degree 
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and not of kind. 
Policy Preferences Of Local Government Leaders 
The final political factor to be considered here is the role of, 
or weight given to, the policy preferences of local government leaders. 
Once again major differences exist in this field between San Salvador 
and San Jo se. 
To a large extent, the elected officials take over the reins of 
municipal government in San Salvador with very few strings attached. 
To be sure, the party, particularly PDC-UNO, has indicated to the cit-
izenry during the campaign where it stands and what it intends to do. 
These pledges, however, like campaign promises everywhere, are both 
flexible and negotiable. 
In the political wings the national government is indeed waiting 
to disallow such legislation as it feels appropriate. But despite the 
animosity between central and city governments, not all ordinances or 
accords are vetoed on partisan or other grounds. The municipality 
simply deals with too many mundane and prosaic matters for the nation 
to be concerned with them all. Even the most ardent supporters of 
central control allow that a great deal of municipal activity cannot 
possibly be regarded as nationwide in its effects. 
There exists, morec;.::er, no externally imposed national party 
line to which the PDC-UNO council must adhere. EI Salvador is a small 
country; San Salvador is the capital city and the chief source of PDC 
political power, national:y as well as locally. The local power 
structure, it has been shown, is inextricably linked to and a part, a 
dominant part, of the national party hierarchy. Not only, then, is 
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there no intraparty cleavage but it is recognized that the municipal-
ity provides the best showcase for party policies, a showcase that 
might someday induce the voters to choose PDC nationally. 
The policy preferences of local government leaders in San Salva-
dor are thus readily and routinely translated into policy outputs of 
the one-party municipal council. And, it must be remembered, the two 
most important administrative posts are filled by elected party mem-
bers. Except for those accords, generally tax related, that are dis-
allowed by the national government, the policy preferences of the mu-
nicipal government leaders become the operational policies of the Mu-
nicipality of San Salvador. 
Policy preferences of local government leaders in San Jose are 
given no such respect. They are not ignored, but neither are they 
automatically transmuted into legislation let alone into practice. 
One reason for this is the difference in the party situation. Actu-
ally there are two important differences in the party situation. One 
of these is the presence, as we have seen above, of several political 
parties in the San Jose municipal council, a very different case from 
the Salvadorean. Second, the local government leadership does not 
constitute, although it is not necessarily excluded from, the national 
party leadership. This is particularly so for the party controlling 
the presidency or the national assembly. 
Further, there is a partnership with the usual shackles between 
local and national government in Costa Rica that is unknown in El Sal-
vador. The national government issues policy statements on local mat-
ters. It is not only politically but fiscally prudent for local gov-
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ernment to heed these, even to the point of suppressing its own policy 
preferences. Perhaps most important, the central government provides 
considerable financial assistance to local government. Much of this 
is statutorily mandated and not subject to curtailment for heterodoxy 
in policy aims but the remainder is discretionary--amounts are to be 
allocated to municipalities but particular municipalities are nowhere 
specified. The central government therefore, buys an arena for its 
policy preferences and those of local leaders are often reduced to 
secondary considerations. 
Finally, the municipal council in San Jose is obligated to not 
only hear but also to give some cognizance to the policy preferences 
of the neighborhood representatives. It will be remembered that mon-
ies raised in a neighborhood are to be spent in that same neighborhood 
regardless of other priorities council may have. Policy preferences 
of municipal government officials, then, are diluted by edicts and 
money from above as well as by narrow submunicipal interests from be-
low. 
It can be seen, then, that the status accorded the policy pre-
ferences of local government leaders varies greatly between San Jos~ 
and San Salvador. And this is only one of the political factors ex-
hibiting this variance. Others have been analyzed above. It remains 
to' be seen how these differences, when combined with any differences 
noted below in economic and social factor, influence policy process 
and policy product. Do the differences we have examined, in fact, 
manifest themselves in any important policy effects? 
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ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic background factors, like the political factors men-
tioned above, are traditionally, and rationally, regarded as affecting 
policy. The factors to be considered here are economic structure, la-
bor force composition and unemployment, public-private mix, distribu-
tional aspects, and national revenue and expenditure patterns. 
Economic Structure 
The measure chosen for economic structure is the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). (For comparative purposes all figures are given in 
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Central American Pesos. $1.00 U.S. = $1.00 C.A.) The makeup of the 
GDP at current prices, for the six years immediately preceding this 
study, is given in Table II. 
TABLE II 
STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CURRENT PRICES 
Costa Rica (000,000 $C.A.) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Agriculture 165.0 lSI. 9 209.8 218.7 230.5 252.4 
Manufacturing 132.0 l4S.1 162.5 182.9 202.3 226.6 
Construction 30.0 34.7 35.7 42.S 54.6 60.4 
Electricity 10.5 12.1 15.0 16.2 19.2 21. 8 
Transportation 27.S 30.S 35.9 3S.l 43.9 4S.6 
Commerce 10S.3 119.1 131. 6 157.7 175.3 195.4 
Finance 19.9 22.9 27.5 32.4 35.6 41. 7 
Rents 55.5 5S.0 60.6 63.9 67.0 71.3 
Government 74.3 S1. 2 92.5 103.0 121.9 140.5 
Services 70.S 75.4 82.9 91.2 98.5 10S.5 
Total 694.2 764.4 S54.l 947.0 1048.9 1167.2 
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TABLE II--Continued. 
E1 Salvador (000,000 $C.A.) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Agriculture 240.0 241.1 242.8 292.5 291.6 291.2 
Manufacturing 170.3 180.4 187.9 195.6 209.4 226.8 
Construction 27.3 22.7 27.0 28.9 32.0 40.8 
Electricity 12.6 14.0 14.4 15.5 16.1 17.2 
Transportation 39.1 45.5 49.2 49.1 52.6 55.8 
Commerce 211. 2 215.9 216.2 217.4 234.8 257.5 
Finance 16.9 18.4 20.5 23.0 24.8 26.2 
Rents 34.3 36.1 37. ~; 38.0 44.0 42.8 
Government 67.0 68.0 76.2 80.1 87.6 95.4 
Services 67.7 74.6 80.6 86.2 92.3 98.9 
Total 879.0 909.5 944.7 1020.1 1071.5 1142.1 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; Banco Central de Reserva de E1 
Salvador. 
Two factors are immediately evident--the economies of the two countries 
are very similar in size, and in 1972, for the first time, the GDP of 
Costa Rica exceeded that of El Salvador. 
Table III gives the percentage composition of the GDP for each 
country over the same time span. Again, the similarities between the 
two are apparent. In both cases agriculture dominates and manufactur-
ing accounts for about one-fifth of the total. Commerce is relatively 
more important in E1 Salvador than in Costa Rica, but only slightly; 
the reverse holds true for rental income. In neither case has there 
been any significant shift in importance of the various sectors during 
the six-year period. 
In Table IV the structure of the GDP is again presented, but in 
constant (1962) pesos. One important difference from the current price 
situation appears--the total Salvadorean economy is larger every year 
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than the Costa Rican. The latter nation has obviously been subject to 
a higher rate of inflation. 
TABLE III 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Costa Rica 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Agriculture 23.8 23.8 24.6 23.1 22.0 21.6 
Manufacturing 19.0 19.4 19.0 19.3 19.3 19.4 
Construction 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.2 
Electricity 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Transportation 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 
Commerce 15.6 15.6 15.4 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Finance 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.6 
Rents 8.0 7.6 7.1 6.8 6.4 6.1 
Government 10.7 10.6 10.8 10.9 11. 6 12.0 
Services 10.2 9.0 9.7 9.6 9.4 9.3 
El Salvador 
Agriculture 27.1 26.3 25.5 28.4 26.9 25.3 
Manufacturing 19.9 19.7 19.7 19.1 19.4 19.7 
Construction 3.1 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.5 
Electricity 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Transportation 4.4 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.8 
Commerce 23.8 23.6 22.7 21.1 21. 7 22.3 
Finance 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 
Rents 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Government 7.5 7.4 8.0 7.8 8.1 8.3 
Services 7.6 8.1 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.6 
Table V presents the year-to-year growth of the GOP, both at 
current prices and, more imformatively, in constant 1962 pesos. Using 
current prices, the Costa Rican GOP is seen to grow considerably 
faster than that of El Salvador. When inflation is accounted for, 
Costa Rica still has the faster growing economy but the differences 
are not so marked. 
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TABLE IV 
STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FIXED (1962) PRICES 
(000,000 $C.A.) 
Costa Rica 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Agriculture 158.7 168.2 188.9 188.1 192.4 201.3 
Manufacturing 126.9 136.9 146.3 157.3 168.9 180.8 
Construction 28.9 32.1 32.1 36.8 45.6 48.2 
Electricity 10.1 11. 2 13.5 13.9 16.0 17.4 
Transportation 26.7 28.5 32.3 32.8 36.6 38.8 
Commerce 104.2 110.1 118.5 135.7 146.4 155.9 
Finance 19.1 21.2 24.8 27.9 29.7 33.3 
Rents 53.4 53.6 54.6 55.0 55.9 56.9 
Government 71.5 75.1 83.3 88.6 101.8 112.1 
Services 68.1 69.7 74.6 78.5 82.2 86.6 
Total 667.6 706.7 768.8 814.6 875.6 931.1 
E1 Salvador 
Agriculture 223.1 227.1 235.4 250.9 260.3 264.1 
Manufacturing 162.0 168.9 170.2 176.8 189.0 196.3 
Construction 27.0 22.7 25.6 25.5 28.2 37.5 
Electricity 14.2 16.1 16.6 18.0 19.6 21.8 
Transportation 41.0 46.4 47.6 51.2 51. 8 54.4 
Commerce 225.3 232.8 232.8 226.2 230.4 245.4 
Finance 16.2 17.6 19.6 20.4 20.8 23.9 
Rents 32.6 33.7 34.9 36.2 37.2 39.8 
Government 64.3 63.8 71.6 73.2 79.8 85.4 
Services 64.5 69.4 75.1 79.2 84.6 89.7 
Total 870.3 898.4 929.8 957.4 1001.7 1058.4 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; Banco Central de Reserva de E1 
Salvador. 
One other point of comparison between the economies may be men-
tioned here. UNICEF has divided the economies of the Latin American 
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countries into six levels of development. In the lowest level, 
along with Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, they have 
placed El Salvador. In the second highest level they have placed 
Costa Rica, along side of Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela and surpassed 
only by Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 
Current 
TABLE V 
PERCENTAGE CHfu~GE IN GDP 
Prices Fixed 1962 Prices 
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Costa Rica El Salvador Costa Rica El Salvador 
1967-68 10.1 5.0 5.8 3.2 
1968-69 11. 7 3.9 6.6 3.4 
1969-70 10.9 8.0 6.0 3.0 
1970-7l 11.1 5.2 7.5 4.6 
1971-72 11. 3 6.6 6.3 5.7 
1967-72 68.1 36.6 39.5 21.6 
Average 11. 3 6.1 6.6 3.6 
Labor Force And Unemployment 
Labor force and unemployment data present another important as-
pect of a nation's economy. Unfortunately for analytical purposes, 
data on employment are neither as detailed nor as reliable as data on 
GDP. Nonetheless, Table VI indicates the labor force composition and 
unemployment rates for the two nations and their capital areas. 
In making comparisons on the basis of these figures, their short-
comings and limitations must be taken into account. Among other fac-
tors complicating a comparative analysis are two major ones: 1) the 
figures for San Jose are for the urban area of San Jose Province while 
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those for San Salvador are for the Metropolitan Area; in both cases 
this is the statistical reporting unit most closely approximating the 
municipality, and 2) in Costa Rica the economically active population 
is calculated from the population twelve years and over while in El 
Salvador the minimum age to be counted is ten. 
TABLE VI 
AVERAGE LABOR FORCE BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1972 (%) 
Costa Rica El Salvador San Jose San Salvador 
Agriculture 37.1 45.6 4.5 3.4 
Manufacturing 11.9 8.3 19.3 18.3 
Construction 6.4 2.1 7.2 5.5 
Electricity 0.8 0.3 1.6 0.6 
Transportation 4.0 2.6 5.1 5.3 
Commerce 10.8 7.4 17.8 17.2 
Finance 2.6 0.7 5.6 3.1 
Service 21. 3 13.1 35.3 35.1 
Other 5.0 19.5 3.7 11.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Economically 
Active 550,410 1,314,857 145,450 218,476 
Population (48%) (46%) (48%) (39%) 
Economically 
Inactive 589,040 1,537,118 154,750 342,028 
Population (52%) (54%) (52%) (61%) 
Total 1,141,740 2,852,045 300,200 560,504 
Unemployed 
Number 39,080 264,231 9,860 30,150 
Rate 7.1% 20.1% 6.8% 13.8% 
SOURCES: / Costa Rica Census of 1973; El Salvador, Direccion General 
de Estadistica y Censos. 
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With these caveats in mind some evident comparisons may be made. 
The economically inactive population exceeds the active population in 
all cases; the difference is considerably more pronounced in San Sal-
vador. In Costa Rica as a whole, a greater portion of th~ labor force 
is engaged in manufacturing, commerce and services than in El Salvador 
while the latter leads in agricultural workers and those of unspeci-
fied or unknown occupation. It may also be readily seen that the ur-
ban area labor forces, unlike the national ones, resemble one another 
very closely. 
Unemployment is much more serious in El Salvador than in Costa 
Rica with a rate almost three times as high for the nation and over 
twice as high for the capital area. It will also be noted that, in 
both cases, unemployment is lower in the metropolitan areas than in 
the rest of the country with the difference being far more marked in 
El Salvador. 
Moreover, there are other factors not shown in the table and al-
most impossible to document. In both cases unemployment is definitely 
understated by developed-nations' standards and in both cases unem-
ployment among those under age 20 is at least twice that for the 
total work force. Finally, in both countries the labor force is grow-
ing faster than job opportunities. 
Public-Private Mix 
Despite a tradition of expanded public service delivery in Costa 
Rica and the absence of such tradition in San Salvador, very little 
difference may be detected between the actual public-private mixes of 
the two national economies as shown in Table VII. 
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TABLE VII 
PERCENT COMPOSITION OF GDP BY SECTOR (PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX) 
Costa Rica 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Percent Private 83.3 83.4 82.8 82.3 83.1 81.9 
Percent Public 16.7 16.6 17.2 17.7 16.9 18.1 
El Salvador 
Percent Private 87.8 88.0 87.1 86.5 86.1 84.9 
Percent Public 12.2 12.0 12.9 13.5 13.9 15.1 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Costa Rica; El Salvador, CONAPLAN, Indica-
dores, 1974. 
It may be seen that in both countries there is slow but (with 
one exception) steady increase in the percentage of the GDP that is 
generated in the public sector. As defined here, the public sector 
activities include the central governments, autonomous and semi-
autonomous agencies, and local governments. Although the relative 
size of public sector participation is similar in both countries, the 
internal composition of the public sector is quite different, as will 
be shown below in the analyses of governmental expenditure patterns. 
Distributional Aspects 
Distributional aspects of the economy may be broadly interpreted 
as including two sorts of considerations--per capita and by economic 
class. Table VIII shows per capita GDP at both current and 1962 
prices, and the year-to-year changes. 
Two significant differences between Costa Rica and El Salvador 
are immediately apparent. Productivity, as measured by per capita 
GDP, is almost twice as high in Costa Rica as in El Salvador. More-
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over, the difference is becoming greater. Salvadorean productivity 
was virtually stagnant over the six-year period while the Costa Rican 
averaged more than three percent annual increase. 
TABLE VIII 
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AND CHANGES, 1967-1972 
Current Prices ($C.A.) Fixed (1962) Prices ($C.A.) 
Per Capita GDP 
Costa Rica E1 Salvador Costa Rica E1 Salvador 
1967 436 285 419 280 
1968 468 285 432 279 
1969 507 286 456 280 
1970 545 299 469 278 
1971 587 304 490 281 
1972 633 313 505 287 
Annual Changes in Per Capita GDP 
1967-1968 7.3 3.1 -0.3 
1968-1969 8.3 0.3 5.6 0.3 
1969-1970 7.5 4.5 2.9 -0.7 
1970-1971 7.7 1.7 4.5 1.1 
1971-1972 7.8 3.0 3.1 2.1 
1967-1972 45.2 9.8 20.5 2.5 
Average 7.5 1.6 3.4 0.4 
That per capita income figures show the same general pattern as 
per capita GDP is shown in Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
PER CAPITA INCOME, 1960 AND 1970 
Current Prices ($C.A.) Fixed (1962) Prices ($C.A.) 
1960 
1970 
Costa Rica 
364 
469 
E1 Salvador Costa Rica 
230 
298 
381 
403 
SOURCE: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales. 
El Salvador 
257 
256 
165 
Again, we find E1 Salvador stagnating in the decade 1960 to 1970 with 
the apparent growth totally eroded by inflation. Costa Rica, on the 
other hand, despite its higher rate of inflation, enjoyed an annual 
average gain of over two percent during this period. 
Although the per capita income is both higher and increasing 
more rapidly in Costa Rica, it is no more evenly distributed there 
than in El Salvador. Table X shows both distribution by income class 
and how this distribution varies between the argricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. 
TABLE X 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BY INCOME CLASS, 1970 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Poorest 
20% 
5.5 9" 
5.5% 
Next 
30% 
12.5% 
10.5% 
Next 
30% 
22.0% 
22.6% 
Next 
15% 
25.0% 
28.4% 
Richest 
5% 
35.0% 
32.9% 
Share of total income received by poorest and richest classes, 1970 
Costa Rica El Salvador 
Poorest 20% Richest 5% Poorest 20% Richest 5% 
Nonagricultural 
Sector 4.7% 25.5% 4.2% 22.7% 
Agricultural 
Sector 9.0% 42.5% 7.0% 39.5% 
SOURCE: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales. 
The general figures by class are very similar for the two, with Costa 
Rica demonstrating a slightly greater concentration in the highest in-
come group. In both countries income is much more concentrated in the 
agricultural than in the nonagricultural sector. These data would 
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suggest the existence of a middle/lower middle class in the nonagri-
cultural sector that is either absent or very small in the agricul-
tural sector. By implication this would support the idea of the 'mid-
dIe class' as an urban phenomenon. 
Another measure of equality or inequality of income distribution 
is provided by the Gini index. Barbara Stallings calculated the in-
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come Gini for Costa Rica as 0.51 and for El Salvador as 0.52. By 
this measure, then, no significant difference exists between the two 
countries. (The extreme cases for Latin America are Ecuador with 0.32 
and Columbia with 0.62; the U.S. scores 0.40.) Gini indices of land 
distribution for the two countries show Costa Rica with 0.78 and El 
Salvador with 0.83. These figures jibe with our income distribution 
data showing wealth to be considerably more concentrated in the coun-
tryside than in the cities. (Again, for comparative purposes, the 
land Gini in the U.S. is estimated at 0.71; the extremes for Latin 
America are Mexico with 0.69 and Peru with 0.93.) 
In summary, then, we see Costa Rica exhibiting a considerable 
and growing productivity and an average income advantage over El Sal-
vador. But we note as well the income is similarly maldistributed in 
the two countries; in both, the poorest half of the population re-
ceives less than 20 percent of the income while the wealthiest fifth 
of the population garners some 60 percent of the total. 
National Government Revenue Patterns 
The revenue and expenditure patterns of national governments are 
of particular concern for a number of reasons. It is here that poli-
tics and economics most directly interface. It is here than political 
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decisions are made about the allocation and distribution of a signifi-
cant portion of the societies' economic resources. And it is these 
patterns that form the tableaux against which we will examine the ac-
tual creation of local government revenue policy. 
All countries claiming some degree of adherence to a market sys-
tem fill their public fisc with a mixture of direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, and non-tax charges. Costa Rica and EI Salvador are no excep-
tions. Most also engage in some sort of borrowing, but borrowing will 
not be considered in this particular section. Our concentration will 
be upon current income. Capital investments depend to a large extent 
on internal or external borrowing. They are sporadic, showing wide 
year-to-year variations. Borrowing, particularly external borrowing, 
is uncertain. The actual pattern of general government revenue is 
likely to be distorted by these occasional influxes of special purpose 
money. As a topic of analysis, then, and as an indicator of the over-
all government mindset on revenue raising, current income is a more 
useful measure than total income. 
Tax structures in both Costa Rica and EI Salvador are incredibly 
complex. To consider their minutae in this paper would be both inap-
propriate and unjustifiable in terms of time and effort. A general 
picture of the current income structure of the Costa Rican national 
government is presented in Table XI along with some indication of 
changes in the five years immediately preceding this study. Parallel 
information for EI Salvador is provided in Table XII. 
Before comparing the separate countries over time, and one with 
the other contemporaneously, we will briefly describe what sorts of 
TABLE XI 
COSTA RICA NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INCOME, 1967 AND 1972 
Current Pesos Constant Pesos Per Capita ($) Percent of Percent Percent 
($000) ($000) (1962) Current Constant Current Income of Taxes of GDP 
Income 1967 
Current income 110,982 106,734 73.30 70.49 100.00 16.0 
Taxes 97,469 93,738 64.37 61.91 87.8 100.0 14.0 
Direct taxes 38,346 36,878 25.32 24.36 34.6 39.3 5.5 
Income 31,662 30,450 28.5 32.5 4.6 
Property 6,684 6,428 6.0 6.9 1.0 
Other 
Indirect taxes 59,124 56,861 39.04 37.55 53.3 60.7 8.5 
Import 26,939 25,908 24.3 27.6 3.9 
Export 1,457 1,401 1.3 1.5 0.2 
Excise 28,976 27,867 26.1 29.7 4.2 
Other 
Judicial activities 1,753 1,686 1.16 1.12 1.6 1.8 0.3 
Non-tax sources 13,513 12,996 12.2 2.0 
Transfer payments 4,864 4,678 
Other 8,649 8,318 
Income 1972 
Current Income 157,288 125,469 85.45 68.16 100.0 13.5 
Taxes 141,168 112,610 76.69 61.18 89.8 100.0 12.1 
Direct taxes 34,392 27,435 18.68 14.90 21.9 24.4 2.9 
Income 33,523 26,741 21. 3 23.7 2.9 
Property 869 693 0.6 0.6 < 0.1 
Other 
Indirect taxes 106,776 85,175 58.01 46.27 67.9 75.6 9.1 
Import 32,387 25,835 20.6 22.9 2.8 
Export 1,795 1,432 1.1 1.3 0.2 
Excise 64,394 51,367 40.9 45.6 5.5 
Other 6,032 4,812 3.8 4.3 0.5 
Judicial activities 2,169 1,730 1.17 0.94 1.4 1.5 0.2 
Non-tax sources 15,938 12,714 10.1 1.4 
Transfer payments 2,365 1,887 
Other 13,753 10,970 
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TABLE XII 
EL SALVADOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INCOME, 1967 AND 1972 
Current Pesos Constant Pesos Per Capita ($) Percent of Percent Percent 
($000) ($000) (1962) Current Constant Current Income of Taxes of GDP 
Income 1967 
Current income 90,762 84,371 24.67 22.93 100.0 10.3 
Taxes 84,355 78,415 22.93 21.31 92.9 100.0 9.6 
Direct taxes 18,803 17,479 5.11 4.75 20.7 22.3 2.1 
Income 15,418 14,081 16.7 18.0 1.7 
Property 3,655 3,398 4.0 4.3 0.4 
Other 
Indirect taxes 61,703 57,358 16.77 15.59 68.0 73.1 7.0 
Import 23,754 22,081 26.2 28.2 2.7 
Export 12,424 11,549 13.7 14.7 1.4 
Excise 22,551 20,963 24.8 26.7 2.6 
Other 2,974 2,765 3.2 3.5 0.3 
Judicial activities 3,849 3,578 1.05 0.98 4.2 4.6 0.4 
Non-tax sources 6,358 5,910 7.0 0.7 
Transfer payments 1,102 1,024 
Other 5,256 4,884 
Income 1972 
Current income 132,352 122,652 37.29 34.56 100.0 11.6 
Taxes 121,960 113,022 34.36 31.84 92.1 100.0 ]0.7 
Direct taxes 28,948 26,827 8.16 7.56 21.9 23.7 2.5 
Income 20,836 19,309 15.7 17.1 1.8 
Property 8,086 7,493 6.1 6.6 0.7 
Other 26 24 0.1 <0.1 (0.1 
Indirect taxes 81,107 75,163 22.85 21.81 61.3 66.5 7.1 
Import 28,349 26,271 21.4 23.2 2.5 
Export 19,000 17,608 14.4 15.6 1.7 
Excise 29,513 27,350 22.3 24.2 2.6 
Other 4,246 3,935 3.2 3.5 0.4 
Judicial activities 11 ,905 11 ,033 3.35 3.11 9.0 9.8 1.0 
Non-tax sources 10,392 9,630 7.9 0.9 
Transfer payments 3,256 3,017 
Other 7,136 6,613 
...... 
Q\ 
\0 
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charges are included within each of the broad categories tabulated. 
Income taxes include levies on personal and corporate incomes as 
well as on inheritances. In Costa Rica, only income derived from 
Costa Rican sources is taxed. Companies and individuals are taxed at 
the same rate. There is no capital gains tax and dividends from com-
panies that have paid Costa Rican income tax are not taxed. El Salva-
dor is the only country in Central American to have separate tax rates 
for juridical and individual taxpayers, and to tax undistributed pro-
fits. 
Moreover, El Salvador extends the income tax concept downward to 
enable lower-income persons, who would otherwise fall outside the 
realm of income taxes, to participate. This is accomplished through 
the medium of the vialidad, a four-part tax on almost everything. 
Part A is a tax on 'liquid capital' and is actually included under 
property taxes. Liquid capital includes, but is not limited to, real 
estate, livestock, mortgages, accounts receivable, loans outstanding, 
cash, savings, bank deposits and business investments including pro-
fessional offices and automobiles. Part B is a flat rate of $4.00 per 
annum assessed on all persons following the liberal professions--
lawyers, doctors, clergy and the like; army officers are specifically 
exempted. Part C is a special income tax on salaries and wages of any 
amount and Part D is levied on artisans and workers, with categories 
from large, well-capitalized enterprises to 'artisans without shops' 
and unskilled workers. The only exceptions to the vialidad are mi-
nors, persons over sixty, members of the armed forces, school teachers 
and married women--unless, of course, any of these own property. 
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Property taxes include, in El Salvador, Part A of the vialidad 
and, in Costa Rica, real property and gift taxes. Unlike the rest of 
Central America, El Salvador levies no special tax on insufficiently 
31 
used land. 
Indirect taxes include import duties, export taxes and levies on 
internal consumption. Imposts on imports and exports are both general 
and specific, both ad speciem and ad valorem. In addition to commer-
cial duties, individuals often pay import and export taxes on personal 
shipments of goods with nominal or no cash value. For example, this 
writer was required to pay no less than seven taxes, each a pittance, 
as import duties on a package of newspaper clippings sent him in Costa 
Rica from the United States" 
In Costa Rica, over one-half of all export taxes come from a spe-
cial levy on each hundredweight of sugar exported; similar taxes are 
imposed in El Salvador on coffee and shrimp. The coffee tax accounts 
for more than 80 percent of the total export tax. 
Excise taxes are the largest single segment of current income 
for both national governments. The structure is much the same in the 
two countries. Generally, the taxed commodities are liquor, gasoline, 
soft drinks, tobacco and matches. The details of the excise tax are 
complex and confusing. Costa Rica lists, in summary, over 160 differ-
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ent ones, including 11 distinct taxes on liquor alone. 
A third class of tax revenue found in both countries but unknown 
in the United States is entitled Juridical Acts. In Costa Rica this 
includes a tax on public spectacles and in El Salvador proceeds from 
traffic fines and the activities of the finance police. In both coun-
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tries, however, the bulk of the money generated in this category comes 
from the sale of stamps and stamped paper. Most legal/official paper-
work is required to be drawn up on paper prestamped or imprinted with 
a certain value. The cost of the paper generally increases with the 
amount of the transaction. Among the documents which by law must be 
executed on stamped paper are wills, contracts, petitions to courts,· 
depositions and applications to various administrative offices. Such 
paper is generally purchased at retail; the retailer having already 
paid the tax, and used as needed. Stamps are usually purchased and 
cancelled in one transaction, and affixed to stamped paper. Fees for 
p~rticular activities are often listed as a paper of some amount and 
a stamp of some amount. 
Again, a personal example may prove instructive. The writer 
wished photocopies of materials of which a government agency had only 
one copy. Administrative regulations forbade the use of the agency's 
copying machine for any but specified agency business, even if paid 
for on the spot. It was decided, however, that the agency head would 
entertain a properly executed petition for temporary removal of the 
documents for copying outside the office at a commercial copy center. 
The petition was to be presented on a two colon paper with a stamp of 
five colones. The paper was purchased from a stationer, the petition 
typed thereon, signed and dated. (Had the petition been longer than 
one page, or had a mistake been made that required starting anew, ad-
ditional sheets of stamped paper would have to have been purchased and 
used.) The petition was then presented to the agency's fiscal officer 
who sold, affixed and cancelled the five colon stamp. The petition 
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was then presented to the agency head who approved it and the writer, 
with passport held as bond and accompanied by a functionary of the 
agency, was permitted to carry off the documents and have them commer-
cially photocopied. 
Non-tax revenues are derived from a variety of sources. Among 
the more lucrative are: patents, copyrights and trademarks; fees for 
various consular activities; and charges for various licenses, permits 
and government services. It should be noted that the figures in this 
section apply only to general government revenues. Hence user charges 
for utilities such as electricity and telephone service provided by 
autonomous or semi-autonomous government agencies are not included. 
One final aspect to be considered before the actual comparison 
of the revenue structures is the collection procedure. Income taxes 
are easy. As in most jurisdictions they are withheld at the source 
for salaries and wages and quarterly payments are required from cor-
porations and the self-employed. Property taxes are handled differ-
ently in the two countries. In El Salvador, bills are mailed out, with 
the taxes to be paid to the Direct Tax Office. Little difficulty is 
encountered in collecting these because these must be paid in order to 
receive a current boleto de vialidad. This tax receipt is required, 
along with the cedula, before any formal or official activities such 
as applying for a passport or renewing a driver'S license, may be un-
dertaken. 
In Costa Rica the practice differs considerably. As one prop-
erty owner described it: 
There is no notice of tax. They change the rates maybe 
every five years. If you get a letter it means you are in 
trouble. Fines are levied but there is apparently no means of 
collection. You go down" automatically two or three times a 
year and pay. Control and bookkeeping are bad. They may 
charge you for someone else's property. Pay in the bank. 
There's no automatic yearly increase in tax--only if you do 
something to the house does the value go up.33 
It should be noted that almost all financial transactions with the 
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Costa Rican government are carried on through the banks; it makes no 
difference which one, since all are government-owned. 
Indirect taxes are usually collected at the source, e.g., the 
liquor or match factory in the case of excise taxes. In El Salvador, 
sufficient excise stamps to cover the expected size of a given ship-
ment are purchased from the Indirect Tax Office and affixed before the 
shipment leaves the source. In Costa Rica, again, the seals are pur-
chased from a bank. Import and export charges are levied by the Cus-
toms Office, and collected on the spot. This is one of the rare cases 
in Costa Rica where payments are not made through a national bank. 
Scofflaws and tax evaders are to be found in the two Central 
American republics as well as elsewhere. Once more, two very differ-
ent mechanisms have been established to deal with non-payment. El 
Salvador has set up a special branch of the Tax Office known as the 
Finance Police. This force is to root out and prosecute malefactors 
and compel them to pay their share to the public purse. The efforts 
of the Finance Police are directed especially at two kinds of tax 
avoiders: smugglers, and even more so, at those who collect taxes 
from their customers (e.g., gasoline wholesalers) and fail to remit 
the funds to the government. 
Costa Rica has chosen to rely more on the free enterprise system 
and less on the coercive powers of the state. A system has been cre-
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ated of fiscales especificos. These are special attorneys who are 
assigned debts owed to the central government, both taxes and other 
arrears. Fiscales especificos may collect these debts any way they 
see fit, by judicial or extrajudicial means. They receive a percent-
age of all monies so collected. 
With this background on the general revenue structure, it re-
mains to compare the two countries and see how each has altered over 
the five-year period. Returning to Table XI we can examine the 
changes in Costa Rica. Using the constant 1962 peso figures we note 
that current income and tax revenues increased, both by about one-
fifth. We note further, however, that direct taxes decreased by over 
25 percent but that this decrease was more than offset by a 
50 percent increase in indirect taxes. One of the more intriguing 
figures was the drop in per capita taxes; a very small drop, only one 
percent, but a decrease nonetheless. Another unexpected decrease was 
in the portion of the GDP taken up by taxes; in this case the drop was 
a substantial 13 percent. This decrease is particularly remark-
able given Costa Rica's tradition of a constantly expanding government 
role in the society and economy. 
Within the tax structure itself a number of major shifts may be 
detected. The most obvious and most significant of these is the move 
from an indirect-direct tax ration of 1.5:1 to 3:1. In other words, 
indirect taxes were relatively twice as important in 1972 as in 1967. 
Probing deeper into the internal makeup of each tax category, the com-
position of the shift may be determined. Income taxes declined se-
verely in importance; property taxes almost disappeared. On the in-
176 
direct tax side miscellaneous taxes, unknown in 1967, made up more 
than four percent of the total tax revenue in 1972, just about compen-
sating for the decline in importance of import duties. The major in-
crease took place in excise taxes which soared from less than 30 
percent of the total to more than 45 percent, consolidating their 
position as the single most lucrative tax source. 
Specific causes behind some of these shifts are worthy of men-
tion. The miscellaneous indirect tax category is made up almost ex-
clusively of a 7.5 percent ad valorem tax on coffee beans delivered to 
beneficios. The property tax was for the most part turned over to the 
municipalities. During this period Costa Rica underwent considerable 
inflation. Most prices increased faster than most wages and salaries. 
Excise taxes on the rapidly escalating prices of goods provided the 
government with a fiscal surplus. The built-in flexibility of these 
taxes thus increased their total share under the inflationary circum-
stances. It would seem that demand for most of the commodities against 
which excise taxes are levied is quite inelastic with respect to price. 
Table XII shows the changes in central government revenue in El 
Salvador over the period 1967-1972. Immediately evident is the in-
crease, in constant pesos, of both current income and taxes over the 
period, both by more than 40 percent. Direct taxes rose by over 
50 percent and indirect taxes by 30 percent. Per capita tax 
burden also increased, by almost 50 percent. A decrease, however, 
was noted in the portion of the GOP devoted to taxes; it went down by 
12 percent. 
Some shifts also occurred in the composition of the tax struc-
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ture, although not as marked as in Costa Rica. Direct taxes became 
relatively more important, although not by much. Import duties' share 
declined. The largest change was in the category of juridical acts 
which more than doubled its proportional contribution. In summary, 
then, the Salvadorean tax structure in 1972 appeared very much as it 
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had in 1967. 
Comparing the tax structures of Costa Rica and El Salvador as 
both existed in 1972, some significant factors are evident. One of 
the most obvious shows that per capita taxes in Costa Rica are twice 
those in El Salvador. In both countries, excise taxes are the largest 
single source of income, but they are almost twice as important in 
Costa Rica as in El Salvador. Proportionally, El Salvador is eight 
times as dependent on export taxes as is Costa Rica. Assuming the tax 
is added to the price of outbound commodities, primarily coffee, El 
Salvador is thus able to effectively export 15 percent of its 
total tax burden. In the realm of direct taxes, Costa Rica derives a 
greater proportion of its revenue from income taxes but the difference 
is almost exactly countered by El Salvador's greater use of the prop-
erty tax. Finally, juridical activities provide only about one percent 
of Costa Rican tax revenue while accounting for almost ten percent in 
El Salvador. 
We can conclude our comparison of tax structures with some qual-
itative assessment of the differences found. Costa Rica uses its fis-
cal policy almost exclusively for money-raising purposes; El Salvador 
also uses its for economic growth purposes. Speaking of a series of 
recent revisions to the Salvadorean tax system, Virginia Watkin gives 
as their major rationale: 
To change the tariff system from one which was primarily 
fiscal or money making in object to one which would encourage 
the investment of capital in productive activity, promote the 
rational use of labor, and encourage the efficient investment 
of monetary reserves as well as provide the government with 
revenue. 35 
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A variety of sociopolitical factors underlie this difference in 
approach to fiscal policy. First, Costa Rica needs the money more. 
It has undertaken a wide range of expensive social programs which re-
quire continuous funding. El Salvador has committed far less resources 
to this activity, and has not raised the expectation level of its cit-
izenry nearly as high. 
Second, Costa Rica by virtue of its more open, accessible poli-
tical system needs be more responsive, with cash as well as symbols, 
to the demands of its people for more, and more expensive, services. 
Salvadorean decisionmakers are somewhat more isolated, and insulated, 
from mass political pressures. They are thus freer to engage in eco-
nomically rational long-term planning and investment strategies. More-
over, they are encouraged in this by the economic elite, the main 
source of political pressure on the policymakers. 
Third, as noted above in the section on national economies, Costa 
Rica has a more productive and advanced economy than does El Salvador. 
The former country, then, is not under the same compulsion as the lat-
ter to address their fiscal policy toward economic development. 
One additional comment here might be addressed to those accus-
tomed to thinking of national government revenue structures in the con-
text of more developed nations. North Americans tend to associate na-
tional taxes with income taxes, personal and corporate. To their eyes, 
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the tax structures of Costa Rica and El Salvador with their heavy de-
pendence on indirect taxes may seem a bit bizal're. It must be remem-
bered however, that to have the income tax as national fiscal backbone 
requires a considerable income-taxable population. The most readily 
income-taxable group, the middle-class wage and salary earner, is far 
too small in the Central American countries to carry this burden. The 
indirect taxes, although tending to be regressive, do spread the bur-
den more evenly throughout the population. 
National Government Expenditure Patterns 
The final economic factors to be considered here are the expend-
iture patterns of the two national governments. Data on these patterns 
may be found in Table XIII for Costa Rica and in Table XIV for El Sal-
vador. Analyses will first be carried out on changes within each of 
the countries from 1967 to 1972, followed by a comparison of the two 
countries for the latter year. 
Immediately evident in examining the changes over time in the 
Costa Rica pattern is the substantial increase in total expenditure. 
Overall expenditures, in constant pesos, increased by about 150 per-
cent. Some of this increase can be accounted for by the cost of serv-
ing an expanded population but per capita expenditures also more than 
doubled. The gr~atest change was in the area of Public Health and 
Social Assistance, but the Economic and Education categories also 
showed massive increases. 
In terms of distribution, Education continued to be the most ex-
pensive activity with Economic expenditures in second place. These 
two, and Public Health, each added about eight percent of the total to 
TABLE XIII 
COSTA RICA NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1967 AND 1972 
Expenditures - 1967 
Current Pesos Constant Pesos Per Capita ($) Percent of Percent 
($000) ($000) (1962) Current Constant Expenditures of GDP 
Sector 
Economic 19,878 19,118 13.12 12.63 17.6 2.9 
Education 25,682 24,701 16.96 16.31 22.8 3.7 
Public Hea1th/ 
Social Assistance 2,217 2,132 1.46 1.41 2.0 0.3 
Other Social 618 594 0.41 0.39 0.1 ",0.1 
Defense 
Justice Included in category 'Other' 
Other 64,450 61,989 42.56 40.94 57.1 9.3 
Total 112,845 108.536 74.53 71.68 100.0 16.3 
Expenditures - 1972 
Economic 53,931 43,017 47.24 37.68 25.3 4.6 
Education 64,017 51,062 56.06 44.72 30.0 5.5 
Public Heal th/ 
Social Assistance 22,415 17,879 19.63 15.66 10.5 1.9 
Other Social 6,949 5,540 6.09 4.86 3.3 0.6 
Defense 
Justice 13,245 10,565 11.60 9.25 6.2 1.1 
Other 53,014 42,286 46.43 37.03 24.8 4.5 
Total 213,570 170,352 187.06 149.21 100.0 18.3 
, 
SOURCES: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es, for 1967 figures; Contra1oria General, Memoria Anua1 1973, ..... 
for 1972 figures. 00 0 
Sector 
Economic 
Education 
Public Hea1th/ 
Social Assistance 
Other Social 
Defense 
Justice 
Other 
Total 
Economic 
Education 
Public Hea1th/ 
Social Assistance 
Other Social 
Defense 
Justice 
Other 
Total 
TABLE XIV 
EL SALVADOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1967 AND 1972 
Expenditures - 1967 
Current Pesos 
($000) 
Constant Pesos 
($000) (1962) 
25,340 
22,364 
11 ,593 
1,039 
Included 
Included 
30,237 
90,573 
25,089 
22,143 
11 ,478 
1,029 
in category 'Other" 
in category 'Other' 
29,938 
89,677 
Per Capita ($) 
Current Constant 
8.20 
7.24 
3.75 
0.34 
9.79 
29.31 
8.12 
7.17 
3.71 
0.34 
9.69 
29.02 
Expenditures - 1972 
35,218 
42,218 
16,475 
9,584 
9,658 
10,085 
29,698 
153,484 
32,637 
39,631 
15,268 
8,882 
8,950 
9,346 
27,522 
142,236 
9.60 
11.65 
4.49 
2.61 
2.63 
2.75 
8.09 
41.82 
8.90 
10.80 
4.16 
2.42 
2.44 
2.55 
7.50 
38.76 
Percent of 
Expenditures 
28.0 
24.7 
12.8 
1.1 
33.4 
100.0 
22.9 
27.9 
10.7 
6.2 
6.3 
6.6 
19.4 
100.0 
Percent 
of GDP 
2.9 
2.5 
1.3 
0.1 
3.4 
10.3 
3.1 
3.7 
1.4 
0.8 
0.8 
0.9 
2.6 
13.4 
SOURCES: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es, for 1967 figures; CONAPLAN, Indicadores, for 1972 figures. 
I-' 
00 
I-' 
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their outlays at the expense of, primarily, general administration. 
Overall, the portion of the GDP devoted to general expenditures of the 
national government increased from 16.3 percent to 18.3 percent during 
the five-year period. 
El Salvador also showed an increase from 1967 to 1972, but of 
less than 60 percent when measured in constant pesos. Per capita 
expenditures increased by about one-third. Although other sectors 
showed a greater proportional increase, Education outlays went up the 
most absolutely. 
A number of changes in the distribution of expenditures occurred 
over the five-year period. In probably the most significant of these, 
Education moved past Economics to become the most expensive sector of 
Salvadorean government activity. In another important change Other 
Social activities increased their share of expenditures more than five-
fold. The portion of outlay spent on Public Health and Social Assist-
ance declined slightly. Overall expenditure consumed 13.4 percent of 
the GDP in 1972, an increase of 3.1 percent over the 1967 figures. 
Two points of comparison between Costa Rican and Salvadorean cen-
tral government expenditure patterns stand out at once. One is the 
much larger absolute and per capita outlay by Costa Rica; the other is 
the general similarity in distribution. On a per capita basis, Costa 
Rica spends almost four times as much as El Salvador; in the Education 
and Economic sectors more than four times. Costa Rica spends a slightly 
higher percentage on Education and Economic; the difference just about 
accounts for the portion El Salvador spends on Defense. Justice and 
Public Health account for about the same proportion of the outlay in 
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both cases. Finally, it may be noted that El Salvador is increasing 
the share of its GDP spent on public activities faster than is Costa 
Rica. At the present rate of change, however, it would take another 
23 years before the two countries spent equal shares of their GDPs in 
the public sector. 
SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Again, policymaking theory holds that a variety of demographic 
and other social factors may affect both the policy process and the 
outputs therefrom. Among the factors postulated as playing this role 
are: population, its age and sex structure and rate of increase; in-
ternal migration patterns; levels of educational achievement; and 
group structure. 
Population And Trends 
The populations of El Salvador and Costa Rica, and the urban 
areas of their capital cities, as of the most recent census, are pre-
sented in Table XV. Population changes for the decade preceding these 
headcounts are also presented. 
Several significant comparisons and contrasts suggest themselves. 
Although Costa Rica had a very high annual population growth, that of 
El Salvador was even higher. In Costa Rica, the urban population grew 
more than two and a half times as quickly as the rural population; in 
El Salvador urban growth was only slightly faster than rural growth. 
In both cases the countries remain about three-fifths rural and two-
fifths urban in terms of population. 
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TABLE XV 
POPULATION AND DECENNIAL CHANGES 
Costa Rica 
Rural Per- Urban Per- Total 
POEu1ation Cent POEu1ation Cent POEu1ation 
1963 875,731 65.5 460,543 34.5 1,336,274 
1973 1,085,973 59.0 754,758 41.0 1,840,731 
Change 
1963-1973 210,242 -6.5 294,215 +6.5 504,457 
Average Annual 
Percent Change 2.4 6.4 3.8 
E1 Salvador 
1961 1,544,100 61.5 966,900 38.5 2,511,000 
1971 2,149,100 60.5 1,405,600 39.5 3,554,700 
Change 
1961-1971 605,000 -1.0 438,700 +1.0 1,043,700 
Average Annual 
Percent Change 3.9 4.5 4.2 
San Jose San Salvador 
Population 1963 327,279 1961 351,726 
Population 1973 318,970 1971 560,504 
Change 91,691 208,778 
Average Annual 
Percent Change 2.8 5.9 
SOURCES: E1 Salvador Census of 1971; Costa Rica Census of 1973 
./ Unexpectedly, San Jose gre\y not only more slowly than Costa Rican 
urban centers generally but also more slowly than the country as a 
whole. This is not in keeping with traditional wisdom as to growth 
rates of primate cities. San Salvador, on the other hand, increased 
its population at a greater rate than both E1 Salvador and other Sal-
vadorean urban centers. Some possible reasons for this differential 
will be suggested below. 
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Although accurate intercensal population estimates are difficult 
to obtain, indications are that in the most recent years the rate of 
population growth slowed in both countries. El Salvador dropped to 
3.9 percent in 1974; this was still the highest rate of natural in-
36 
crease of any nation in the world. Costa Rica's rate of population 
growth is believed to have dropped below two percent annually. Among 
the evidence offered to support this belief is the closure of some 
schools for lack of pupils. 
A peculiar difficulty arises with the 1971 census in EI Sa1va-
dor. At that time hostilities and tensions associated with the so-
called 'Soccer War' were still at their peak. A large but indetermi-
nate number of Salvadorean nationals, usually squatters and/or resi-
37 
dents of Honduras, were temporarily driven back into EI Salvador. 
It is not known how many of these were or ought to be counted in the 
census, nor where within EI Salvador they were located. CONAPLAN as-
38 
sumes most of them did not appear in the census figures. 
Age and Sex Structure 
The structure of the population by age and sex for both countries 
and urban areas is shown in Table XVI. Once again some worthwhile com-
parisons, both internally between city and country, and crossnation-
ally, may be made. In both Costa Rica and El Salvador the country as 
a whole shows a higher proportion of persons under age fourteen than 
does the capital city. On the other hand, both cities show a higher 
proportion of those between fifteeen and fifty years of age. 
Two aspects of the age distribution in Costa Rica deserve men-
tion: one, the number of children in the youngest age bracket is less 
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TABLE XVI 
AGE -- SEX DISTRIBUTION 
75 years and older 
70 - 74 
Costa Rica D 65 - 69 60 - 64 
N = 1, 760,560 55 - 59 
50 - 54 
San Jose 
• 
45 - 49 
40 44 
N = 418,970 35 39 
30 - 34 
25 29 
20 24 
15 - 19 
10 14 
- 9 
- 4 years 
10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 
Percent of Total Population 
75 years and older 
70 - 74 
E1 Salvador CJ 65 - 69 60 - 64 
N = 3,549,260 55 59 
San salvador. 
50 - 54 
45 - 49 
N = 560,504 40 44 
35 39 
30 - 34 
25 - 29 
20 24 
15 19 
10 - 14 
- 9 
4 years 
10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 
Percent of Total Population 
Sources: Costa Rica Census of 1973 
San Salvador Census of 1971 
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throughout the country than the number in the five-to-nine category. 
In San Jos~ each of the two lowest age categories has fewer members 
than the one immediately above it. This supports our contention of a 
decreasing rate of population growth in Costa Rica, a decrease that is 
more marked in San Jos~ than in the remainder of the country. 
In each case the Index of Femininity (IF) is higher for the city 
than for the nation at every age over ten and exceeds 100 in 
every case over age 15. This holds even though Costa Rica as a 
whole has a population that is over 50 percent male. Indices of 
Femininity may be found in Table XVII. 
TABLE XVII 
INDICES OF FEMININITY (IF) 
Age Costa Rica E1 Salvador San "" Jose San Salvador 
Total 98 102 112 115 
0-4 years 95 99 94 95 
5 - 9 years 96 96 98 103 
10 - 14 years 97 96 103 104 
15 - 19 years 101 104 121 130 
20 - 24 years 103 104 120 119 
25 - 29 years 101 110 116 117 
30 - 34 years 104 105 118 119 
35 - 39 years 103 105 125 125 
40 - 44 years 96 101 115 120 
45 - 49 years 99 107 113 130 
50 - 54 years 97 110 114 133 
55 - 59 years 98 106 113 139 
60 - 64 years 100 100 135 137 
65 - 69 years 105 107 144 127 
70 - 74 years 101 97 132 148 
75 years and older 101 127 152 174 
Number of Females 
Index of Femininity = x 100 
Number of Mal es 
SOURCES: E1 Salvador Census of 1971; Costa Rica Census of 1973. 
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In absolute numbers, the greatest excesses of females over males 
in San Jos~ and San Salvador is found in the 14 to 44 age bracket. 
IFs reach their maxima in the oldest age brackets, pointing up simply 
that here as elsewhere, women live longer than men. 
Two possibilities are suggested by the data above: one, that 
there is a movement into the capital cities from the rest of the coun-
try by young adults; and two, that the majority of the young adults so 
migrating are women. It will be shown below the extent to which other 
data and observations support these migratory hypotheses. 
Internal Migration 
Scholarly literature on migration from countryside to city in 
Latin America (and in the developing nations in general) abounds. 
Theories and explanations are offered, causes and effects are sug-
gested, analyses proliferate. Nonetheless, reliable data on this phe-
nomenon are rare. A few general tenets may be mentioned. Inmigration 
to cities, especially to capital cities, and even more especially to 
primate cities such as San Jos~ and San Salvador is larger than out-
migration. Primate cities, therefore, are expected to grow much more 
quickly than rural areas. Factors leading to migration include both 
attraction factors to the cities and repulsion factors from the coun-
tryside. Marcia Koth and associates, for example, have identified 
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fifteen of these. Other basic tenets hold that migrants are over-
whelmingly poor and male. 
In this study we will be concerned only with those aspects of 
migration that impinge directly on our central theme or that suggest 
some alternatives to traditional wisdom. To reiterate an earlier 
• 
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statement, reliable data on internal migration are indeed scarce. It 
is theoretically possible to get a quantitative picture of migration 
from either a macro or a micro viewpoint. In a macro approach, one 
would need data on initial population, birth rate, death rate and fi-
nal population for a jurisdiction for a particular time period. Put 
algebraically, M = Pt - Po (l + NRR) where M = migrating population, Pt 
= population at end of time period t, Po = population at beginning of 
time period t and NRR = net reproduction rate (birth rates - death 
rates over time period t). Po(NRR) then, would give the population at 
the end of time period t if only natural increase had occurred. The 
difference between this figure and the actual head count at the end of 
the period would give the size and direction of the migration. 
No recent studies have adopted this approach. Again, at least 
part of the reason for this must be the uncertainty attached to popu-
lation statistics, particularly in Costa Rica. Two earlier studies 
however did adopt this approach. The highlights of their findings are 
presented below, with the ususal caveat. 
In a 1970 study Jeffry Gibson looked at urbanization in Costa 
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Rica and E1 Salvador, as well as Honduras. The results are shown in 
Table XVIII. Two points need be mentioned here. The figures are for 
migration to provinces, not to urban areas. It may be assumed that the 
bulk of the migrants settled in the urban areas but this is not speci-
fied. In addition, migration numbers and annual percent increases do 
not seem to jibe. 
In a slightly earlier study for the United Nations (also using 
figures to 1963) J. van den Boomen examined the San Salvador Metropo1i-
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tan Area. He not only calculated the size of migration but deter-
mined a number of characteristics of the migrants such as place of ori-
gin and age at time of migration. He found some 125,000 migrants in 
metropolitan San Salvador, about 42 percent of the population. 
Further, he determined that over 80 percent were under 30 years 
of age when they moved and that three-quarters had migrated from towns 
of more than 10,000 population. 
Period 
1930-1950 
1950-1963 
TABLE XVIII 
NET INMIGRATION 
" San Jose 
20,700 
25,200 
San Salvador 
68,600 
48,700 
Annual growth rate due to migration 
1930-1950 
1950-1963 
4.5% 
4.6% 
(Note: Actual first-time period for San Jos~ is 1927-1950.) 
SOURCE: Jeffry Gibson, Demographic Analysis of Urbanization. 
3.0% 
4.5% 
The micro approach to calculating migration involves sampling 
from a selected population and extrapolating the results. This ap-
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proach was followed by White in his 1969 study. He interviewed 270 
migrants randomly selected from seven areas of San Salvador chosen to 
represent different types types and qualities of housing but excluding 
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upper-middle class and above. Some of his more noteworthy conc1u-
sions were: that only one-quarter of the people entering San Salvador 
came from the countryside; that the majority of the migrants were 
young women, hence more than a quarter of the metropolitan population 
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is women of childbearing age while less than one-fifth of the rural 
population is; and that half the women and 40 percent of the men who 
migrate to the capital do so for economic reasons. One interesting 
finding was that 12 percent of the women move to the capital to join 
a man while another 13 percent do so to get away from one--husband, 
father or step-father. 
White's findings, therefore, are consistent with our supposition 
from the age-sex distribution data that migration to San Salvador is 
occurring, and that the migrants tend to be young women. Our findings 
do not support the conventional view of the migrant population as pre-
dominantly male. 
The greatest discrepancy between the implications of our data 
and traditional wisdom lies in San Jose. San Jose is indisputedly a 
primate city yet during the 1963-1973 decade it grew more slowly than 
not only other Costa Rican urban centers but also than the country as 
a whole. Part of this, it is reasonable to assume, is the result of 
a lower natural reproduction rate in the city, as suggested by the 
population pyramid (Table XVI). The case can be made, logically, 
that women in the capital are better educated, have greater access to 
medical advice and birth control methods and consequently choose to 
have fewer children. We have, however, no data to support this con-
tention (nor to refute it). 
With land distributed slightly more equitably in Costa Rica, and 
the much lower rural population density than in El Salvador, the push 
from the countryside to the city is less in the former country. This 
could account for some decreased migration and hence for San Jose's 
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slower growth. In addition, it will be shown below that government 
decentralization policies, especially those of INVU are specifically 
designed to discourage growth in the metropolitan areas. Moreover, 
U.S.-type suburbanization is luring members of San Jose's growing 
middle class to residences outside the urban zone of San Jose Prov-
ince. We can therefore offer explanations in the abstract for this 
phenomenon of slow urban growth but lacking reliable statistics we 
cannot prove our contentions. 
In examining population movements within El Salvador another po-
tential source of cityward migration was discovered. This particular 
concept has not heretofore appeared in the literature. Without know-
ing how generally applicable it is in other countries it is presented 
here. Standard pictures of the rural life in developing areas show 
small farmers eking out a subsistence livelihood on their minifundia 
and working occasionally for a large landholder, either as rent for 
their small plots or to augment their marginal existence. Those who 
decide they cannot make it on the land move to town. 
In San Salvador, however, a landless rural class has developed 
the migrant farm laborer. An indeterminate number of (usually) men 
follow the crops, much as migrant farm laborers do in the U.S. They 
move from one end of the country to the other harvesting cotton, cof-
fee and sugar cane. In the course of their travels they pass through 
various cities. Initially they may simply spend a day of two there 
between jobs. The stays become longer. Having visited a number of 
towns in this fashion, they may consciously choose one for longer 
stops or eventual settlement. On the one hand then, these farm labor-
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ers are 'accidental' migrants to the city in a way that no other group, 
save only perhaps military draftees, is. On the other hand, they ration-
ally select their urban residence, not reacting simply to proximity or 
the pull of the capital as the usual migrant is assumedto do. 
Educational Achievement 
Level of educational achievement is generally regarded as a so-
cia1 background factor influencing the quality of policymaking in both 
municipal and national situations. In this section we look very 
briefly at the educational accomplishments In the two countries. Both 
Costa Rica and E1 Salvador follow a system of education involving only 
slightly different nomenclature than in the U.S. Primary school en-
compasses the first six years, and is the only school most pupils ever 
know. Upon completing this, the student obtains a certificate a110w-
ing him to enter secondary school. The latter requires five years to 
complete and the graduate is awarded the title 'Bachelor of Sciences 
and Letters.' 
From here the students may enter the University or attend spe-
44 
cia1ized schools. Those who enter university with the intention of 
becoming, for example, physicians or lawyers, go directly into the 
professional schools; pre-law or pre-medicine courses of study as are 
found in the U.S. universities are unknown in Central America. Gener-
ally, a course of study in the university requires six years. Teach-
ing faculty are usually part-time, earning the bulk of their income 
from outside practice of their professions. 
Traditionally, Costa Rica and E1 Salvador have each had one Na-
tiona1 University, state-supported but otherwise autonomous. Both 
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schools are currently housed in attractive suburban campuses. In 1966 
a new university, Jos€ Simeon Canas University of Central America, a 
45 Roman Catholic institution, was opened in the outskits of San Salvador. 
Table XIX indicates the relative educational achievements of the 
two countries. 
1950 
1960 
1970 
TABLE XIX 
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS 
Costa Rica 
Literacy Rate - Age 10 and over 
79% 
84% 
89% 
Percent of age group attending school - 1970 
5-14 years 
15-19 years 
20-29 years 
67% 
41% 
5% 
E1 Salvador 
38% 
499" 
58% 
54% 
24% 
2% 
Percent of the population graduated from university - 1970 
1% 
SOURCE: UNICEF, Las Sociedades Actua1es. 
Although precise figures do not exist, educational levels are 
higher in the capital cities. It is estimated that over 95 per-
cent of those between ten and sixity years of age are literate in 
San Jose; the 1971 census found the literacy rate for San Salvador 
to be 88 percent. Further, it is estimated that the percent of 
the population with a university education is three to five times 
higher for the capitals than for the countries as a whole. It can 
readily be seen that the Costa Rican population, by whatever measure 
is more advanced educationally than the Salvadorean. In recent years, 
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however, El Salvador is closing the gap, especially in terms of basic 
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litera.cy. 
Group Structure 
Although the 'average' citizen of El Salvador or Costa Rica 
might not associate himself with as many or as diverse organizations 
as his counterpart in the U.S., groups are not unimportant in these 
two countries. In a 1973 study, for example, John Booth found 66 per-
cent of Costa Rican family heads to be members of one or more volun-
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tary groups. 
In this section we look briefly at three sorts of groups: busi-
ness associations, unions and student organizations, and civic 
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groups. The nature of politics in Costa Rica and El Salvador would 
lead us to suspect that business associations might be more powerful 
and influential in the latter country than in the former. Empirical 
research supports this contention. In Costa Rica the chief spokes-
group for business interests is the Asociacion Nacional de Fomento 
Economico (ANFE). It is small, with perhaps 300 individual and cor-
porate members. It adopts an uncompromising laissez-faire liberal ap-
proach that is very much at odds with the social service orientation 
of the usually dominant PLN. The ideology and rhetoric of ANFE is 
carried to the people by La Nacion, Costa Rica's most highly regarded 
but not politically influential daily newspaper. 
In aligning itself automatically against the PLN on almost every 
issue, ANFE has not traditionally been able to influence policy to any 
major extent. (This could change now that a more business-oriented 
government with control of both Presidency and Assembly took office 
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in July, 1978.) In fact, business organizations in general have been 
weaker than might be expected. One reason for this is that almost all 
businesses and business organizations act politically only through 
ANFE. If ANFE is not effective, they seek no other approach. A sec-
ond reason is that coffee growers, the strongest agricultural sector, 
present no united front. Despite the existence of the Junta de De-
fense de Caf~ (JUDECA) and its potential power, coffee growers con-
stantly attempt to undersell one another in the international market, 
vitiating JUDECA and virtually eliminating their political influence. 
No such political mistakes are made by the business organizations 
of El Salvador. The largest and most important of these is the Aso-
ciacion Nacional de Empresas Privadas (ANEP). ANEP has some 400 cor-
porate and 11,000 total members including 11 organizations, chief 
among which are the Sociedad de Comerciantes e Industriales Salva-
dorenos, the Comite de Bancos, Seguros y Financieras and the Camara 
de Comercio e Industria (CACI). ANEP and its constituent members 
benefit from the domination of the national political scene by PCN, 
their ideological fellow. Nonetheless, ANEP takes nothing for granted 
and, along with CACI maintains a professional staff to look out for 
its interests at both the national and municipal levels. 
In the agricultural realm as well, organization is tighter than 
in Costa Rica. Unlike the internal feuding that characterizes JUDECA, 
cooperation and profit maximization predominate in the quasi-
governmental Compania Salvadore~a del Cafe (COSDEC). 
The most powerful and active unions, in both countries, are the 
teachers' associations. Costa Rica's Asociacion Nacional de Educadores 
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(ANDE) is probably the most politically influential group of any kind 
in the country. It has a membership of 13~OOO and is basically a 
closed shop; all educators in any establishment receiving public funds 
are required to join. It lobbies very intensively for its own inter-
ests with considerable effect. (It will be interesting to see the im-
pacts on ANDE's political power of the decreasing need for teachers re-
sulting from the reduced numbers of young children.) 
The Asociaci6n Nacional de Educadores Salvadore~os (ANDES) is 
even more active than ANDE. It may be, however, that ANDES is so mil-
itant as to cause some backlash against it. Moreover it is divided in-
ternally into factions of varying degrees of intransigence, and this 
dissension weakens its effectiveness in dealing with outside agencies, 
particularly with the national government. 
Unions of other public employees are also found in both coun-
tries. In EI Salvador these unions are legion; most small groups have 
their own organization, especially the more skilled tradesmen and those 
in critical occupations (e.g., garbage collectors). Despite the number 
of unions, the majority of public employees are not covered. The sit-
uation in Costa Rica is quite similar although the number of individual 
unions is smaller. The most important of these is the Asociaci6n Na-
cional de Empleados Publicos (ANEP) but even ANEP represents only about 
five percent of the public employees, mainly lower status blue-collar 
workers. 
Private-sector labor unions are found in Costa Rica but they are 
not so numerous, so well organized or so militant as those in EI Sal-
vador. No overall organization such as the AFL-CIO exists in EI Sal-
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vador. Probably the closest is the Federaci6n Unitaria Sindical de El 
Salvador (FUSS), an extremely militant group. Its tactics run more to 
general strikes attempting to seek government-mandated wage increases 
than to negotiations with or actions against individual employers or 
employer associations. One interesting feature of the Salvadorean la-
bor scene is the presence of worker federations maintained basically as 
wings of the major political parties. The two most important of these 
are PCN's Confederaci6n General de Sindicatos (CGS) and PDC's Union Na-
cional de Obreros Cristianos (UNOC). 
Both national universities have student organizations but they 
differ greatly. The Federacibn de Estudiantes Costarricenses (FECR) is 
not generally politically active. Sporadically it rouses itself to pro-
test against such matters of particular student interest such as in-
creased bus fares and higher tuition but then lapses back into its 
wonted apathy. Its Salvadorean counterpart, the Asociacion General de 
Estudiantes Universitarios Salvadorenos (AGEUS) is far more militant 
but no more effective. One recent government response to its demands 
was the complete closure of the National University from July through 
December, 1972. 
Of most immediate interest to this study are the community organ-
izations. In El Salvador these are of two kinds. One is the service 
club such as the Lions and the Rotary Women who occasionally venture in-
to the realm of municipal politics. Because of their service orienta-
tion they are often successful in achieving aims of low political sen-
sitivity (e.g., having garbage cans placed in downtown San Salvador). 
The other type of group is the community associations. They have no 
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corporate status, no financial base and are effectively controlled by 
FOCCO. In general, the community groups tend to be ad hoc and transi-
tory in nature and their sphere of interest limited to their immediate 
neighborhood. 
In Costa Rica, however, some 300 development associations are 
found at the district, canton and provincial levels. As indicated 
above in the section on political structure, they are entitled by law 
to a certain share of municipal revenue. They also have status as pub-
lic corporations. Like their Salvadorean counterparts, their interests 
are limited to their immediate neighborhoods but they tend to be suc-
cessful in such matters as obtaining improvements to community play-
grounds. DINADECO trains leaders for these groups but does not control 
them, unlike FOCCO. Municipal officials often regard them as nuisances 
but are obliged to pay some attention to them although not in the set-
ting of general municipal policy. 
In summary, then, the following comparisons may be made between 
the various categories of groups in Costa Rica and El Salvador. In 
Costa Rica the business groups have aligned themselves in low-key op-
position to the dominant PLN and generally play no important role in 
policymaking; in El Salvador the business groups are aligned with the 
dominant PCN and play a substantial role in policymaking, even to the 
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extent of occupying two of the nine seats on CONAPLAN. 
The Costa Rican government acts very much as patron to its citi-
zens, including the working class. Most employees therefore feel very 
little necessity for active trade unionism and the movement, though not 
officially discouraged, is weak. The Salvadorean government does not 
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play this role of patrOn to the same extent; trade unionism is militant 
although not terribly successful in its attempts to gain wage and bene-
fit increases through central government action. Teachers' unions are 
active in both countries. In Costa Rica they are united and lobby suc-
cessfully for their interests; in EI Salvador they are given to inter-
necine warfare and are less successful in achieving favorable government 
action. 
Associations of university students, traditional pressure groups 
in Latin America, operate with similar lack of success in both coun-
tries. Costa Rican university students are generally so low keyed and 
apolitical as to be ignored; the more radical, militant and activist 
Salvadorean students seem only to generate resentment against them-
selves. 
Community groups are active, recognized, permanent, funded and 
often effective in Costa Rica. Their Salvadorean counterparts are less 
active, spatially constrained, transitory and usually without finances. 
The most successful ones are branches of international service clubs in 
their sporadic forays into the local political scences. Such community 
groups as exist in Salvadorean neighborhoods, particular lower-class 
and public-housing developments, are looked on by both PCN and PDC pri-
marily as instruments to be manipulated for their own partisan politi-
cal purposes. 
lliE GENERAL PLAN 
It is a tenet of the planning creed that an overall plan for the 
development of an area will provide some framework within which ra-
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tional policymaking can take place. There exists a Plan for metropol-
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itan development in San Salvador and none in San Jose. It might be 
expected therefore, that the policy processes in San Salvador and the 
outcomes thereof might be affected and improved. 
A thorough examination of the General Plan, however, makes this 
appear unlikely. In the first place, the Plan is designed to react to 
expected population growth, not to influence it. Second, the Plan 
basically perpetuates current land use and transportation patterns; it 
does not suggest altering them. Third, it is couched for the most 
part in such vague terms as to make implementation both difficult in 
itself and even more difficult to measure or evaluate. Fourth, there 
is no reason to expect much attempt at implementation--plans for met-
ropolitan San Salvador have been created for the past thirty years; 
all sit languishing in the office of the Director General of Urbanism 
and Architecture. Fifth, the Plan appears to have been drawn up in a 
vacuum; linkages to the outside are hardly mentioned. And finally, 
the greatest shortcoming from the point of view of this study, no role 
whatsoever for municipal government is even hinted at; the existence 
of twenty-two local governments in the area, including San Salvador, 
is ignored. 
Given this situation, our initial assumption that the existence 
of the Plan would have an effect on municipal policymaking in San Sal-
vador seems unlikely to hold. Nonetheless we look in subsequent chap-
ters to see if we can find any difference between our two municipali-
ties that can be traced to the Plan. 
The above, then, is the examination of the various political, 
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economic and social background factors we feel likely to influence the 
policy process and the outputs therefrom in San Jos~ and San Salvador, 
and to account for anticipated differences between the two municipal-
ities. 
In the following chapter we discuss the nature of the policy 
process as we actually find it, both in general and more specifically 
for the making of revenue policy at the local level in the municipal-
ities. This process and its results are related and tied to the back-
ground factors in both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII. Chapter VII con-
siders very specific connections between certain of the factors and 
day-to-day housing and municipal finance programs. Chapter VIII ex-
amines more holistically the relationships between the total package 
of background factors and the overall policy process and its conse-
quences. 
CHAPTER V NOTES 
1. Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica 1949 (as amended) 
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1965). 
2. Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador 1962 (Washington, 
D.C.: Pan American Union, 1966). 
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3. There is an exception to classification by size: the chief munic-
ipality of each district receives the title of city, regardless of 
its population. Thus, for example, Suchitoto with 5,300 persons 
is classified as a city while Cuscatancingo with a population of 
18,800 is a pueblo. 
4. See the discussion of Rojas, "El Codigo Municipal," above, p. 35. 
5. Costa Rica, Municipal Code, Article 4. 
6. Costa Rica, MuniciEal Code, Articles 4-10. 
7. The party composition of the 1974-1978 San Jose Municipal Council 
was PLN - 5, PUN - 3, RD - 2, PNI - 1, PRN - 1, and PASO - 1. 
8. El Salvador, Municipal Act, Article 74. 
9. Municipality of the Central Canton of San Jose, Regulations Gov-
erning Internal Organization, Administration and Debate of the Mu-
niciEal Council, Article 7. 
10. The administrative structure of San Salvador was in a state of ex-
treme flux during the period of the field work. The organogram 
and accompanying description constitute the best available snap-
shot of the structure at one point in time. 
11. The Council's term actually begins and ends two months earlier. 
The most recently completed Council term, for example, ran from 
1 May 1974 to 30 April 1978, while that of the Municipal Executive 
ran from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1978. 
12. See page 117 above. 
, . ." 13. Cliavez Mena, "OrganlzaclOn Municipal," p. 30. 
14. Ebel, "The Decision-Making Process in San Salvador," p. 191. 
15. Personal interview, 8 April 1974. 
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16. For a complete account, see Alfred Cuzan, "Urban Resource Alloca-
tion and Policy Performance: Center-Local Linkages in El Salvador 
and Costa Rica," paper presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the 
American Society for Public Administration, Chicago, 1-4 April 
1975. 
17. Not to be confused with the General Treasury of Specific Municipal 
Funds, an agency of the national government with which all munici-
palities are to deposit their funds. 
18. El Salvador, Law of Municipal Finance Organization, Article 4. 
19. Personal interview, 18 April 1974. 
20. Costa Rica, Instituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municipal (IFAM), Filo-
sofia, Objectivos y Programas de Trabajo, San Jose, 1971, p. 17. 
21. This was the only Peace Corps Volunteer in either Costa Rica or El 
Salvador working on an urban project. 
22. The President, two Vice-Presidents and the Cabinet constitute the 
Council of Government. 
23. A number of smaller, usually agrarian-populist, parties contest 
elections in outlying areas but are not found in San Jose. 
24. A straight proportional representation system, on a department 
basis, is used for elections to the Salvadorean National Assembly. 
25. In both polities, as is traditional in Latin America, a great many 
physicians, surgeons and dentists are very active politically, 
even to the point of seeking fairly minor political office. These 
medical politicians may be found in all political parties. In 
North America this phenomenon is virtually unknown. 
26. This is somewhat surprising as most Salvadoreans are technically 
illegitimate and there is no particular stigma attached to ille-
gitimacy. 
27. Literally. These charges and countercharges appeared in La Prensa 
Grafica during the 1974 municipal election campaign in San Salva-
dor. 
28. The monetary unit used for comparative purposes here is the Cen-
tral American peso which is equal in value to the U.S. dollar and 
will be indicated by $C.A. Figures were initially in Salvadorean 
or Costa Rican colones and were converted into Central American 
pesos by the writer. Conversion values used were $1.00 C.A. = 
¢2.50 Salvadorean and $1.00 C.A. = ¢6.62 Costa Rican. The symbol 
¢ is used for colones of both countries. 
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29. UNICEF, SIECA, and ODECA, Informe Final: Conferencia Sobre La 
Familia, La Infancia y La Juventud de Centroam~rica y Panam~ (Gua-
temala: Editorial Jos~ de Pineda Ibarra, 1973), p. 116. 
30. Barbara Stallings, Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica, SAGE Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 3 (Beverly Hills: 
SAGE Publications, 1972), p. 59. 
31. Visual evidence of this can be seen in the existence of vacant 
lots in the heart of San Salvador. No such unused real estate may 
be seen in other Central American capitals. 
, 
32. Montero, "Evolucion del Sistema Tributaria," Tables 8 and 11 (un-
paged). This does not include a variety of municipal taxes on the 
liquor trade. 
33. Personal interview, 25 March 1974. 
34. It has, however, changed greatly from the 1940s and 1950s when im-
port duties supplied 40 percent to 50 percent of total revenues. 
See Wa11ich, Public Finance, p. 52. 
35. Virginia C. Watkin, Taxes and Tax Harmonization in Central America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 1967), p. 233. 
36. San Jose (Costa Rica) La Nacion, 25 February 1974, p. 22A. 
37. Estimates range from 63,000 to 300,000. See White, El Salvador, 
p. 185. 
38. El Salvador, CONAPLAN, Indicadores: Economicos y Sociales 1973, 
San Salvador, p. 13. 
39. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 19. 
40. Jeffry Gibson, A Democratic Analysis of Urbanization: Evolution 
of a System of Cities in Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, 
Latin American Studies Program Dissertation Series, no. 20 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1970). 
41. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Aspectos Demograficos 
y Socioeconomicos del Area Metropolitana de San Salvador, prepared 
by J. van den Boomen, (E/CN.12/CCE/ 333/TAO/LAT/54) January 1, 
1966. 
42. White, El Salvador. 
43. Ibid., p. 159. This is the only one of the studies in which the 
methodology is specified. 
44. In Costa Rica, Normal School and Schools for the Performing Arts. 
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In El Salvador, Normal School and Schools of Nursing, Social Work, 
Agronomy, Physical Education and Engineering Technology. Students 
entering Trade Schools usually do so at the end of their primary 
schooling. 
45. Two explanations are offered for the genesis of this university. 
One attributes it to the uneasinesss of the Church and some sec-
tors of the economic elite over the 'Marxist bias' of the National 
University. Faculty members of the new university, however, per-
ceive that their offerings of such disciplines as Industrial En-
gineering and Planning fill a vacuum left by the National Univer-
sity's concentration on Law, Philosophy, Art and Humanities. 
46. A literate person is defined as one who can read, write and under-
stand a simple paragraph. Those who can only write their names 
are classed as illiterate. 
47. John Booth, "A Replication: Modes of Political Participation in 
Costa Rica," WPQ 29 (1976): 628. A sample of 1,446 family heads 
was interviewed. 
48. For a more thorough analysis of group participation, see Cuzan~ 
"Central-Local Linkages"; and Ebe1, "Decision-Making Process in 
San Salvador." 
49. The other members of CONAPLAN are the Ministers of Finance, Econ-
omy, Agriculture, Labor and Public Works; and the Presidents of 
the Central Reserve Bank and of the Republic. 
50. El Salvador, Ministerio de Obras Publicas, San Salvador: Plan de 
Desarol10 Municipal, San Salvador, [1973J. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE POLICY PROCESS 
In Chapter III we presented a general view of the policy process 
and our model of choice for analysis thereof. Here we apply the anal-
ysis to our particular areas of interest, most particularly to munici-
pal revenue policy. This chapter focuses on process, and more speci-
fically on process within what we have defined as the boundaries of 
the political system. Policy output, that is, the current set of pol-
icy practices, will be described below in the subsequent chapter. 
In the section on housing policy, emphasis is on the general na-
ture of the process--what matters are to be considered, what questions 
are to be asked. Because of the national character of housing policy, 
no specific cases are examined in the area. Two cases are, however, 
examined in the revenue section. In San Salvador we look at a case of 
aborted overall tax reform and in San Jose at a successful case of a 
policy to introduce a new tax. 
Case studies may be approached in one of two ways. From one 
viewpoint, the case is the heart of the analysis; all other material 
is only background against which to examine the particular case. From 
the other viewpoint, the case is merely illustrative of general prin-
ciples presented elsewhere. 
Which of these approaches is chosen is influenced to a large ex-
tent by available information. Where a number of different policies 
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of the same type (e.g., revenue) can be located and traced from begin-
ning to end, and where more general data are sparse and/or no well-
defined framework for analysis exists, the former, inductive, approach 
is obviously appropriate. Where a reasonably well-developed theory 
exists, where data on the general situation have been assembled and 
where a framework for analysis is in place, the latter, deductive, 
approach fits. This is the approach selected here. 
Particularly in the matter of revenue policy, we have on the one 
hand definite hypotheses and a framework for analysis and on the other 
hand a shortage of complete, informative cases. Our case studies, 
therefore, serve primarily as illustrations and as checks on our gen-
eral assumptions. 
HOUSING POLICY 
Public housing policy in both Costa Rica and El Salvador is na-
tional, not municipal. National agencies have been set up in both 
cases to deal with housing. In El Salvador, municipalities are speci-
fically excluded from housing planning. General provisions of 'good' 
public housing policy are indicated above in Chapter IV. The results 
of all this policyrnaking, the current package of rules and regulations 
and the actual provision of dwelling units, will be presented below in 
Chapter VII. Comparisons and contrasts will be indicated among INVU, 
IVU and FUNDASAL. Consequently, this chapter will consider housing 
policy only very briefly. 
It is fair to state that with the establishment and funding of 
INVU and IVU respectively, both countries have completed the metapolicy-
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making stage. In the ongoing policy process in the realm of publicly 
supported housing, a variety of decisions need to be made on a more or 
less continuing basis. 
The first issue the agency decides is the location of a public 
housing project. (For analytical purposes each publicly assisted hous-
ing project, whether for sale or rent, will be regarded as one policy 
package.) Location is the single most critical decision for a number 
of reasons, reasons that are not always the same in Costa Rica as in 
EI Salvador. 
Most public housing in EI Salvador is in the capital metropoli-
tan area; much of the government housing in Costa Rica is in outlying 
sections of the country. Even if we restrict analysis to the urban 
areas of San Jos~ and San Salvador, the locational considerations are 
different. In the San Salvador area, IVU must select its sites from 
those undeveloped areas not already dedicated to some non-housing use, 
and then work on acquiring them. INVU, on the other hand, owns a 
, 
variety of sites (former coffee fincas) in the outskirts of San Jose. 
Its decision, then, is which ones, if any, to build on. Another very 
real constraint exists in San Salvador; ANDA simply does not have the 
capacity to provide acceptably priced water to elevations above 900 
meters. 
Following the decision as to location and influenced by the site 
and situational factors of the real estate chosen, policy as to type 
of construction is considered. Again, a number of subdecisions must 
be made before coherent policy can emerge. One question that needs be 
answered very early is, 'Do we build single-family units or multiple-
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family units or some combination of both?' It will be shown below 
that some external considerations, beyond the agency's judgments as to 
what best suits the needs of their clients, are involved at this stage 
of the decisionmaking process. 
Two subsidiary questions regarding construction arise at this 
point--what sorts of construction material to use and how complete the 
housing ought to be. The former question is the more easily answered. 
Engineers and accountants can invoke a purely rational decisionmaking 
model and come up with a single best (most cost efficient) solution. 
Again, a difference between INVU and IVU is noted; I~~ takes the 
state of the art as defined by the contractors/bidders as a given. It 
thus reduces its options, and its decisionmaking costs. IVU operates 
its own materials technology laboratories seeking better and cheaper 
materials; it must decide when and how much of its own technology to 
employ and test. 
The other question, how far to go, is a hard political one and 
must be answered nearer the top of the agency hierarchy. Arguments 
can be, and are given for providing only cleared patches of earth and 
construction materials, for providing furnished turnkey housing, and 
for every intermediate position. The usual result of this argument 
will be indicated below. 
The underlying purpose behind all these activities is, of course, 
providing housing for poeple. Not enough housing can be provided, how-
ever for everyone who is unable to purchase or rent in the private 
housing market. As a result, two pairs of decisions are necessary at 
this stage in the policy process. One deals with whether ruralites 
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or urbanites are to be sheltered; the other with the appropriate in-
come level population to be served. 
Again, arguments can be made for concentrating on rural housing 
and equally valid counter arguments for an urban emphasis. Koth sum-
marizes the five general arguments for rural housing: 
1. Urban housing programs encourage cityward migration with 
its attendant problems. 
2. Better housing in a rural area leads to more employment 
there and thus a tendency for people to remain. 
3. Provision of housing in rural areas creates the potential 
for development of small family shop industries as bases for 
future industrial specialization. 
4. Education of rurals through self help programs and the 
like integrates them into the national culture. 
5. Provision of housing in rural areas can encourage coloni-
zation on un- or under-used land. l 
Another argument made from time to time for concentration on rural 
housing provision is that the rural areas have the greatest need, i.e., 
that shortfall, both absolutely and proportionately, is greater in 
rural areas. Gustavo Antonini, for example, estimates a 1970 housing 
deficit for Costa Rica of 115,545 units of which 94,156 or 81.5 per-
2 
cent are needed in rural areas. 
Proponents of an urban emphasis for public housing provision of-
fer their own reasons in favor of this emphasis. The four most usual 
are: 
1. Urbanization is inevitable, now is the time to make the 
transition smooth. 
2. The rapid expansion of cities requires rapid expansion of 
services, including housing, to prevent epidemics. 
3. Housing programs in urban areas generate greater external 
economies, e.g., bettering the health and psyches of indus-
trial workers. 
4. 'Probably the most important,' political agitators in urban 
slum areas find fertile ground for spreading disaffection--
better housing may decrease conflict. 3,4 
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The actual concentration of effort in Costa Rica and El Salvador will 
be indicated below in Chapter VII. 
In much the same manner, arguments are made for emphasizing 
housing for the poorest classes as opposed to housing for the lower-
middle classes, those who can almost but not quite compete in the gen-
eral housing market. The basic dispute is between humanity and effi-
ciency. Those arguing for the lowest classes suggest that they need 
it more, that the lower-middle class will eventually be able to shift 
for itself; not so for the poorest. The arguments for the lower-middle 
class hold that they will be able to pay their rent or mortgage, get-
ting money back into the pot for additional housing; that this is the 
fastest stimulus to an increase in the construction industry, an in-
dustry in which the poor could get work and move to the lower-middle 
class; and that it is simply too expensive to house the lowest classes. 
Again, the policies chosen by the agencies will be presented below. 
Choosing a socioeconomic class to benefit from public housing 
activity is not sufficiently precise for program purposes. Projects 
house families, not socioeconomic classes. And again, the families 
most in need of public housing may be just the ones who do not fit in 
a project--no skills to finish a self-helf unit, too many children, or 
problems with contagious disease, for example. 
The last set of major considerations that go into the process of 
making decisions about publicly assisted housing involves financing. 
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Financing policy is Janus ian: the one face looks outward to the over-
all financing of the project while the other looks inward to the fi-
nancing by the inhabitants of their individual shares. 
Financing of housing at the macro level is more a search for 
money than a selection among alternative funding opportunities. A 
number of major problems constrain and inhibit investment in housing. 
The wealthy classes in Central America have been traditionally disin-
clined to make any non-argricultural investments in real estate, save 
for luxury construction or for speculative purposes. Private entre-
preneurs can realize faster and larger returns from other investment 
opportunities, particularly in an inflationary climate such as that of 
Costa Rica. National governments do not have the sums of money needed 
5 
generally available to them. It becomes necessary, therefore, to 
seek external sources of funding. With external sources of funding 
come additional participants in the policymaking process, and addi-
tional constraints. 
Consider, for example, the following provisions which are but 
some of the restrictions mandated by one external funding agency, Banco 
Interamericano de Desarollo (BID), on any public housing projects for 
which it has loaned money. Recipient governments must invest the funds 
within a set period and make all purchases and let all contracts (ex-
cept for self-help projects) through public bidding. Relationship of 
the project to a comprehensive national housing policy must be speci-
fied and self-help must be at a maximum. The project must eventually 
be self-sustaining. Money loaned must be used for private home owner-
ship and new construction, not for rental units or restoration. Hous-
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ing is to have 'minimal internal amenities' and provision of non-
housing urban infrastructure is prohibited. In short, governments and 
agencies borrowing to finance housing construction may pay only a very 
low interest cost but a very high one in loss of freedom to design and 
institute local housing policy. 
Methods provided for owners and renters in public housing facil-
ities to finance their individual shares will not be discussed further 
here but will be examined below. Chapter VII, then, will present the 
current character of housing policy, i.e., the set of day-to-day ac-
tivities resulting from these policy deliberations. Practices to be 
considered include regulations governing clientele selection, and spe-
cific accomplishments--the actual provision of dwelling units. Ex-
plicit comparisons among INVU, IVU and FUNDASAL will be offered. 
GENERAL MUNICIPAL REVENUE POLICY 
Unlike housing policy, municipal revenue raising is very much a 
~ local government function in both San Jose and San Salvador. To be 
sure, there are in both countries greater (Costa Rica) or lesser (El 
Salvador) levels of subventions from national to city governments, but 
the municipalities must raise money on their own. Transfer payments 
will be considered briefly in the following chapter; here the concen-
tration is upon the processes by which the local governments attempt 
to increase their own revenues. Initially we examine the general 
methods for the augmenting of the local govern~ents' own funds, next 
we examine an unsuccessful attempt to raise taxes in San Salvador and 
/ finally we trace the arduous route through which San Jose was able to 
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impose a new charge. In all of these we will concentrate upon activi-
ties within the boundaries of the political system. 
City councils in San Salvador and San Jose, like their counter-
parts worldwide, devote a good bit of their energy to raising enough 
money to finance a wide variety of municipal services and activities. 
And like their counterparts elsewhere, their attempts to raise money 
often meet with stiff resistance. 
In both cities, the municipality's own income comes from three 
6 
sources: patentes or impuestos municipales, tasas and contribuciones. 
Unfortunately there are no perfect correlations with any of our better 
known generic terms for municipal revenue sources in North America. 
Patentes include general municipal taxes and various sorts of licenses. 
They are charges for the privilege of doing something within the mu-
nicipal boundaries (e.g., residing, engaging in commerce, carrying a 
firearm) that does not require any municipal effort or service. Tasas 
are basically charges for continuing services provided by the munici-
pality as, for example, garbage collection and street cleaning. Con-
tribuciones are charges made for new, usually one-time-only municipal 
activities such as installing a culvert, paving a street or construct-
ing a sidewalk. Services for which contribuciones are charged are 
the sorts of improvement which, if provided by municipal governments 
in Oregon, would likely be Bancroft-bonded. 
To further the confusion in terminology, tasas and impuestos are 
both used freely as generic terms for any government impost or levy. 
In San Salvador the term arbitrio is often used in place of patente; 
the two are interchangeable. 
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Considering our framework for policy analysis, then, we may as-
sume that the municipal political systems have gathered the whole 
range of po1icymaking phases, so far as possible, within their own 
boundaries. In other words, there may be demands, isolated or aggre-
gated, made upon them from outside for expensive services but the de-
mands for increased revenues to support these services come from with-
in. 
Individual councillors, then, may be regarded as the initiating 
actors in attempts to increase revenue. It should be noted, however, 
that in some cases, especially in San Salvador, the bureaucracy will 
make the original demands or recommendations. 
In the usual practice, an individual councillor will suggest to 
council that the rates for a particular charge or tax be raised, or 
that a specific new source of revenue be adopted. The council dis-
cusses the idea and if it is deemed worthy of further consideration it 
will be assigned to the appropriate committee, the Standing Committee 
on Budget and Finance in San Jos~ and the Interim Finance Committee in 
San Salvador. 
The committee may consider each suggestion on its own, or it may 
engage in some internal aggregation and assembly a package for council 
discussion. After due deliberation, the council may decide to pass 
the increase, to reject it, or to return it to the committee for modi-
fication. If the increase is passed, the adoption phase for that par-
ticular policy is complete. 
Legitimation, in both senses, is the next stage. In both Costa 
Rica and E1 Salvador, as stated above, any changes to municipal tax or 
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user charge rates as well as any new charges require approval from the 
Central Government. A definite procedure, then, exists for legitimat-
ing (in the legal sense) the revenue policy. Different levels of 
Central Government approval are required for tasas and contribuciones, 
whether new or modified, than for patentes. Since the former are sim-
pler, they are discussed first. 
When the Municipality of San Salvador passes any new tasa or 
contribucibn or makes any rate change therein, the Vo.Bo. of the Min-
istry of the Interior is required, before the new levy comes into ef-
fect. The Municipality first transmits its proposed policy to the 
Governor of the Department, who in turns transmits it to the Ministry 
of the Interior. The Governor may comment on the proposal but cannot 
himself approve or disallow it. 
Upon receiving the request, the Ministry assigns it to its De-
partment of Municipal Control. The Department considers the proposal, 
and may call for such comment from interested parties as it feels ap-
propriate. When it has reached a decision as to the desirability of 
the policy, the Department reports back to the Minister with its rec-
ommendation. (Sometimes the policy proposal just disappears; the De-
partment of Municipal Control is widely regarded as a graveyard for 
dead municipal rate increases.) 
The Minister of the Interior is not bound by the recommendation 
of the Department; he is perfectly free to approve or disapprove the 
policy. If he approves, he so informs the Department Governor who in 
turn informs the Municipality. At this point the Municipality must 
publish the policy proposal, in both the Official Journal and a news-
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paper of general circulation, thrice at intervals of not less than one 
working day. Then, and only then, can the Municipality begin to im-
plement its new revenue policy. 
The policy process in San Jos~ is parallel but somewhat simpler. 
Again, the policy suggestion passes from individual councillor (or 
from the bureaucracy) to the complete Council, thence to the Standing 
Committee on Budget and Finance and thence back to the full Council 
for its approval. 
In Costa Rica too, Central Government approval of changes in 
tasas and contribuciones is required. The municipal accord is trans-
mitted to the Comptroller General of the Republic. Within this office, 
the policy is analyzed by the Department of Economic Studies which 
makes a recommendation to the Comptroller. If the Comptroller ap-
proves, he publishes the document in the Official Journal. Eight days 
after publication, the Municipality may commence application of its 
new policy. 
In both countries, the process for instituting new policy in the 
realm of municipal impuestos (arbitrios, patentes) is even more com-
plex than that for tasas and contribuciones. Aggregation, formulation 
and adoption procedures remain the same but another formal actor en-
ters the legitimation phase. Changes in the structure of the im-
puestos require approval not only of the executive power of the cen-
tral governments but also of their legislatures. 
In El Salvador, the impuesto policy, like the tasa/contribucion 
policy, is transmitted through the Department Governor to the Ministry 
of the Interior. After study by the ministry's Department of Munici-
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pal Control, it is returned to the Minister who sends it to the pre-
siding officer of the Legislative Assembly for introduction to that 
body. 
After brief initial consideration, the Assembly assigns the bill 
to its Committee on Interior and Public Works which considers it and 
returns it to the full Assembly for discussion there. If approved by 
the Assembly, the policy filters down as before to the municipality 
for application. 
In Costa Rica, municipal irnpuesto policy is transmitted in the 
same manner as tasa policy up to the point where the Comptroller Gen-
eral makes his recommendation thereon. From here it goes to the Min-
ister of Government who in turn sends it to the President of the As-
sembly for introduction. The Assembly assigns it to the Committee on 
Social Affairs (Asuntos Varios) for study and recommendations. If the 
full Assembly passes the bill on its return from Committee, it is sent 
to the President of the Republic for approval, and he causes it to be 
published in the Official Journal. Again, after the eight-day waiting 
period, the municipality may begin implementing the policy. 
The policy that the municipality can now execute may not be 
precisely the same as the one it adopted. Both national legislatures 
have the right to modify as well as reject the municipal policy pro-
posal. If the modifications are not to the municipality's liking, it 
either has to live with them or not proceed with the policy implemen-
tation stage. 
Concurrently with the formal, legal legitimation process for the 
municipal revenue policy, the informal legitimation takes place. Sel-
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dom are policies to raise tax or user charge rates, or to institute 
new ones, universally popular. In Costa Rica and EI Salvador it is 
generally during this phase that the affected interests attempt to 
have the policies disallowed or at least the more objectionable fea-
tures changed. It is, therefore, the primary point of access for in-
formal policymakers. Both types of informal policyrnakers, as identi-
fied in Chapter III, can be found here. 
Municipal officials are not content to await deliberations on 
the fate of their policy proposals. They lobby for them in the same 
way as other interest groups. Generally, municipal officials are the 
only actors seeking favorable consideration for new or higher taxes. 
As lobbyists, municipal officials are proximate policymakers acting 
outside their prescribed roles and are therefore regarded as informal 
rather than formal policy participants. 
In opposition to the increased levies are whichever groups will 
be paying the bill. In many cases this is their first chance to in-
fluence the legislation. Many of these individuals and groups rou-
tinely deal with the central governments and make effective use of 
7 
their contacts. Specific examples are provided below as we examine 
attempts at major tax reform in San Salvador. 
It was expected that the legitimation process would be much 
smoother and more pro forma in Costa Rica than in El Salvador. After 
all, the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly and the San Jos~ Municipal 
Council had the same sort of partisan make-up. Presumably, then, the 
bitter political and ideological strife that exists between San Sal-
vador and EI Salvador would be absent. Legitimation thus would be 
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much more likely for tax increases in San Jose than in San Salvador. 
In neither case, however, did the municipalities meet with much 
success in having their revenue policies approved. Other municipali-
ties in both countries had new taxes and rate structure changes ap-
8 
proved rather routinely but not the capitals. San Jose had not had 
a new tax approved since 1935 and San Salvador's tariff schedule had 
9 
remained unaltered since it was first adopted in 1947. The re-
searcher, then, who is attempting to select one particular tax policy 
to trace in great detail is faced with a major problem--the lack of 
any policy that could be examined from perception through application. 
It was decided therefore to discuss briefly a policy that failed in 
the legitimation phase in San Salvador and to examine more closely the 
most successful example available in San Jose. 
SAN SALVADOR - TAX REFORM AND HOW IT FAILED 
Since it came to power in San Salvador in 1964, the Christian 
Democratic Party has attempted to overhaul the city's archaic and 
10 
chaotic tax structure. A variety of motives underly these efforts; 
it is inappropriate to discuss them here. What is examined in this 
section is the policy process associated with these attempts, and its 
ultimate breakdown. 
The basic objectives of the tax reform were twofold: one, to in-
crease the amount of municipal revenue; and two, to shift the inci-
dence of much of the tax burden from smaller to larger enterprises. 
This latter action would not only serve the political end of pleasing 
PDC's small merchant supporters but also the administrative end of in-
222 
creasing tax collection efficiency. 
To provide a sample of the nihilistic state of the existing tax 
structure and the order of reform attempted by the municipality two 
short examples follow. The only categorization, the only order, is 
purely alphabetical; there is no attempt to group similar sorts of ac-
tivities. The first ten entries in the Tarifa read thus (amounts are 
monthly charges in $C.A.): 
TABLE XX 
EXCERPT FROM SAN SALVADOR TARIFF STRUCTURE 
Concept 
Fire Insurance Agencies 
Air Transportation Agencies 
Foreign Life Insurance Agencies 
Steamship Agencies 
Agencies of Foreign Commercial Houses 
Oil Company Agencies 
Gasoline Company Agencies 
Soap Company Agencies 
First Class Automobile Sales Agencies 
(capitalized at over $20,000) 
Second Class Automobile Agencies 
(capitalized at over $20,000) 
Total 
$78.00 
$100.00 
$52.00 
$78.00 
$16.00 
$40.00 
$100.00 
$4.00 
$15.60 
$7.80 
SOURCE: Tarifa de Arbitrios de 1a Municipa1idad de San Salvador. 
It can readily be seen that categories such as 'agency' or 'factory' 
contain large numbers of listings in no useful pattern. Shrewd busi-
nessmen can and do simply pick and pay for their least heavily taxed 
commercial activity. 
San Salvador's proposed tax policy provided far more order. In 
one section, for example, it gathered together financial institu-
tions--private banks, branches of foreign banks, savings and loan as-
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sociations, stock brokers, insurance companies, finance companies and 
pawnbrokers. Under the 1947 Tarifa some of these paid no municipal 
tax; others paid amounts ranging from $13.00 to $78.00 per month, re-
gardless of size. To complicate matters still further, they were 
listed under seven different headings on as many pages. Under the re-
formed policy, 20 categories were created according to the amolli~t of 
capitalization. The smallest business would pay $8.00 per month under 
the new schedule; the largest $390.00 plus one peso for every $200,000 
of capitalization over $40 million. Financially and administratively, 
then, the new policy made eminently good sense from the Municipality's 
point of view. 
The City Council realized that any tax reform policy it adopted 
would not go unquestioned by those who would bear the brunt of the 
tax. Consequently it began attempts at informal legitimation even be-
fore the formal process. In October, 1964, the municipality met with 
the Camara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador (CACI) and pre-
sented, in general terms, its proposed policy. CACI indicated that 
it recognized the need for a new municipal tax policy and would not 
oppose one that did not unjustly oppress its members and friends. 
The Municipality' continued with its policy formulation, and 
adopted and transmitted to the Legislature its request in March 1965. 
The Municipality had not discussed the policy details with CACI and 
the latter group was quite unhappy with them. Its immediate response 
was the formation of a junta with the Asociacion Salvadurena de In-
dustriales (ASI) and other affected groups to oppose the new policy. 
The junta's attempts to abort the policy in the legitimation 
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phase involved both the formal and the informal legitimation. On the 
informal side CACI and allies began a widespread media attack on the 
policy. Among other disastrous results of the policy's implementa-
tion, it was alleged, would be the ruining of the larger businesses 
most impacted by the new taxes and massive price hikes to poor shop-
pers, the ultimate consumers of the tax increase. Moreover, the junta 
suggested, the Municipality's fiscal problems were primarily a result 
of its own administrative ineptness (or political chicanery) in not 
collecting the revenues to which it was currently entitled. The new 
policy included greatly increased levies on bars, go-go joints, dance-
halls and billiard parlors. The junta insisted this was an improper 
attempt to use a fiscal instrument, a tax policy, for a non-fiscal 
purpose, i.e., the imposition of a particular moral standard on the 
11 
community. 
Formal attempts to block legitimation occurred in two arenas. 
The business sector used its two seats on CONAPLAN as a springboard 
for trying to convince the Executive Power that the new municipal tax 
policy, if allowed, would endanger the national policy of commerical 
and industrial development. Not only, it was suggested, would this 
harm the nation economically but would also tend to damage PGN poli-
tically. 
In the legislative arena, GAG! and the junta sought and were 
granted permission to present arguments to the Committee on Interior 
and Public Works in opposition to the policy. CAGI then requested 
from the municipality seven types of information it said were neces-
sary to adequately respond to the new tax structure. These were: 
1. a detailed breakdown of revenues received by category of 
tax; 
2. detailed data on expenditures by category of service, dis-
tinguishing between expenditures for service and for adminis-
tration; 
3. detailed data on the causes of the municipal deficits; 
4. specific estimates of new revenues by categories of tax; 
5. a detailed plan for investment of the projected new reve-
nues; 
6. detailed data on uncollected taxes; 
7. projected plans for administrative reform of the municipal 
government. 12 
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Need~ess to say, the nature of the municipal revenue system effective-
ly precluded the assembling of this information. Nonetheless, the 
Mayor of San Salvador asked the junta to meet with him, saying he 
would then provide the needed data. The junta refused, announcing 
that it would get the information when it was provided to the Legisla-
tive Committee. The Municipality did not, could not, provide the in-
formation and the National Assembly adjourned without acting on San 
Salvador's proposed tax policy. 
Ten years later there still had been no major changes in San 
Salvador'S tax structure. In 1971 the Municipality modified its pol-
icy proposal but once again it did not meet with the approval of the 
National Assembly; once again the policy died in the legitimation 
stage. 
PDC's financial program for 1974-1977 concentrated on better ad-
ministrative procedures, special lines of credit from the Central Bank, 
transformation of some unspecified municipal services into profitable 
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enterprises and obtaining of permission to charge National Government 
agencies for services rendered. Interestingly enough, overall tax re-
13 
form was not mentioned. 
San Salvador's new revenue policy, then, was never implemented. 
The process ended in the legitimation phase. In this case, informal 
and formal legitimation appear to go hand-in-hand; failure to obtain 
the one almost guarantees failure to obtain the other. 
It may be useful here to conduct a post mortem on the dead tax 
reform policy. Not only might we determine the causes of this parti-
cular policy fatality, we might also be able to generalize and perhaps 
suggest some preventative activity for future municipal policy pro-
posals. 
Once again dominating the policy failure is the statutory re-
quirement for National Government approval of municipal tax changes. 
If formal legitimation of this type were not required, there would be 
no chance for disallowal. 
This requirement is particularly lethal to municipal policy in 
the situation where political and ideological emnity exists between 
the PDC Government of San Salvador and the PCN-dominated Central Gov-
ernment. Exacerbating the situation in this particular case was the 
opposition to the Mayor of San Salvador personally. The tax reform 
was the brainchild of Napoleon Duarte, a charismatic figure known na-
tionwide and generally regarded as having a very good chance of becom-
14 
ing EI Salvador's first PDC President in recent years. He could not 
be allowed this triumph. 
Not only is the Municipality at odds politically with the Na-
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tional Government, it is weak vis-a-vis the business community. The 
private sector has two seats on CONAPLAN representing basically the 
largest firms; the municipalities have no seats. Moreover, CACl and 
its allies have more technical and financial expertise than has San 
Salvador. Any contest between the two, therefore, is extremely un-
equal and very likely to be won by the business interests. 
Not all the Municipality's problems, however, arise from the 
political and institutional stacking of the deck against it. Some of 
the problems are of its own making. In failing to keep CACl informed 
as the details of the policy were being drawn up, it may have unneces-
sarily antagonized them. In addition, the charges of administrative 
ineptitude in tax collection leveled against the Municipality are un-
deniably true. The city is definitely in a no-win situation: it can-
not reorganize its fiscal procedures until it gets some additional 
revenue, some breathing room and Central Government approval; this ap-
proval will not be forthcoming until San Salvador gets its fiscal house 
in order. 
It must be noted that San Salvador is not totally without al-
lies, at least potential ones, at the national government level. The 
Municipality's political capital is definitely limited though, and it 
must be spent prudently. The City was not willing to wage all-out war 
against either Central Government or the business community; other 
matters were coming up on which it would be looking for their sup-
15 
port. 
For a variety of reasons, then, the policymaking process in this 
particular case was aborted in the legitimation phase. Partisan poli-
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tics, intense lobbying and some errors on the part of the municipal-
ity all contributed to its failure. There is no doubt, however, that 
this policy will be resurrected in one form or another. San Salva-
dorIs need for additional revenue is not ended, nor are attempts at 
formulating and implementing policy to provide this revenue. 
THE PARKING METER COMES TO SAN JOSE 
The parking meter was invented by Carl Magee in Oklahoma City in 
16 
1932. Since then it has been adopted globally both as an instrument 
of traffic control and as a source of revenue, particularly municipal 
revenue. Most cities of any size, U.S. or foreign, have their down-
17 
town streets lined with parking meters. San Jos{ is no exception. 
In this section we examine the process by which parking meter policy 
in San Jose came into existence. 
/ In the early 1950s San Jose was growing rapidly. The rapid 
growth was accompanied by an expanded flow of truck and automobile 
traffic and the attendant increase in congestion. One effect of this 
was inconvenience to the customers atterr~ting to park near a downtown 
, 
book and printing shop, Libreria Universal. The proprietor, Hubert 
Federspiel, approached the Municipal Executive about the problem and 
18 
suggested the installation of parking meters. 
Shortly before Christmas, 1954, Federspiel wrote the Bogota 
agent of Magee-Hale-Park-O-Meter Company asking about the availability 
19 
of parking meters. The agent responded on January 5, 1955 saying 
that the meters could be shipped immediately from Panama to San Jose 
and suggesting that the Municipality begin marking the streets and in-
229 
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stalling the bases for the meters. Federspiel forwarded the letter 
to the Municipal Executive; the demand had formally entered the poli-
tical system. 
The Executive forwarded the request and the agent's letter for 
the consideration of the City Engineer. Two months later the Engi-
neer replied and reported that after consulting the Director of Transit 
(a Central Government official), it was decided that the installation 
of private parking meters could not be allowed. However, he contin-
21 
ued, the idea of parking meters should be studied. 
Less than two weeks later a solicitation for bids to supply the 
Municipality with 400 automatic parking meters appeared in the Offi-
22 
cial Journal. The bids were to be for the meters and installation 
and were to indicate the price C.I.F. Limon or Puntarenas. The meters 
were not to be purchased outright by San Jose but were to be operated 
on a profit-sharing arrangement between the Municipality and the sup-
plier for five years, after which time the Municipality would assume 
ownership. Users of metered parking spaces would be charged 50 c~n-
timos per hour or ten c~ntimos for 12 minutes. 
Bids were opened on April 21, 1955, and were considered. At its 
meeting of July 22, the Municipal Council, acting on the advice of the 
23 
Auditor, rejected all bids. The Municipal Executive was authorized 
to draw up a more specific solicitation and reopen the bidding. There 
was no discussion. 
It is useful to consider the phases of the paradigmatic policy 
process to this point, the actors involved, and the roles played. Ini-
tial perception of an environmental condition and its definition as a 
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need or problem were done outside the political system by an individ-
ual. The matter of the parking meter was considered strong enough to 
stand by itself; it was not aggregated with similar issues. Hubert 
Federspiel then made a demand of the political system and the process 
24 
entered the government phase. Formulation of the initial policy was 
done by the bureaucracy and the policy passed to the Council for adop-
tion. It failed at the adoption phase and was returned through a 
feedback loop for reformulation. 
A more detailed specification package was assembled by the Ex-
ecutive and the official call for bids was made in October, 1955. The 
most fundamental change from the earlier solicitation was that the 
more recent one sought bids for the outright sale of the parking me-
ters to the Municipality. Bids were opened on October 31 and the Mu-
nicipa1 Council considered them at its February 29, 1956, session. It 
was decided to award the contract to Jaime Gliell and Company repre-
senting the Duncan Meter Corporation of Chicago. A clause was written 
into the authorizing ordinance to the effect that: 
It is intended that this award will become effective imme-
diately the Legislative Assembly authorizes the imposition of 
the tax that takes place with the installation of the parking 
meters and as soon as the Comptroller General of the Republic 
approves the supplemental budget. 26 
The policy, however, was never presented to the Legislature for enact-
ment as law nor to the Comptroller for approval of the budget changes. 
No further official co~~ent was made on the matter for almost two 
years. 
Parking meter policy reappeared with another solicitation for 
27 
bids in the Offical Journal during July, 1957. Other than requiring 
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the meters to be automatic rather than manually operated, the specifi-
cations were the same as in the previous solicitation. Bids were 
opened that same month and went to the Council's Joint Committee (Fi-
nance and Public Works) on Parking Meters. 
The Committee reported back to the Council at a special meeting 
in November. At that meeting the Municipal Executive referred, some-
what obliquely, to the fate of the previous parking meter ordinance: 
Yeu. TCTI1CIi'loe:.c tilCi.l. ;;;Cij.1e :: c:;:' 3 years ago we introduced the 
matter of parking meters . . . and through one circumstance 
or another we have had to vacate the solicitations . . . the 
last time they made us a very good offer that did not require 
any down payment by the Municipality but this [the current 
offer] is an investment that pays for itself and is a better 
deal for the Municipality . . . and then as now what we have 
to look for is the benefit of the Municipality . 28 
Nothing more was said of the earlier policy attempt. 
The Council proceeded to discuss the bids before it. The lowest 
bid was from the Maico Company but the Committee recommended against 
accepting it. Panama had used these meters for a while but had 
switched. Therefore, it was implied (but never stated), they must be 
unsuited for use in Central America. Moreover, it was argued, they 
were German made and solving any problems with meters from so far away 
would be both inconvenient and expensive. 
Unlike the earlier meetings on this subject, debate at this one 
was intense and wide ranging. One cowlcillor argued, for example, 
that if Costa Rica was trying to sell its coffee in G6Tillany, surely 
29 
a Costa Rican municipality could buy a German parking meter. An-
other councillor pointed out that the Comptroller was not likely to 
30 
approve the purchase of any meters but the cheapest. The Municipal 
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Executive responded that because the lowest bid required a larger down 
payment and charged the Municipality interest on the unpaid balance, 
it really was not as low as it seemed and he could persuade the Comp-
troller to accede to the Municipality's wishes. 
Finally the Council decided, as before, to award the contract to 
Jaime Guell for Duncan parking meters. Then came discussion of the 
mechanics of the purchase, specifically, obtaining necessary Central 
Government approval, and arranging the financing. Financing arrange-
ments with the company were simple and readily agreed upon: ten per-
cent down, the rest in 12 equal monthly installments. Two other fi-
nancial matters were not so simple: the Municipality had to petition 
the Central Bank for permission to buy U.S. dollars for the transac-
tion and the Minister of Finance for exemption from customs duties. 
Once again the question of Central Government approval arose. 
This time, however, it was suggested that only the Executive Power and 
not the Legislative Assembly need legitimate the policy. The City's 
Legal Officer suggested that asking the Assembly for enabling legis-
lation was an imposition on that overworked body. Further, it was un-
likely the Assembly could consider the request within the 120 days 
specified for closing the contract. Moreover, he was of the opinion 
that the parking meter fee was a tasa, not an impuesto; the legisla-
tive Vo.Bo., then, was unnecessary. 
He was supported in this position by the Municipal Executive who 
pointed out that there were existing laws controlling traffic and 
parking. In addition, charges were levied, in the guise of fines, 
against those who currently overparked in controlled zones. There-
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fore, he concluded, no further legislation was needed, only the ap-
proval of the Comptroller. 
These municipal officials had not reached their conclusions in a 
vacuum. Conversations had been held between them and functionaries of 
the Comptroller and of the Ministry of Transportation, as well as with 
Deputies of various parties. The Council was convinced, and passed 
the ordinance making the award to Guell with the stipulation that ap-
proval of the Comptroller was needed to legally bind the contract. 
Such approval was not forthcoming; some two months later the 
Comptroller voided the contract. The directive from his office read: 
CONSIDERING: The Comptroller estimates that the functioning 
of parking meters in the City of San Jose, with the purposes 
of regulating the parking of vehicles in the public ways 
through the medium of paying the Municipality for the right, 
constitutes a tax [impuesto], and since it is not logical to 
authorize the purchase of the apparatus prior to approval on 
the part of the Legislative Assembly. 
THEREFORE: The resolution passed by the Municipality of San 
Jose is declared null. 31 
Once again the purchase of parking meters was stymied. 
At the next City Council meeting, the Municipal Executive ques-
32 
tioned the action of the Comptroller. Why, he wondered, had the 
Comptroller said nothing when any of the three solicitations for bids 
appeared in the Official Journal? Moreover, the Executive asked, was 
there any connection with a letter to the Comptroller from a disap-
pointed bidder claiming that his firm had actually submitted the low-
est bid, that factors not taken into account made it the best, that no 
interest would be charged the Municipality and that their meters were 
33 
of very good quality? Was not the Comptroller, the Executive con-
tinued, actually saying "The parking meter of Mr. Maroto is effec-
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tively the cheapest. Consequently the award is being revoked and pre-
sented to Mr. Maroto"? If so, this was not a valid exercise of the 
Comptroller's power. 
Various members of the Council expressed agreement with the Ex-
ecutive. Regardless of right and wrong, however, the Comptroller had 
the power to block the purchase. The Council formed a committee to 
present its viewpoint as forcefully as possible to the Comptroller. 
The committee was to meet with the Comptroller and ask him to rescind 
his resolution. 
The committee met with the Comptroller and put forward its case. 
The Comptroller was not impressed. After almost a year of arguing 
that the parking meter charge was a tasa and not an impuesto, the Mu-
nicipality capitulated. The Finance Committee and the Municipal Ex-
ecutive reformulated the policy, which was adopted by the Council 
34 
without discussion or debate, and forwarded it to the Executive 
Power for transmittal to the Assembly. 
Two important changes appeared in this new version of the policy 
proposal: one, it was presented as primarily a traffic control and 
public security measure, with municipal revenue as a secondary consid-
eration; and two, it stated that half the proceeds from fines levied 
against non-paying parkers would go to the Director General of Transit, 
an arm of the Central Government. 
After four months of study by the Comptroller and other inter-
ested officials of the Executive Power, the project was submitted to 
35 
the Legislative Assembly on July 9, 1959. The full Assembly assigned 
it to the Interim Committee on Taxes and Municipal Enterprises. The 
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Committee considored the proposal and decided to seek some outside ex-
p6rtis6. On Octotc~ 28 the Committee secretary wrote the Director 
General of Transit seeking his advice, suggestions and criteria for 
36 
putting the policy into operation. 
Nothing happened. Nine months later the Municipal Executive 
wrote to the Chief Clerk of the Legislative Assembly: 
It has been over a year now since the Minister of Government 
sent the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly the project. 
As, in reality, I am ignorant of reason as to why said project 
has not been submitted for the consideration of the honorable 
Assembly, I would very much appreciate your informing me in 
this respect. 37 
For once, a timely reply was forthcoming. Less than a week later the 
Chief Clerk answered: 
Allow me to inform you that the project to which you refer 
does not have a recommendation [from the Committee]. More-
over, as the said project was presented in the past Legisla-
ture, and in this [one] no Deputy has asked that it be 
brought to the floor, permit me to suggest that it would be 
t~ YO~8 convenience to ask some Deputy to make such a mo-
tlon. 
No such Deputy was found. 
In April, 1961 the Municipality found itself in financial diffi-
cu1ties of undetermined magnitude. Two Councillors suggested a hard 
look at the state of the municipal fisc. This task was assigned to 
39 
the Committee on Finance and Budget. The Committee reported back at 
the next meeting with the disturbing news that projected revenues for 
the year would fall short of projected expenditures by ¢1,757,281.48. 
The Committee suggested that the shortage was due to an insuffi-
cient1y progressive tax structure. No one, however, was willing to 
introduce changes. The Council decided to tighten its belt, cut down 
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on the use of municipally owned vehicles by councillors, sell a number 
of small municipally owned lots and seek new sources of revenue. 
Two months later Councillor Car16s Larfn Angulo brought up park-
40 
ing meters at a council meeting. He presented an already written 
ordinance and it was adopted unanimously, with no discussion. 
This version of the policy proposal contained a number of new 
provisions. In the preamble, for example, it stated that the Munici-
pality was seeking to cooperate with the Director General of Transit 
in managing traffic and parking and to do this by the use of the most 
modern technical and scientific methods, had decided to install park-
ing meters. In a radical shift of direction the preamble went on to 
say that day-care centers were needed in San Jose and that the Chil-
dren's Asylum and Orphan's Hospital were worthy institutions and would 
receive money from the proceeds of the parking meters. Other money 
would go for road upkeep, benefiting motorists who fed the parking 
meters, and for sanitation works. 
This something-for-everyone accord was transmitted to the Exec-
utive Power for submission to the Legislature. On July 3 the Minister 
of Government forwarded it to the Assembly, where it was officially 
received on July 5. The Assembly wasted no time in deciding it was 
going to shelve the proposal and rather curtly informed the Minister 
of this: 
. we have resolved to remove from the consideration of 
this Assembly the projected law presented by the Municipality 
of San Jose and intended to authorize the installation of 
parking meters. 41 
At this point, then, the parking meter policy, if not dead, was at 
least moribund. 
Outside the Legislature, however, a variety of activities re-
lating to the parking meter policy was occurring. In San Jose, two 
Councillors asked the Municipality to give the Little Sisters of 
the Poor of St. Peter Claver a continuing grant of ¢500 per month 
to help them with their day-care center. The Council passed the 
42 
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request to the Committee on Finance and Budget. The Committee re-
ported back to Council and the Council passed a motion saying in ef-
fect: 
It is a great idea, the Sisters do wonderful work, but the 
Municipality just cannot afford it. If, however, the Legis-
lature would act on Larin Angulo's parking meter proposal, a 
considerable sum of money could be destined for construction 
and maintenance of day care centers . . • In any event, the 
Committee is happily studying the matt2r for 1962 in case the 
Assembly does not approve our project. 3 
Once again the Central Government was informed of the Municipality's 
request. Once again nothing happened. 
During the spring and summer of 1962 INVU conducted a superfi-
cial survey of traffic flows for San Jose and for other cities, with 
an eye to using the results in choosing locations for housing projects. 
The Municipality used this information to buttress its case and once 
more requested legislative approval for its parking meter policy. No 
changes were made in the project, only a request, accompanied by the 
INVU material, for a reconsideration of its proposal. The Executive 
Power transmitted the request to the Legislature; it was not heard of 
again. 
In the meantime traffic congestion and parking problems contin-
ued to increase and plague downtown San Jose. The City Road Depart-
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ment undertook to study just how severe the difficulty was and to 
quantify its magnitude. This work continued for two years and in Feb-
ruary, 1965, the 'Plan for the Regulation of Parking in the Central 
Area of San Jos~' was proposed by the Technical Branch of the Road De-
partment. Among its findings were the amount of vehicle traffic 
(100,000 vehicle trips per day), average length of parking time for 
various groups, needed dimensions for convenient parking space and 
total number of regulated parking spaces. Among its recommendations 
were wider streets, more signal lights, no parking along bus routes 
and a more extensive zone of limited time parking--controlled by park-
ing meters. 
The Municipal Executive took advantage of the information and 
recommendations in the plan to support his plea for reconsideration of 
the parking meter project by the Legislature. In July he wrote to the 
President of the Assembly: 
The projected parking meter law is buried in the Legislative 
Assembly. This bothers me and a number of the councillors, 
especially Carlos Larln for it would enable us to regulate 
the use of our congested ways and at the same time provide 
some funds for street repair and maintenance .... We have 
2,147 parking spaces in the central area and want meters on 
them . . . It is certain, Mr. President, that if you reintro-
duce for discussion the projected Parking Meter Law for the 
municipalities of Costa Rica, you would receive the gratitude 
of all the Councils in the country.44 
One modification of singular importance is suggested in this letter. 
No longer is the request to the Legislature for the approval of a pol-
icy for San Jose but for all the municipalities of the country. 
The President of the Assembly was convinced. The next day he 
45 
reintroduced the project into the Assembly. In his preamble to the 
239 
bill he pointed out that the project, originally sent to the Assembly 
on October 17, 1962, had undergone two major changes: one, it was now 
presented as primarily a congestion relief rather than a revenue mea-
sure; and two, it was to cover all the municipalities of the country, 
not only San Jose. 
For the first time, the Legislature considered the policy pro-
posal seriously. The Committee on Social Affairs studied the bill and 
with only one minor change reported it back to the full Assembly with 
a favorable recommendation on September 27. One other minor change 
was made on the floor. (A second amendment, trying to lower the 
hourly charges, was defeated.) The Assembly passed the bill on Octo-
ber 6 and sent it to the Executive Branch where it received the ap-
46 
proval of the President of the Republic on November 2, 1965. The 
formal legitimation phase was complete. 
Once again the Municipality prepared to solicit bids; this time 
with the assurance the Central Government would not declare the bid-
ding null. On January 5, 1966, the call went out for bids to supply 
47 
2,000 parking meters. Bids were to be opened on February 8. 
The Municipality had made a number of changes and refinements in 
its requirements since the last abortive effort to purchase meters. 
Potential bidders requested more than the allotted time to prepare 
their new offers. Consequently, the Municipality received no acccpt-
able bids by the closing date. 
At this point the Municipality began to consider the structure 
of its bid solicitation more closely. Particularly, it began to con-
sider what technical specifications it actually wanted in a parking 
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meter. For example, some previous solicitations had required auto-
matic meters and some had required manual meters, with no particular 
rationale in either case. With the political concerns about the park-
ing meters taken care of, San Jose decided to allow itself the luxury 
of taking the time to determine precisely what mechanical features 
the apparatus ought to have. This would not only ensure the Munici-
pality obtaining the meter best suited to its needs but would also en-
able it to prepare a detailed enough specification list that potential 
suppliers could prepare reasonably costed bids. 
The President of the Council assigned to the Committee on Trans-
it and Urbanism the task of studying the various meters available and 
determining exactly what specifications to include in the next bid no-
tice. One of the Committee's first activities was an examination of 
the parking meter operations in other cities. The three cities most 
closely investigated were Panama and Guatemala, where climatic condi-
tions were similar to those in San Jos~, and Portland, Oregon, which 
had a long history of successful parking meter operation. 
For a city that had been in such a hurry, time and time again, 
to rush its parking meter policy through both Council and Central Gov-
ernment, San Jose seemed singularly unconcerned with actually putting 
the meters into operation. The study phase lasted over four years; 
48 
not until October, 1970, did the call for bids go out. 
Bids were opened on January 20, 1971, and were sent to the Joint 
Committee on Transit, Urbanism, Finance and Budget. The Committee 
made its recommendation to Council two weeks later. The Council by a 
vote of 13 to one awarded the contract to Enrique Herrero y Compania 
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for 500 Duncan parking meters at a cost of $41,065. This time, fi-
nally, the contract was fulfilled. 
On July 7, 1971, the Municipality published the regulations gov-
erning parking meter use. They would be in operation from 6 A.M. to 
6 P.M. Monday through Saturday, would cost parkers one colon per hour 
(twice the rate originally suggested), and only diplomatic personnel 
would be permitted to park free. 
The final, legal, official enabling activity took place in Oc-
tober when President Jose Figueres promulgated an executive decree 
50 
authorizing the regulations. 
Although unusually heavy summer rains had forced some delays in 
the parking meter installation, 380 were in place by November. As 
part of the celebration marking the beginning of National Guard Week, 
the first parking meters went into operation at 6 A.M., November 8, 
1971. It was 16 years, nine months and one day since Hubert Feder-
spiel's letter to the Municipal Executive had injected the demand for 
a parking meter policy into the political system. 
As was the case in San Salvador, the major difficulty in creat-
ing this policy lay not in the formulation/adoption phase where the 
Municipality was the chief actor but in the legitimation phase, con-
trolled by the Central Government. It is worthwhile to examine those 
modifications that took place in the original policy proposal and led 
to the policy's ultimate approval by the Central Government. 
One factor had to be the increasing specificity of the proposal 
and its support from hard data. The original policy called for 400 
meters; no specifications of any kind were either required or sug-
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gested, nor was there any indication as to what uses the income derived 
therefrom might be put. The proposal as approved contained detailed 
specifications on both matters. The original policy contained no traf-
fic count, no estimate of number of parking spaces, no indication as 
to what sorts of people parked in the city center, for how long or for 
what purposes. Information was provided on all these aspects for the 
approved policy. 
Another change in the policy which influenced its ultimate le-
gitimation was its shift in emphasis. As originally proposed by the 
Municipality it was strictly a revenue raising policy. As finally ap-
proved it was a policy for controlling parking and relieving traffic 
congestion, a policy that only coincidentally generated some funds for 
San Jose--or at least so it was perceived. 
Probably the most important factor leading to the parking meter 
policy's success in the Legislature was the broadening of its scope. 
As a lone policy suggestion it had little appeal to the Central Gov-
ernment, either the Assembly or the Executive. As part of a larger 
policy for improving traffic circulation it was much more attractive. 
Above all, the Central Government was reluctant to legitimate any pol-
icy that would benefit only the Municipality of San Jose; it proved 
far more receptive to a policy that could be applied in all the cities 
of Costa Rica. 
Two unsuccessful elements of the Municipality's legitimation 
strategy might also be mentioned here. San Jos~ attempted to both 
shame and bribe the Central Government into approving its policy; 
neither approach worked. The Municipality tried to make the Central 
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Government feel guilty about the lack of funds for the so deserving 
child-care programs. The effort failed, as did the attempt to bribe 
by designating some of the parking meter proceeds for the Director 
General of Transit. 
Ultimately, then, the Central Government was willing to app~ove 
a detailed policy, backed by hard data, that would enable the munic-
ipalities of the country to control traffic flows in their downtown 
areas. It was not willing to approve a vague policy designed to fill 
the municipal coffers of San Jose. 
With the parking meters in place and the regulations in force, 
the bulk of the policy process was complete. Only marginal adjust-
ments remained, either to iron out unforeseen bugs or to respond to 
public feedback. Initial public feedback was widespread. 
For the first few days after the parking meter policy went into 
effect it was a major newsmaker in San Jose. On November 9, La Prensa 
Libre reported that 450 tickets had been issued the first day for 
51 
failure to plug the meters. The article suggested that it was 
partly the Municipality's fault; it had failed to instruct the popu-
lace on the mechanics of how to operate a parking meter. The same day 
La Nacion reported that there were fewer automobiles on the streets 
and that therefore one of the objectives of the parking meter policy 
52 
was being met. The same article mentioned that to ensure payment of 
fines, the authorities would remove license plates of those cars il-
legally parked, with the plates to be returned only when the fine was 
paid. 
The next day La Nacion headlined its article "Easily Evaded are 
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the Parking Meters" and indicated a certain insufficiency of enforce-
53 
ment on the part of the Municipality. La Prensa Libre wrote of a 
social problem caused by the meters; the fact that car parkers were 
54 
robbed of their living. The particular object of this journalistic 
concern was one Francisco Mora Campos who had been supporting a wife 
and three children on the ¢150 per week he had been earning as a car 
parker. 
The following day was a slow one for parking meter news. The 
Municipality did publish a note on how and where to pay fines but 
there were no news stories or editorial comments. On the twelfth of 
November, however, things picked up. An unidentified 'Lover of Pro-
gress' wrote to the editor of La Nacion praising the meters and the 
Municipality for installing them, while the editor himself opined: 
"We believe that the initiative of the Municipal Corporation merits 
55 
applause." More interestingly, La Prensa Libre announced a protest 
56,57 
march against the parking meters by collectors and messengers. 
It should be noted here that this protest was one of the very 
few manifestations of public disapproval of the parking meters. (Cy-
clists, objecting to paying the same amount as automobiles for metered 
parking spaces, had earlier protested.) If those who parked in the 
central area were strongly opposed to thus paying for it, they were 
not saying so publicly. With no major actual or perceived local op-
position to the policy, the Municipality felt little need to publicize, 
explain or justify it. Informal legitimation, therefore, took place 
almost automatically. 
The Municipal Corporation was delighted with the performance of 
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its parking meters. A month after they first went into operation, it 
gave Enrique Herrero y Compan1a an order for another SOD meters. In 
their first four weeks, parking meters had grossed ¢92,OOO exclusive 
58 
of fines. 
A second lot of parking meters was purchased and installed. 
There was no debate at the Council meeting, no objections from the 
Central Government and no public protest. The adoption, legitimation 
and implementation phases of parking meter policy appeared to have be-
come routinized. 
59 
In May, 1973 the Council discussed parking meters once again. 
Two factors dominated the discussion: the nature of the general ar-
gument on the need for more meters, and Councillor Chavez Molina's 
impassioned pleas against them. One reason put forward for the pur-
chase and installation of new meters was consistency in parking reg-
ulation. Meters were currently functioning in the center of downtown 
and on the fringes; in the space between were gaps, overcrowded areas 
of free parking. These areas should, logically, be metered. A more 
important reason was the financial one. The City needed the money and 
had lots of places to put meters where none were then installed. It 
should be emphasized that with the exception of Chavez Molina there 
was no question as to whether there should be any more meters, only 
as to how many and where they should go. One argument advanced for 
in~ediate purchase of 1,000 was the rising cost of iron and steel 
which would surely be reflected in higher future prices for the ma-
chines. 
Chavez Molina's arguments against the purchase of parking meters 
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were surprisingly intense and wide ranging. In the first place, he 
suggested, Costa Rica's foreign exchange was very hard earned by the 
sales of millions of pounds of milk products and coffee. It should 
not be squandered on "North American gadgets so San Jose can enjoy the 
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lUxury of playing big city." Further, iron and steel prices might 
be going up but these materials were not used in the parking meters. 
Moreover, the United States, in a deliberate attempt to destroy the 
economies of Bolivia and Chile, was cornering the world markets in 
tin and copper. When they released their stockpiles of these materi-
a1s, used in parking meter construction, the cost was bound to go 
down. Finally, at least in part because of the perfidy mentioned 
above, the U.S. dollar was going to decline in value against the 
colon. Not until this happened should the Municipality consider pur-
chasing any parking meters. Chavez Molina's arguments availed noth-
ing. The Council, over his lone dissenting vote, decided to buy an-
other 1,000 meters. 
The parking meter has come to San Jose and become institution-
alized. It is there, moreover, primarily as a revenue raising de-
vice. When municipal officials were asked how well the parking meter 
policy was working they inevitably replied: "Very well. They are 
making lots of money for the Municipal Corporation." Not once did an 
official volunteer any comments about traffic control. 
As a revenue generator the parking meter has been successful, 
as shown in Table XXI. Table XXII shows the 1974 budget estimated in-
come and expenditures for the parking meters. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
TABLE XXI 
PROCEEDS OF PARKING METER OPERATIONS, 1971-1973 
Amount collected from parking meter operations, 
exclusive of fines 
¢135,355.75 (8 November - 31 December) 
¢93l,136.85 
¢1,080,96l.45 
SOURCE: Municipality of San Jose, Office of the Treasurer. 
TABLE XXII 
ESTIMATED PARKING METER REVENUE - 1974 
Income 
Parking fees 
Fines 
Total 
Expenditures 
Current 
1,000 New Meters 
Total 
¢2,203,530.00 
375,840.00 
1/:2,579,370.00 
¢976,871.80 
135,383.50 
¢1,112,255.30 
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Net Income ¢1,467,114.70 
SOURCE: Municipality of San Jose, 1974 Budget 
To put the parking meter revenues in perspective, 7.6 percent 
of the current income of the Municipality of San Jose comes from this 
61 
source. The Parking Meter Division employs some 95 persons; only 
the Streetcleaning and Garbage Collection Divisions have more employ-
ees. 
The development of parking meter policy may not seem a terribly 
exciting subject of examination, but it is important for a number of 
reasons. It is important to San Jose because it was the first new 
tax it was able to levy in over 35 years. The parking meter generates 
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the second largest amount of revenue of the City's own sources. And 
it does provide a means, although this is definitely a secondary con-
sideration, of influencing traffic circulation in the downtown area. 
It is also important to the analyst. In the first place, it is 
the only municipal policy of the past 40 years that can be traced 
through from its genesis to its implementation. Second, it shows the 
sort of time frame in which policymaking takes place. Finally, it 
demonstrates the overarching role of the legitimation phase in policy-
making in a Central American urban center. 
The next chapter will present the results of the total policy-
making effort, national and municipal, in the realms of urban public 
finance and public housing; that is, the current set of practices and 
regulations in San Jose and San Salvador will be examined and com-
pared. 
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CHAPTER VI NOTES 
1. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 100. 
2. Gustavo A. Antonini, Public Policy and Urbanization in the Domin-
ican Republic and Costa Rica (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Center for Latin American Studies, 1972), p. 67. This is in gen-
eral agreement with the data in Las Sociedades Actuales which 
found in El Salvador 67 percent of housing generally to be defi-
cient but 77 percent of rural housing to be so; comparable fig-
ures for Costa Rica were 38 percent generally and 50 percent in 
rural areas. 
3. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 100. Emphasis is from Koth. 
4. See the section on FUNDASAL in Chapter VII. 
5. BID estimates that in most Latin American nations at least ten 
percent of the GDP would have to be devoted to public housing on 
an ongoing basis to eliminate current deficits and maintain mini-
mUIn standards. 
6. San Salvador levies are further subdivided into permanent, even-
tual and local but these classifications need not concern us here. 
7. It is sometimes difficult to tell the players without a scorecard. 
One national legislator, a former San Jose city councillor, tells 
of seeing other ex-councillors lobbying in the Assembly against 
municipal tax increases for San Jose. These same individuals had 
voted for similar tax increases when on the municipal council, and 
had proclaimed loudly the need for additional revenue. 
8. One informant, for example, owned two supermarkets. One was lo-
cated in San Jos~, the other in the suburban community of Escazu. 
During the period (about seven years) he had owned them, Escazu 
had been granted two tax increases that affected him; San Jos~ had 
been turned down by the Legislature three times. At the time of 
our last conversation in early 1974, his Escazu supermarket, which 
was one-third the size of the San Jos~ supermarket with one-quarter 
the volume of business, paid six times as much in municipal taxes 
and fees. 
9. And when adopted, it was based on and nearly identical to an ear-
lier schedule dating back to 1933. 
10. Much of the material in this section is based on Ebel, "The 
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Decision-Making Process" and on interviews with Dr. Fidel Ch~vez 
Mena, Dr. Victor Manuel Cuellar Ortiz, Manager of Asociacion Sal-
vadore~a de Industriales and Don Daniel Escobar, San Salvador Mu-
nicipal Secretary. 
11. PDC is publicly committed to improvement of community morals. It 
is also publicly committed tu shifting t~~ incidence away from 
small businessmen. Most bar owners, etc., are small businessmen. 
My own impression is that this ;'Ias an attempt to maximize tax rev-
enue from this source, realizing that demand for commercial vice 
is very price inelastic. PDC could thus appear not to be taxing 
small businessmen while San Salvador could enjoy increased tax 
revenues. 
12. Ebel, "The Decision-Making Process," p. 212. 
13. As late as April, 1974, I was informed by an official of ASI that 
the San Salvador business community favored municipal tax reform. 
It had opposed the 1964 measure not because it opposed higher 
taxes per se but because it did not feel that sufficient rational 
modification of the entire structure was involved. 
14. There are many in El Salvador who maintain, loudly and openly, 
that Duarte did in fact outpoll Arturo Armando Molina of the PCN 
in the 1972 presidential election. A full-page advertisement in 
La Prensa Grafica of 14 February 1974 refers to Duarte as: "The 
President elected by the People." In any event, he was implicated 
in the attempted golpe de estado of March, 1972, and is currently 
in exile in Venezuela. 
15. And it is sometimes forthcoming. A Duarte-originated project for 
expanding and modernizing the municipal markets received wide-
spread support. The bill providing national government guaran-
tees for a BID loan to San Salvador for this purpose was not only 
approved by the Legislative Assembly but was cosponsored by ten 
legislators (of whom one was MNR and six were PCN) from seven de-
partments. 
16. I am indebted to William J. Allen and Fred D. Wood for this infor-
mation. 
17. Parking meters abound in downtown San Salvador but are universally 
ignored, and with good reason. They are unmodified U.S. models 
with instructions in English and designed to function with U.S. 
nickels and dimes. 
18. It will be remembered that at this time the office of Municipal 
Executive was filled by the Governor of San Jose Province, ap-
pointed by the Central Government. 
19. All events prior to 1955 have been constructed from the memories 
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of those involved. There is no written record. 
20. James E. Tribble to Hubert Federspiel, 5 January 1955. 
21. Luis A. Truque G., Chief Municipal Engineer, to Julio Caballero A., 
Municipal Executive, 8 March 1955. 
22. Costa Rica, Imprenta Nacional, La Gaceta, 21 March 1955, p. 776. 
23. San Jos~, Municipal Council, Minutes of Regular Session Number 74, 
22 July 1955. 
24. It is customary in policy analysis to term any request made of the 
political system a demand, no matter how conciliatorily it may be 
phrased. 
25. La Gaceta, 12 October 1955, p. 2959. 
26. Article 3 of award terms, Minutes of Regular Session Number 101, 
29 February 1956. 
27. La Gaceta, 5 July 1957, p. 1538. 
28. Minutes of Extraordinary Session Number 28, 15 November 1957. 
29. Councillor Vargas Castro, as reported in Minutes of Extraordinary 
Session Number 28. 
30. Councillor Cortes Bolanos, as reported in Minutes of Extraordinary 
Session Number 28. 
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31. Costa Rica, Contraloria General de la Republica, Oficio Numero 
868, 26 February 1958. 
32. Minutes of Regular Session Number 175, 4 March 1958. 
33. This was not the firm who submitted the lowest bid for the German 
parking meters, but another, Eduardo Maroto e Hijos. 
34. Ordinance Number 4, Regular Session Number 51, 3 March 1959. 
35. La Gaceta, 15 July 1959, p. 1527. 
36. Jose Rafael Cordero Croceri to Luis Quesada, 28 October 1959. 
37. Carlos Lara to Oscar Chacon Jinesta, 22 July 1960. 
38. Chacon to Lara, 26 July 1960. 
39. Minutes of Regular Session Number 262, 21 April 1961. 
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40. Ordinance Number 3, Regular Session 262, 20 June 1961. 
41. Jose Rafael Vega Rojas, Ad Hoc Secretary of the Legislative Assem-
bly, to Joaquin Vargas Gene, Minister of Government, Police, Jus-
tice and Grace, 6 July 1961. 
42. Minutes of Regular Session Number 295, 22 August 1961. 
43. Minutes of Regular Session Number 301, 12 September 1961. This is 
not a direct translation but does contain the essence of the Coun-
cil's statement. 
44. M.A. Padillo J. to Rafael Paris Steffens, 14 July 1965. 
45. Decree Number 2366, La Gaceta, 29 July 1965. 
46. Decree Number 3580, La Gaceta, 17 November 1965. 
47. La Gaceta, 12 January 1966, p. 114. 
48. Municipality of San Jose, Licitaci~n Publica No. 22-70, 26 October 
1970. 
49. Minutes of Regular Session Number 87, 12 February 1971. 
50. Decree Number 2047-G, La Gaceta, 16 November 1971. 
51. San Jose (Costa Rica) La Prensa Libre, 9 November 1971, p. 14. 
52. San Jos"e (Costa Rica) La Nacion, 9 November 1971, p. 6. 
53. La Nacion, 10 November 1971, p. 6. 
54. La Prensa Libre, 10 November, p. 13. 
55. La Naci6n, 12 November 1971, p. 14. 
56. La Prensa Libre, 12 November 1971, p. 4. 
57. Some activities in Costa Rica commercial life move at a very lei-
surely pace. To cash a check or make a deposit in a bank rou-
tinely takes from one-half hour to a full hour. As executive time 
is too valuable to be spent in this fashion, a veritable army of 
low-paid messengers and collectors are hired to perform these and 
similar tasks. Generally these employees ride motor scooters 
which they park anywhere there is space. It is easy to see why 
they would find the new parking regulations onerous. 
58. Minutes of Regular Session Number 213, 10 December 1971. 
59. Minutes of Regular Session Number 426, 24 May 1973. 
60. Ibid. 
61. A comparison with the City of Portland is informative: 
Parking meter revenues as % of 
city's current revenue 
Number of employees 
Cost of collection as % of 
revenue from parking 
Number of parking meters (approximately) 
'" San Jose 
7.6 
95 
43.1 
2,000 
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Portland 
2.2 
26 
17.7 
7,000 
CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS 
In this chapter the end results of public housing and municipal 
revenue policymaking are considered. In housing, INVU and IVU will be 
compared as to their current philosophy and practice in terms of cli-
ent selection, financing arrangements~ ~nd in more concrete terms, of 
actual performance in providing housing. To furnish an added dimen-
sion, IVU and FUNDASAL will also be compared. The results of public 
finance policymaking are presented in terms of current budgets and 
patterns of municipal revenues and expenditures. San Jose and San 
Salvador will not only be compared one with the other, but will be 
examined against the backdrop of de Moraes' developmental paradigm. 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
Instituto Nacional De Vivienda Y Urbanismo 
The ongoing policy output in the field of public housing in San 
~ Jose, and in all of Costa Rica, is to be found basically in the day-
to-day activities of INVU. To be sure, INVU is not the only agency 
involved in public housing provision in Costa Rica, nor is public 
housing I~~U's only task. Nonetheless, it is the lead agency in the 
field and housing is its primary concern. INVU lists as its first ob-
jective: 
To provide families who lack adequate lodging the means nec-
essary to acquire housing with their own resources. In this 
direction, INVU is 10 give preference to urban and rural fami-
lies of low income. 
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In many of its housing practices, INVU resembles a private developer. 
Its first activity, at least in its major projects, is the acquisition 
of land. 
Usually this land is a coffee finca. Choice of finca is deter-
mined not only by availability--INVU has, but to date has not used, 
legal authority to expropriate and purchase land--but also by location 
in relation to existing or proposed employment opportunities. A good 
deal of cooperation exists with other autonomous agencies. Often, for 
example, ICE will not provide electricity nor SNAA sewers to certain 
industrial sites unless INVU plans or can provide nearby housing. 
The land is then divided into large tracts, capable of holding 
from 500 to 2000 housing units. These tracts are developed one by one 
as funding becomes available and other agencies are prepared to pro-
vide urban services. INVU lays out and plans the development, speci-
fying number, type and situation of houses. When conditions permit, 
when funding and infrastructure are available, INVU calls for bids. 
Construction contracts are awarded to the lowest bidders. 
Most of the contracts are for completed single-family dwellings; 
presently about 75 percent of the units built are of this type. Ten 
to 15 percent of the units are classified as minimum housing--essen-
tially shells with roof, floor, outside walls and an interior source 
of water and sewer hookup. The different types are not mixed in any 
one project. 
Until 1973, INVU provided urbanized lots in some projects. 
These were simply graded plots with water available. The idea was 
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that the inhabitants-to-be of these projects would then aid one an-
other in construction of their houses. In practice, however, the peo-
pIe involved tended to sell the construction materials, whether pro-
vided by INVU or belonging to their neighbors, and pocket the money .. 
The spirit of mutual aid and community assistance so evident in the 
construction of squatter settlements seems to vanish when institution-
ali zed. INVU no longer provides urbanized lots. 
Perhaps the most usual measure of output in the field of housing 
policy is actual number of cases of housing assistance to family 
groups. Table XXIII shows what INVU accomplished in the six years 
immediately preceding this study. 
TABLE XXIII 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY INVU, 1967 TO 1972 
Year Living Units Other Assistance b 
Constructed a 
1967 1,268 241 
1968 724 393 
1969 149 484 
1970 666 1,223 
1971 1,267 1,016 
1972 1,751 1,291 
Total 5,843 4,648 
Total 
1,527 
1,117 
633 
1,889 
2,283 
3,042 
10,491 
(Note: a includes minimum housing; b includes urbanized lots and the 
various financing arrangements, except credit extended to buy INVU-
constructed housing.) 
SOURCE: INVU, Memoria 1972. 
Although INVU is a national agency, its housing contruction practices 
make it appear basically an urban housing agency. Of the 5,843 living 
units constructed, 5,481 or 94 percent were built in urban areas. 
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Other assistance was less concentrated; some 57 percent of the activ-
ity in this category took place in urban areas. 
Financing is another day-to-day activity reflecting housing 
policy. On the one hand, INVU must obtain overall funding for its 
projects and their operation; on the other hand it must consider fi-
nancing arrangements for its clients. 
INVU receives funding from a variety of sources. When it was 
established in 1954 it took over some $11,000,000 from its predeces-
sor, the housing office of the Social Security Administration. By 
law it received $600,000 at the same time from the Central Government 
2 
and a guaranteed annual appropriation of $1,200,000. In addition, 
the National Insurance Institute and the Social Security Administra-
tion are permitted but not required to invest an unspecified part of 
their reserves in INVU. Moreover, INVU has a continuing income as 
those to whom it has loaned money or sold houses on credit repay their 
obligations. Finally, INVU can borrow both internally and externally. 
This is a very uncertain source of funds but the amounts, when avail-
able, can be considerable. The primary source of external funding is 
the Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (BID). 
INVU has a variety of programs for funding its various client 
groups. Two of these, for rural households, will be mentioned only 
briefly. Four others, applicable in urban areas, are considered in 
more detail. 
The two specifically rural credit arrangements are known as 
supervised rural credit and the rural communities program. Super-
vised rural credit is available to the small farmer who wishes to 
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build or improve a home on his or her own land. The credit is super-
vised in that the money is acco~npanied by technical assistance or ad-
vice, and the borrower is presumably to pay some attention to this 
advice as a condition of obtaining the loan. Amounts ranging from 
$150 to $2,000 are available to each borrower with an annual interest 
rate of eight percent and a repayment schedule of between five and 
ten years, depending on the amount borrowed and household income. 
In the rural communities program, families are given building 
lots in the vicinity of existing rural population centers. These lots 
are generally pieces of either abandoned fincas or unused portions of 
3 
large plantations owned by multinational corporations. In addition 
to the lots, families are given enough credit to purchase bl ';ng 
materials for a home. Amount of credit and repayment terms aJ ~ 1-
lored to the size of house needed and family income. It is aSSV::L" 
that the family will do the actual construction. This program appears 
to be working more successfully than the parallel mutual aid or self-
help programs in urban areas. 
INVU operates two financing programs that are applicable in ur-
ban or rural areas. To date, both have been used more extensively in 
urban areas. The first of these is the savings and credit program. 
Under this program INVU establishes a regular savings plan for an in-
dividual. When the individual has saved a certain amount, he or she 
is eligible to be granted enough credit to purchase a house in an 
INVU project. The actual amounts of money involved, again, are tai-
lored to the individual family's needs and resources. 
INVU also operates a savings and loan program for individuals 
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needing money for a particular housing situation that does not involve 
a dwelling unit in an INVU project. INVU lists four uses to which the 
funds may be put: 
1. Purchase of a dwelling unit and its lot, or construction 
of same on the borrower's own lot. 
2. Purchase, expansion or repair of a dwelling unit. 
3. Cancellation of a lien on the borrower's house. 
4. Purchase of land [on which the house sits] by the owner of 
a dwelling when this [dwelling] has been built on someone 
else's property.4 
Under the savings and loan program, a borrower determines how much he 
or she needs and how long it will take him to save, usually, 25 per-
cent of this amount. When he has saved his quota, INVU lends him the 
remainder at nine percent interest. A typical schedule, known as Plan 
6 - 9, is shown below in Table XXIV. Plans range from 2 - 4 to 
10 - 12. The first number indicates the number of years over which 
the individual saves his share, in regular monthly amounts. The sec-
ond figure indicates how many years he has to repay the loan received 
from INVU. Under Plan 6 - 9 then, the individual saves in six years 
25 percent of the amount subscribed and borrows the remaining 75 per-
cent, to be repaid in nine years. 
The remaining two forms of funding are the particularly urban 
ones of cooperatives and semi-urban credit. As used here, cooperative 
refers to the practice of an employer formally cooperating with INVU 
to expedite housing credit for his employees. Among the more usual 
forms of cooperation are an employer's agreeing to guarantee loans 
made his employees by INVU and the employer's agreeing to lend the em-
ployee the amount the employee would normally have to save. Under 
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Plan 6 - 9 for example, an employer would lend the employee (or, more 
precisely, pay INVU on the employee's behalf) an amount equal to 25 
percent of the total subscription. The employee could thus immediately 
use the money for housing purposes and not have to save for six years 
first. The employee would, of course, have to make loan repayments 
for 15 years rather than for nine. 
TABLE XXIV 
TYPICAL PAYMENT SCHEDULE, INVU SAVINGS AND LOAN PROGRAM 
Amount Amount Amount Monthly Monthly 
subscribed to save of loan saving loan 
payment payment 
¢ 5,000 ¢ 1,250 ¢ 3,750 ¢ 21.60 ¢ 50.80 
10,000 2,500 7,500 43.10 101. 60 
20,000 5,000 15,000 86.20 203.20 
30,000 7,500 22,500 129.20 304.80 
40,000 10,000 30,000 172.30 406.30 
50,000 12,500 37,500 215.40 507.90 
60,000 15,000 45,000 258.40 609.60 
70,000 17,500 52,500 301. 40 711.20 
80,000 20,000 60,000 344.50 812.80 
90,000 22,500 67,500 387.50 914.40 
100,000 25,000 75,000 430.60 1,016.00 
SOURCE: INVU, Sistema de Ahorro y Prestamo. 
Finally, the semi-urban program extends credit and technical as-
sistance to families with possession of individual parcels of land on 
the urban fringes of populated areas. If the families do not have 
clear possession, credit may be extended to buy the land, as well as 
pay for construction materials. It is expected that the families to 
whom credit is extended will provide most of the labor for the con-
struction of their individual homes. 
Although it is nowhere made explicit, the creation of semi-urban 
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credit is a tacit recognition of squatter's rights. (Semi-urban credit 
is INVU's newest program; it began in 1973.) Rather than engage in 
massive programs to relocate squatters or simply use the force of the 
law to drive them fr,m affected property, INVU has decided to make the 
best of it and regularize squatting. On the one hand, this involves 
making money available to buy the land from its legal owner; or at 
least to obtain a long-term lease. On the other hand, it involves 
giving the squatter a chance to replace his tugurio shack with a 
sounder and more sanitary dwelling. Throughout Central America squat-
ter settlements are no longer regarded as a blight to be forthwith 
eliminated but as part of the national housing stock to be upgraded, 
legitimized and used. 
Two additional observations may be made on INVU's funding prac-
tices; the delinquency rates of their clients and some indication of 
the size of INVU's operation. At the end of 1972, some three quarters 
of INVU's debtor-clients were making their payments on schedule. 
About seven percent were seriously overdue, six months or more behind 
5 
schedule. There is no evidence that INVU has any mechanism other 
than moral suasion to pressure their deadbeat clientele into paying. 
Nor is there any evidence that INVU would be inclined to do so. 
INVU is in a difficult situation in this regard. From one side 
its main external source of funding, BID, presses it for prompt col-
lection as a condition for any possible future loans. From the other 
side, internal Costa Rican political pressures effectively preclude 
any firm action against delinquents. All of these considerations may 
be reflected in the figures showing the rate of nonpayment to be 
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6 
slowly increasing in recent years. 
Because so much of INVU's funding varies so widely from year to 
year, detailed figures on the operation do not provide enough useful 
information to justify their compilation. However, Figure 13 may give 
some idea of the size of INVU from a financial viewpoint. 
Capital investment in housing 
Loans made by INVU 
Reserve fund 
1972 income from own sources 
Debts owed by INVU 
$57,000,000 
24,000,000 
17,000,000 
9,500,000 
11,200,000 
Figure 13. Selected financial data for INVU, 31 December 1972. 
It should be noted that about 60 percent of INVU's debt is owed to 
agencies outside Costa Rica, primarily to BID. 
The third general aspect of INVU activity to be considered here 
is client selection, both in terms of class and in terms of individ-
uals. The major construction activities are designed to benefit pri-
marily the middle and lower middle classes. The urbanized lot and 
minimum housing programs were aimed at the very poor, but urbanized 
lots are no longer provided. Minimum housing accounted, in 1972, for 
just under 12 percent of INVU's 'housing solutions' (less than nine 
percent by value). The rural communities program, the only one the 
poorest of the rural dwellers can take advantage of, benefited in the 
same year a total of eight families. Semi-urban credit, of possible 
benefit to the lowest income classes was just being introduced. At 
the time the field work for this study was completed, then, the poor-
est class had, at best, access to only one-eighth of INVU's activity; 
the other seven-eighths could be used only by the middle or lower 
7 
middle class. 
263 
Some of INVU's programs are open to anyone who can meet stated 
criteria; others require a very strict selection from among many ap-
plicants. The savings and loan program, for example, welcomes and 
will contract with anyone willing and able to meet its requirements. 
Most programs, however, must be selective. There are far more 
applicants than opportunities for available housing units or funds. 
In cases where INVU is working in cooperation with another agency, 
that agency may select the clients. This would be the case where, for 
example, the National Petroleum Company (RECOPE) and INVU together 
provided 2,900 housing units for RECOPE's employees near its refinery 
in Limon. 
For those cases where specific applicants must be chosen, and 
where INVU must make the choice, as in the occupants for the INVU-
constructed housing projects, a variety of criteria is taken into ac-
count. First, INVU considers the three big questions about each appli-
cant: how needy each is, how long each has been on the waiting list 
and, of paramount importance, how able each is to make the payments on 
time. INVU scores each applicant on each characteristic, combines the 
scores, and ranks the results. 
To further distinguish among applicants~ IN\nJ conducts, both 
overtly and covertly, a socioeconomic study of each applicant family. 
In the course of this INVU seeks information on conjugal harmony or 
discord, excessive drinking or gambling, and general neighborhood rep-
utation. With these data, the rankings are refined once again and an 
ordered list of the most eligible applicants is drawn up. From this 
list applicants are chosen in order whenever an opening or opportunity 
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appears. New applicants are fitted into the list according to their 
ranking. All in all, it is a reasonably sophisticated if overly rig-
orous system fOT choosing individual families to be served. 
The final point to be made about INVU in this section is a re-
iteration of the first. Although INVU is not the only agency involved 
in providing, or at least funding, public housing, it is the lead 
agency. In the period 1968 through 1972, it provided 48 percent of 
8 
Costa Rica's public housing. In addition to furnishing more housing 
than any other agency, INVU also is the broadest based. The other 
agencies involved in public housing either supply housing only for 
9 
their own employees or limit their activities to low-cost loans. 
One aspect of INVU's activities not considered here is an esti-
mate of how successful it is in reducing Costa Rica's housing deficit. 
This will be provided below in the section comparing INVU's programs 
and performance with those of IVU and FUNDASAL. 
Instituto de Vivienda Urbana 
IVU, as the name indicates, is primarily a housing agency. Un-
like INVU, it does not have responsibility for national urban planning 
or similar functions. As its name further indicates, IVU is particu-
larly an urban housing agency. Rural housing, also within INVU's pur-
view in Costa Rica, is provided in El Salvador not by IVU but by a 
separate agency, the Instituto de Colonizacion Rural (ICR). 
Like its counterpart in Costa Rica, IVU's first concern is ob-
taining land. Unlike San Jos~, San Salvador has no handy fincas that 
can be purchased or expropriated adjacent to major urbanized areas. 
IVU, therefore, has not been able to be as selective as INVU in choice 
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of building sites; it has had to acquire a greater number of smaller 
scattered locales. 
IVU provides housing through three basic sets of practices: 
auto-construction, direct contracting, and administration. Auto-
construction is similar to the urbanized lot program tried and aban-
doned in Costa Rica. In auto-construction, IVU provides the lots and 
building materials and the tenants-to-be provide the labor. IVU moni-
tors closely the activities in auto-construction and schedules people--
so much time for general labor, so much for work on what will be their 
own dwelling, so much time for rest. Even so, there have been cases 
of buildings left half completed. Worker energy has a tendency to 
vanish once a roof, floor and outside walls have been finished. IVU 
has used auto-construction for both single-family and multiple-family 
dwelling units. 
Direct contracting needs little elaboration. IVU draws up plans 
and specifications for a particular project and invites bids on it. 
All things being equal, the lowest bidder is awarded the contract and 
builds the project. IVU has from time to time, however, attached par-
ticular conditions to the bids. One of these requires a guarantee 
from the chosen contractor to employ and train a certain number of 
those who will live in the completed project. Since almost none of 
the IVU housing is destined for the poor and unskilled, this practice 
is neither as widespread nor as useful as it might be. 
Another innovation introduced by IVU was the experimental hous-
ing program. In this program ten companies were given general speci-
fications for particular types of housing--e.g., 50 square meters of 
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floor space, two bedrooms, bathroom, kitchen, living room--and were 
told to build a unit or two of each type as cheaply as possible, using 
whatever building material they wished. IVU suggested, however, that 
general preference be given to materials of domestic manufacture and 
specific preference to materials worked on in its own laboratory. If 
any company was able to design and build a housing unit at much less 
cost than its competitors, and below current housing prices, it would 
receive a sizable contract from INVU. Unfortunately, final data on 
the experimental housing program are not yet available so it is not 
known if any great cost breakthroughs were made. 
In construction by administration, IVU itself does the work. It 
is restricted to construction in tugurio areas and the actual labor is 
performed by the inhabitants of these areas. Construction by adminis-
tration differs from auto-construction in three important respects. 
First, the workers in construction by administration are hired by lVU 
and paid wages. Generally, they will move into the housing thus 
built, but this is not a given. Second, the end result of this activ-
ity is seen as either urbanized lots or minimum housing; auto-
construction aims at a more finished product. Third, construction by 
administration is used on occasion for non-housing construction such 
as communal latrines to serve tugurios. 
Again, the single most useful measure of policy output in the 
field of public housing is actual number of housing solutions, includ-
ing urbanized lots, provided. Table XXV shows IVU's accomplishments 
from 1967 through 1972. Accurate data were not available for number 
of urbanized lots provided. However, it was estimated that about one 
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and one-half times as many lots as houses were supplied. If this fig-
ure is accurate, some 8,000 lots were prepared and housing solutions 
10 
in all totalled between 13,000 and 14,000 units. 
TABLE XXV 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY IVU, 1967 THROUGH 1972 
Year 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Total 
SOURCE: IVU, Memoria de Actividades 1973. 
Number of Housing Units 
880 
1,415 
1,380 
1,050 
200 
484 
5,409 
IVU provides basically three types of housing. One, minimum 
housing, has already been described. The others are completed single-
family and multiple-family units. Single-family housing contains on 
a single floor, two bedrooms (rarely three), a kitchen, a bathroom and 
a living room. Multiple-family units are the same except they are a 
bit larger and contain three bedrooms. At first glance it might seem 
unusual for apartments to be larger than single-family houses but 
greater population densities on scarce land can be obtained with this 
mix than with larger, one-story, single-family houses. Strict regula-
tions govern the maximum cost for each type of housing. Table XXVI 
shows how these limits increased over a ten-year period. Actual av-
erage unit cost of single-family housing completed in 1972 was $2,545 
11 
and of multiple-family housing was $2,908. 
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TABLE XXVI 
MJ~XIMUM ALLOWABLE PER UNIT COSTS FOR IVU HOUSING, IN $C.A. 
1964 1969 1974 
Minimum housing 480 800 1,800 
Single-family housing 1,480 2,400 3,400 
Multiple-family housing 2,080 2,600 3,800 
SOURCE: Information supplied by IVU Architect Oscar Arrivillaga. 
IVU receives its funding from the same general sources as INVU: 
its own resources including rent and mortgage payments; subsidies from 
the Central Government; internal borrowing through bonds and loans 
from financial institutions; and foreign loans, particularly from 
USAID and BID. IVU has never been as well capitalized as INVU. In-
stead of taking over public housing from an agency with $11,000,000 
as INVU did, IVU replaced Mejoramiento Social, a destitute agency 
that had managed to construct only 1,000 housing units in its eight 
years of existence. Moreover, IVU has no guaranteed subsidy from the 
Central Government. The agency asked that it receive automatically 
three percent of the annual National Government budget; this sugges-
tion was flatly rejected. In fact, IVU is one of the first to suffer 
cutbacks whenever the Government faces a financial exigency. 
IVU maintains three sorts of financial arrangements for its 
12 
clients. Urbanized lots are sold on the installment plan. Actual 
monthly payments are tailored to individual income but in no case is 
the repayment period to be longer than ten years. The usual interest 
charges is six percent. 
Single-family housing is financed on a contract or rent-to-own 
basis. Unlike payments for urbanized lots, payments for housing are 
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not tailored to family income. Terms are reckoned on a 20-year pay-
ment schedule, at six percent interest. Monthly payments for housing 
in a specific project are calculated and made known in advance. Fam-
ilies unable to meet these payments are expected to refrain from ap-
plying for housing they cannot afford. 
IVU's third financial program for its clients is a straight 
rental operation. Again, monthly payments are fixed, and not based 
on family income. Rents are pegged so ~hat a particular rental pro-
ject, and borrowing and other administrative costs attached to it, are 
paid off in 20 years. Rents collected after the apartments have been 
paid go into IVU's reserve fund. IVU reserves the right to raise 
rents at any time to keep up with inflation. Tenants not willing or 
able to pay the increase are expected to seek less expensive housing. 
A total picture of IVU's financial position would be difficult 
to compile. In addition, it varies considerably from year to year 
given the vagaries of both Central Government support and external 
funding. Nonetheless Figure 14 gives an indication of the size of 
IYU's operation from a financial viewpoint. 
Investment in housing being sold by contract 
Investment in rental housing 
Debts owed by IVU 
Income from own sources, July 1972 - June 1973 
Reserves and unexpended capital 
$24,000,000 
6,400,000 
12,400,000 
3,000,000 
26,800,000 
Figure 14. Selected financial data for IVU, 30 June 1973. 
About 84 percent of IVU's debt is owed to external lenders, again, 
principally USAID and BID. 
Although IVU does not operate any savings or loan programs as 
INVU does, there are two government programs to assist individuals in 
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financing their homes. These deserve brief mention here. One is the 
Financiera Naciona1 de Vivienda (FNV); the other is the Fondo Social 
para 1a Vivienda (FSV). 
FNV was created in 1963. It is described as a "public corpora-
tion of undefined function, with autonomy in the administration of its 
13 
patrimony, intended to serve as a Central Credit Bank for housing." 
Essentially, FNV has four functions: serving as a credit reservoir 
for the savings and loan associations that have come into being since 
its establishment; insuring individual savings accounts up to ¢12,000; 
insuring the associations' home mortgages; and creating a secondary 
market for these mortgages. 
The original capital for FNV came from a Central Government sub-
sidy of $800,000 and a USAID loan of $3,100,000. Prior to the estab-
1ishment of FNV, savings and loan associations were unknown in E1 Sal-
vador. Three have since been formed. These associations pay their 
depositors six percent on savings while the commercial banks pay four 
percent. The two percent spread is a matter of custom and not, as in 
14 
the United States, mandated by law. 
Mortgage loans backed by FNV may be made for new homes, up to 
90 percent of the value of the horne, but no loan can be for more than 
¢25,000. Maximum term for the loans, which bear interest at nine per-
cent, is 20 years. Oscar Salegio, Chief 0:- IVU's Engineering Depart-
ment, estimates about one-quarter of all new housing built by the pri-
15 
vate sector is financed by FNV-backed mortgages. 
The other housing finance agency in E1 Salvador is FSV which has 
adopted as its motto: "Building for the worker." It is a new program, 
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dating only from 1973. Designed to build housing for individuals who 
are regularly employed but still unable to meet payments in IVU pro-
jects, FSV is funded by contractors, workers, and employers. Workers, 
who save their money with FSV, will be able to borrow from it to fi-
nance minimum housing. Contractors, who lend money to FSV, expect to 
profit both through being awarded construction contracts and through 
interest paid them. Employers, who also lend money to FSV, expect to 
get in return not only interest but a healthy and adequately housed, 
if almost captive, workforce. 
FSV has net been in operation long enough to assess its perform-
ance. In a full-page advertisement in La Prensa Grafica it described 
16 
itself as "constitutional mandate converted into reality." The ad-
vertisement continued: 
The valiant contribution of the State, of the patron and of 
the worker will make it possible to realize massive construc-
tion of housing. In granting credit, preference will be given 
to workers with the lowest incomes, as established in accord-
ance with appropriate regulations. For this the SOCIAL FUND 
FOR HOUSING has been created. New urban solutions, innumer-
able sources of labor and major economic growth. Sufficient 
reasons to get on with progress. 17 
FSV represents a radical departure from earlier policies of no direct 
government credit assistance to individuals. It remains to be seen 
how successful it is. 
A final consideration in the examination of IVU's financial prac-
tice is the timeliness of its clients' repayments. INVU published de-
tailed figures on how many of its clients were up to date in their 
payments, how many were behind, and how far behind. IVU provides no 
such data. It does, however, give some indication as to actions taken 
against delinquent debtors. In the courts of El Salvador in 1972-
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1973, IVU initiated the following proceedings for "reasons of delin-
quency and other causes": 300 demands for dismissal of tenants; 177 
warnings of eviction; and 103 petitions for eviction. Twenty-four 
properties were repossessed as a result of complaints filed in earlier 
18 
years. 
It would be assumed that in the less open Salvadorean system, 
IVU would be free to administer the financial side of its program 
without the political pressures with which INVU must contend. This 
is not necessarily true. In 1968, under the external influence of 
BID, IVU tightened up its collection procedures and announced that all 
clients who failed to pay what they owned in 15 days would be evicted. 
A great hue and cry arose. PDC siezed the opportunity to denounce the 
government for heartless treatment of the very social group it had 
promised to serve. IVU was not prepared for this response: "Shocked 
by the unexpected outbursts, the agency [IVU] directors withdrew their 
19 
demands for immediate mortgage payments." Neither country, neither 
agency, then, has a monopoly on fiscally remiss but politically potent 
clients. 
It is worth emphasizing once again the nature of IVU's clien-
tele. IVU does not even pretend to provide housing for the lowest in-
come segment of society, those with a family income of less than ¢250 
per month. Salegio estimates that 30 percent of the urban families in 
El Salvador cannot afford minimum housing of 40 square meters, to be 
20 
paid for in 20 years at six percent interest. IVU's housing, then, 
is available to those making at least ¢250 per month but not making 
21 
enough to compete successfully in the private housing market. 
273 
Like INVU, IVU makes a socioeconomic study of each applicant. 
Unlike INVU, there is no ranking of the applicants on the basis of 
purely family characteristics. IVU's aim in selecting clients is to 
choose those who are the best overall fit for the particular housing 
to be filled. If there are TIl any applicants who do not fit a project 
for some non-economic reason (e.g., family size), future IVU projects 
may be designed with this applicant group in mind. Once a particular 
project is designed, however, clients are selected to fit; the project 
is not modified to suit the needs or demands of potential clients. 
One activity IVU engages in that INVU does not is the contruc-
tion of housing for particular occupational groups. IVU will often 
announce that a particular project is being built, for example, to 
22 
house nurses, teachers and clerks. There can be a variety of mo-
tives for this. One may be that these groups are regarded as making 
special contributions to the country's development. Another may be 
that the amount and stability of their incomes places them in an 
economic category IVU finds desirable or convenient to serve. Yet a 
third reason may be that many of these people are government employees 
and subsidized housing can be offered them in lieu of better wages. 
Whatever the underlying principle, this practice removes large por-
tions of IVU-supplied housing from the reach of the general populace. 
Fundacion Salvadore:5a De Desarollo Y Vivienda Minima 
In establishing minimum income criteria, then, IVU has effec-
tively eliminated a large portion of the housing-short population from 
participation in its program. The only qu~si~public agency designed 
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to serve the lowest income classes is FUNDASAL. 
FUNDASAL, a private non-profit corporation, was established in 
1972 to attack the entire problem of marginality. What constitutes 
marginality is vividly described: 
It signifies a lack of food and housing, school and work, 
health and recreation. The marginal [person] is one without 
bread and without a roof, illiterate and unemployed, beaten 
down and sick. Marginality signifies existence on the margin 
of the most precious values of our society. The lack of an 
adequate house degrades the family with a promiscuity and a 
greed that is almost animal. Hunger and idleness destroy the 
bodies and the wills: the child--almost a man--begs through 
the public streets; the girl of thirteen--now a woman--sells 
her body in the bars and bordellos; the youth--now an adult--
compensates for his impotence with a senseless machismo; the 
man--now aged--drowns his frustration in a bottle of guaro. 
In the creed of marginality, good is anything that helps sur-
vival: prostitution is an office; robbery, a career; alcohol, 
a refuge. God, country, family and honor mean nothing to one 
who has no father, no land, no home, no life of his own. 23 
FUNDASAL regards the provision of housing as the single most critical 
activity in its attack on marginality. 
All FUNDASAL housing is provided through a form of modified 
auto-construction. Professional builders and tradesmen hired by 
FUNDASAL work through the week on the housing projects. On Sundays 
the future tenants, under supervision, provide the necessary unskilled 
labor. All housing is in the form of rent-to-own or contract sale 
lll1its. 
As usual, it is difficult to assess the performance of an organ-
ization this new. The usual measure, housing units provided, does 
give some indication although no comparisons over time are possible. 
At the end of 1973, FUNDASAL was in the process of constructing 2,270 
24 
units. The first 525 of these, in San Jose del Pino, were completed 
25 
and occupied by the tenants in April, 1974. 
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FUNDASAL seeks i.ts funding wherever it is to be found. It re-
ceives some subsidy from the Central Government, $80,000 in 1973, but 
the Government has made no long-term commitments. Total income in 
1973 was $988,800. In addition to the subsidy there were miscellane-
ous donations of $68,800 and loans of $840,000. The largest single 
grant to date was $640,000 in 1974 from the Interamerican Founda-
26 
tion. Municipalities often donate the land for the housing pro-
jects. Domestically, FUNDASAL has borrowed money from the Central Re-
serve Bank and the private Mortgage Bank of El Salvador. Externally, 
it has received major grants and loans from the Panamerican Develop-
ment Foundation, USAID, Campaign Against Hunger and New Homeland plus 
smaller amo'Li.llts of assistance from a wide variety of sources. Private 
individuals and coporations both within and without El Salvador con-
27 
tribute money and materials. 
FUNDASAL's financial arrangements with its clients are quite 
simple. The price of each housing unit to the tenant is somewhere 
between ¢l,500 and ¢2,500 depending on the size of the unit and the 
terms under which FUNDASAL was able to obtain funoing for the con-
struction. The wealthier tenants payoff their debt at 15 colones 
per month, the poorer tenants at ten colones per month. 
Client selection criteria for FUNDASAL housing are also quite 
simple. The basic requirement is that family income not exceed ¢250 
per month. By its own estimate, this income limit is high enough to 
create for FUNDASAL a pool of potential clients that includes more 
than 60 percent of housing-short urban Salvadoreans. Within this 
range; need is taken into account. Tenants are expected to have lived 
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at least five years in the area; FUNDASAL does not wish to do anything 
that might encourage migration to the capital. Established families 
are preferred as tenants. To be regarded as established, family mem-
bers should have lived together for two years; a longer time period 
is better. Finally, FUNDASAL wants tenants who are disposed to work 
Sundays in auto-construction. Its feeling is that families willing to 
make this commitment are not only particularly deserving but also are 
less likely to let their house deteriorate. FUNDASAL does indicate, 
however, that none of their criteria is written in stone; rather they 
are to be regarded as flexible guidelines. 
Two other facets of FUNDASAL's operation are discussed here: 
one, its institutional relationship with other agencies, and two, the 
non-housing aspects of its program to fight marginality. 
Like other builders of housing, FUNDASAL requires a package of 
permits, approvals and urban services. Seeking these brings it into 
contact, and sometimes into conflict, with a number of other agencies. 
The nature and low budget of its operation effectively banish FUNDASAL 
housing to the more remote outskirts of the urban areas. This makes 
the obtaining of many urban services more difficult. Difficulties 
are compounded in dealing with government agencies that are both reg-
ulatory and service providing. 
One such agency is ANDA. FUNDASAL housing, like other housing, 
requires the Vo.Bo. of ANDA before it can be legally built. However, 
obtaining the Vo.Bo. of ANDA qua regulatory agency in no way guaran-
tees the provision of sewers and water from ANDA qua service agency. 
Much the same difficulty exists with DUA. DUA must approve con-
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struction plans but such approval does not mean that DUA will provide 
the site with adequate road access. Preconstruct ion approval must be 
obtained not only from these agencies of the Central Government but 
also from the municipality. Generally municipalities, especially San 
Salvador, give their Vo.Bo. almost automatically; CAESS, the electric 
company, will provide service anywhere, anytime, to anyone willing to 
pay for it. 
In some cases ANDA and/or DUA will refuse FUNDASAL permission to 
build. FUNDASAL's reaction is usually the same as that of other Sal-
vadoreans, it goes ahead and builds anyhow, illegally. It should be 
noted that there are on the outskirts of San Salvador a great many 
illegal dwellings that are not marginal. These are sound, healthy, 
often large and expensive houses that are illegal solely because they 
lack the Vo.Bo. of ANDA or DUA. Many of these illegal dwellings have 
no road access and can be reached only on foot by long flights of 
stairs. ANDA has been known to relent and provide services to 
FUNDASAL housing, after refusing it permission to build. ANDA does 
not seem to let its regulatory and service functions interfere with 
one another. 
One of FUNDASAL's strongest institutional links is with Jose 
Simeon Canas University of Central America. To a large extent, the 
Univer~ity acts as FUNDASAL's research arm and provides it with a 
great deal of technical assistance. At the same time, FUNDASAL's 
projects serve as laboratory and training ground for the University's 
engineering, planning, and community development students. 
FUNDASAL has adopted the position that provision of housing 
alone is not a sufficient attack on marginality. To complement the 
housing program, it undertakes educational, economic, and community 
development activities. 
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Educational activities are pragmatic and aimed at adults. The 
prime targets are FUNDASAL's current or projected tenants but there 
are no restrictions. A typical program was undertaken in conjunction 
with the movement of families into San Jose del Pino. (See above, p. 
274.) Courses were given in the day-to-day concerns of mother-child 
relationships, human reproduction, venereal disease, social develop-
ment, sanitation and parasite control. The courses were intended pri-
marily for the new tenants in FUNDASAL housing but others from the 
tugurios were welcome to, and did, attend. 
Economic activities are designed to maximize the productive ca-
pacity of the marginal population. In one case FUNDASAL established 
a small ornamental iron workers' cooperative and located a market for 
the lamps, watch faces and mirror frames it produced. In another sit-
uation it organized a building materials cooperative to produce con-
crete pipes, sewer lines and similar fixtures. FUNDASAL also set up 
two cooperatives to make and market Persian-types rugs and carpets. 
Finally, in an effort to mobilize what little savings are possible in 
the tugurio and to liberate its tenants from usury, FUNDASAL has es-
tablished small credit unions, using some of its patrimony as seed 
capital. 
Although it budgets less than five percent of its expenditures 
for community development, FUNDASAL regards organization as a vital 
sector in its war on marginality. FUNDASAL considers itself a non-
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political entity that politicizes its clients. It is estimated that 
among the marginal population of San Salvador, ten percent are on the 
right wing, ten percent on the left wing and the remaining 80 percent 
29 
are totally apolitical. FUNDASAL attempts to break this shell of 
political apathy by organizing its tenants. It has had some success. 
Tenant organizations have become pressure groups and successfully lob-
bied for roads and bus service. 
This organizing activity has also had a partisan political ef-
fect that FUNDASAL officially maintains is unintended. Before organ-
ization in particular tugurio areas, few of the people voted and of 
these few votes, 90 percent were cast for PCN. After organization, 
the number of voters increased fivefold and PCN received only ten per-
30 
cent of the votes. 
Two factors complicate community organization in the tugurios of 
of San Salvador: Mano Blanco and Organizacion Democratica Nacional 
(ORDEN). While neither group can be linked directly to the Central 
Government, both do share the same Hobbesian view of mankind and gov-
ernance as PCN. Mano Blanco is dedicated to maintaining order among 
tugurio dwellers. Protest marches demanding jobs or improved bus ser-
vice upset its sense of harmony; Mano Blanco does its best to dis-
courage these practices at the same time FUNDASAL is encouraging them. 
ORDEN is a right-wing para-military organization whose purpose 
is the repression of any manifestations of liberalism. A weekly news-
magazine referred to it as "the dreaded 50,000 member Orden [sic] mi-
31 
Ii tia." ORDEN has recently been implicated in the murders of two 
Jesuits and others with similar leftist leanings. Both of these 
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groups have opposed FUNDASAL's community organizing efforts in the 
tugurios. Where their initial opposition has been unsuccessful and 
FUNDASAL has organized the inhabitants, support for both Mano Blanco 
and ORDEN has dwindled seriously. 
FUNDASAL, then, attacks the whole area of marginality through 
community development, economic programs and provision of low-cost 
housing. It is considered here primarily because of the quasi-public 
nature of this last activity. In the section below, INVU, IVU and 
FUNDASAL are compared on a variety of criteria. 
Summary 
In Chapter VIII some general conclusions about and comparisons 
of Salvadorean and Costa Rican housing in the larger sense are made. 
Here the day-to-day activities and programs are summarized. This sec-
tion will also give some indication as to how successful the public 
housing programs are in reducing the public housing deficit in the two 
countries. 
Some comparisons among the three agencies and their housing 
practices have been made above; Figure 15 gives a summary of the sa-
lient characteristics. 
One measure used in evaluating the success of public housing 
agencies is how much of the housing problem they solve. To determine 
this, it is necessary to know not only the supply side of the picture 
but also the demand, the size of the housing shortfall. A wide vari-
ety of estimates of the housing deficit is available for both Costa 
Rica and EI Salvador. Most of these estimates are quite precise; 
some of them may even be accurate. Because these estimates do vary so 
Characteristics 
Average number of housing 
solutions provided an-
nually, 1967-1972 (ex-
cluding urbanized lots) 
Provision of completed 
standard housing 
Provision of minimum 
housing 
Auto-construction, self-
help, mutual aid 
Rental housing 
Physical work performed 
by the agency itself 
Guaranteed subsidy from 
the Central Government 
Bonds sold to other 
INVU 
1,561 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
government agencies Yes 
Savings and loan program Yes 
Rigorous debt collection 
procedures No 
Socioeconomic class served Low to 
Middle 
Housing for particular 
occupational groups No 
Assistance to rural 
families Yes 
Community organization 
program No 
Level of cooperation/ 
coordination with 
municipalities Low 
lVU FUNDASAL 
902 N.A. 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
No No 
Yes N.A. 
No Yes 
Yes No 
Lower Lowest 
Middle to 
Middle 
Yes No 
No No 
No Yes 
Variable High 
Figure 15. Characteristics of public housing agencies. 
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widely, it is not realistic to accept anyone of them as truly repre-
32 
sentative. Even government figures are suspect. White, for exam-
pIe, states that the Salvadorean authorities give the housing problem 
33 
"spuriously exact statistical treatment." 
In an attempt to reduce the inherent biases and inaccuracies in 
this area and provide the maximum validity to our comparisons, we 
adopt here the estimates and projections made by outside agencies who 
have assembled data for both countries. To further confuse the issue 
and complicate measurements and comparisons, two different kinds of 
data are estimated: total deficit, and housing to be constructed an-
nually by the public sector to meet a certain goal. These mayor may 
not be presented in conjunction, and goals mayor may not be set ra-
tionally, with a specific, realizable aim. 
One set of estimates is provided by Jorge Riba to the Organiza-
34 
tion of Central American States. His figures as to number of houses 
necessary to maintain the status quo are combined with actual perform-
ance figures for INVU and IVU in Table XXVII. 
Riba's estimates of needed housing include that necessary to 
handle population increases and to maintain the current housing 
stock; he does not include any housing destined to reduce existing 
deficits. 
Considering the future, Riba projects that in 1975 Costa Rica 
will have to build 18,700 units and El Salvador, 17,400 units. Com-
35 
parable figures for 1980 are 21,600 and 19,600 respectively. An-
other source estimates 1975 housing needs at 19,400 units for Costa 
36 
Rica and 36,000 units for El Salvador. 
TABLE XXVII 
COMPARISON OF HOUSING NEED AND PUBLIC SUPPLY 
COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR 
1965 AND 1970 
283 
Year Housing Units 
Needed 
Housing Units 
Publicly Supplied a 
Percent of Need Met 
by Public Agencies 
1965 
1970 
1965 
1970 
14,400 
16,300 
14,100 
15,600 
COSTA RICA 
736 
1,889 
EL SALVADOR 
1,864 
1,050 
5% 
12% 
13% 
7% 
(Note: a, only housing provided by IVU and INVU is included.) 
SOURCES: Jorge Riba, La Vivienda en Centro~llerica; IVU, Memoria de 
Actividades 1973; INVU, Memoria 1972. 
In contrast to Riba's estimates of INVU and IVU performance dur-
ing the 1960s, Wynia suggests they were able to keep pace: 
With little help from the private sector, the housing agen-
cies managed to stay only slightly ahead of the urban popula-
tion growth. Consequently, at the end of the decade the ur-
ban housing deficit remained approximately the same as it had 
been in 1960. 37 
There is no disagreement, however, that little of the accumulated 
38 
housing deficit has been eliminated in either country. Neither 
agency any longer defines its targets in terms of eliminating the 
39 
deficit. IVU sets up construction targets of so much housing 
each year for (usually) a five-year period; INVU sets no long-range 
targets at all. Only when it has completed preliminary engineering 
for a specific project will it make any public statement. 
In concluding this comparison of housing practices of IVU and 
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INVU, a few points merit further emphasis. One is the difference in 
the approach to self-help housing. INVU assumed that provision of 
materials and technical assistance would be sufficient with future 
tenants providing the will and the labor. This assumption proved 
false. IVU adopted a more structured approach, with definite sched-
uling and on-site supervision. This approach worked better, although 
not perfectly. In fact, most of some unexpected cost overruns suf-
fered by IVU were a result of high administrative costs in its self-
help program. 
One characteristic shared, involuntarily, by INVU and IVU has 
been severe financial difficulty, the worst of any Central American 
housing program. Neither agency found its BID and USAID assistance 
sufficient to establish self-sustaining programs. Both agencies 
found themselves effectively abandoned by their central governments 
in times of budgetary shortages. For several years, in fact, the 
Costa Rican government refused to pay INVU the annual subsidy of 
40 
$1,200,000 due it by law. 
In EI Salvador, then, the fiscal crisis was due primarily to 
unexpected administrative costs and secondarily to inadequate Central 
Government support, both exacerbated by BID insistence on completion 
of self-help housing before any further loans would be considered. 
In Costa Rica the crisis was due primarily to lack of promised Cen-
tral Government funding and secondarily to unexpectedly expensive 
self-help housing costs. These were exacerbated by USAID and BID in-
sistence that before they would disburse further loan money, existing 
projects had to be completed and the C'entral Government had to meet 
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its obligations. 
In spite of everything, IVU and INVU have been the two most suc-
cessfu1 housing agencies in Central America at actually providing 
dwelling units. They have been the most ambitious, undertaken the 
largest projects, and encountered the greatest difficulties. Their 
specific construction practices, financing arrangements and clientele 
selection have been compared above; Chapter VIII will examine briefly 
the larger aspects of housing policy and po1icymaking in Costa Rica 
and E1 Salvador. 
MUNICIPAL REVENUE 
In this section the current revenue and expenditure patterns of 
the two municipalities are considered. They are compared not only 
with one another but also with de Moraes' ideal of good municipal rev-
enue practices. In addition, some of the findings of Arvids Kalnins, 
United Nations municipal revenue specialist, on administrative short-
41 
comings in San Jose are presented. 
San Salvador 
The chaotic, almost anarchic, state of San Salvador's municipal 
revenue system has been detailed above in Chapter VI. Nowhere is this 
42 
more evident than in the budget. Municipal revenues are obtained 
from the following general sources: 
1. Taxes on capital investment 
2. Taxes on economic activities carried on in public 
places 
3. Taxes on public entertainment and raffles 
4. Taxes on construction 
5. Charges for municipal services 
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6. Fees for licenses and permits 
7. Fines 
8. Charges for market stalls. 
43 
As noted above, no such logical categories are used in the Tarifa. 
Nor are they in the budget. Over 95 percent of current income is 
lumped under the single catch-all category of 'Regular Income.' The 
reason for this imprecision is simple: municipal authorities do not 
know hDl'l much they can expect from any particular tax or charge, nor 
44 
from any group thereof. 
In fact, the preparation of the budget is almost exclusively 
concerned with the expenditure side. First, the Municipality figures 
out what it is going to do and how much it will cost to do this. Ex-
cept for large specific projects, this is the same as the previous 
year, modified slightly to account for wage increases and higher cost 
of materials. Next, the total of any expected subsidies, donations 
and special fees is calculated. This latter amount is subtracted 
from the former. The amount then needed to balance the budget, it is 
assumed, will somehow come from the Municipality's olio of taxes and 
charges. The dangers of this approach to budgeting are recognized by 
the Municipality. In the preamble to the budget, a statement warns 
citizens of possible service cutbacks and employees of possible lay-
offs if, for any month, it looks like expenditures are too high or 
revenues are underrealized. 
It is reasonable to assume that most of San Salvador's regular 
income comes from the taxes on capital investment and construction. 
These activities are carried on by larger corporations who presumably 
engage in accurate bookkeeping even if the Municipality does not. 
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These corporations, moreover, tend not to be political allies of the 
PDC. The Municipality therefore can collect from these taxpayers more 
easily and cheaply than it can track down hosts of sidewalk vendors, 
particularly when these vendors do tend to be political supporters of 
PDC. This particular tax collection practice, it will be remembered, 
underlay much of CACI's suspicious and hostile attitude towards San 
45 
Salvador. 
In summary, then, the revenue side of San Salvador's budget is 
shown in Table XXVIII. 
TABLE XXVIII 
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN SALVADOR, CASH ON HAND 
AND PROJECTED REVENUE 
Income from own sources 
Regular 
Special Funds 
Fines 
Subsidies 
Cash on Hand 
Total 
1973 ($C.A.) 
$2,864,076 
43,622 
3,168 
2,164 
162,164 
$3,075,194 
SOURCE: Municipalidad de San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973. 
It should be noted that these figures do not include income from the 
46 
municipal markets. These are governed by their own law and by the 
47 
loan agreement with BID. Interestingly enough, the City Markets 
Law permits the markets manager much greater financial latitude than 
that possessed by the Municipality generally. For example, the man-
ager can spend up to $8,000 without the Vo.Bo. of the Central Govern-
ment; San Salvador can spend only $2,000. The Municipality is re-
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quired to spend some of its general fund money on market administra-
tion. In 1973 it had $81,500 earmarked for this purpose. 
If the revenue side of San Salvador's budget is vague and unim-
formative; the expenditure side is much more thoroughly and completely 
presented. Table XXIX presents the expenditures for 1973 both by 
category of expenditure and by nature of service provided. 
TABLE XXIX 
PROPOSED SAN SALVADOR MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES, 1973 ($C.A.) 
Category 
Wages and Salaries 
Services 
Supplies 
Equipment 
Construction 
Transfer Payments 
Total 
Financial Administration 
Sanitation 
Public Works 
General Administration 
Police 
Community Action 
Slaughterhouse 
Other 
Total 
By Expenditure Category 
Amount 
$1,938,504 
411,260 
217,223 
129,000 
80,000 
299,208 
$3,075,194 
By Service Category 
$1,118,482 
548,575 
531,132 
265,480 
165,966 
98,344 
92,270 
254,945 
$3,075,194 
Percent 
63.0 
13.4 
7.1 
4.2 
2.6 
9.7 
100.0 
36.4 
17.8 
17.3 
8.6 
5.4 
3.2 
3.0 
8.3 
100.0 
SOURCE: Municipalidad de San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973. 
Expenditures in the category Financial Administration would be consi-
dered overstated in United States municipal accounting practice. For 
example, all bookkeeping and data processing costs for the whole mu-
289 
nicipal operation are included here, not cos ted out and charged to the 
respective departments. 
Probably the most striking aspect of the San Salvador municipal 
budget is its small size. A budget of just over $3,000,000 is not 
48 
very much for a city of over 500,000 population. To be sure, many 
functions generally regarded as municipal are performed (or not per-
formed) in San Salvador by other agencies. Streets are constructed by 
DUA and water and sewers provided by ANDA, to mention just two of 
these. Nonetheless, the usual condition of the Municipality of San 
Salvador is one of penury. 
San Jose 
Municipal revenue sources in Costa Rica are quite diverse, and 
the quality of the collection practices is uneven. The chaos that 
reigns in San Salvador is absent but the Costa Rican system is still 
exceedingly complex. In addition to charges for municipal services, 
municipal revenue sources may be divided into those available to all 
municipalities and those restricted to only certain municipalities. 
The basic levies made by all municipalities include taxes on 
real estate, public spectacles, and construction; license charges for 
carrying on various commercial and industrial activities; three dif-
ferent liquor taxes; municipal stamps; and fees for the slaughtering 
of swine and cattle. The livestock-slaughtering fee for an animal is 
to be split evenly between the municipality where it was finished and 
the one where it was slaughtered. Of these taxes, all but the license 
charges are covered by generic national laws setting conditions and 
rates that are constant throughout the country. A special law is 
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needed for each municipal license charge on industrial or commercial 
activities. 
A variety of taxes is levied by only some municipalities, in 
some cases by only one. These include taxes on land left vacant or 
unproductive, sugar, tobacco, salt, mangrove wood, lobsters, turtle 
harvesting, wood, petroleum, cement and graves. Most of these taxes 
are governed by general national laws but each grave or wood tax re-
quires a specific act of the National Assembly. 
One further complication that existed through 1969 was the web 
of relationships between municipalities and the Central Government. 
The two levels had shared in a variety of real property, coffee, liq-
uor and ad valorem taxes. New legislation effective January 1, 1970, 
modified this so the municipalities shared among themselves the total 
49 
proceeds of the property tax. San Jose's share is fixed at 29.4 
percent of the amount collected. The Central Bank collects this tax 
and takes 8.6 percent for administrative costs. The remaining 62 per-
cent is divided among all other municipalities in the country accord-
50 
ing to population. The importance of this revenue source, and the 
relative position of others, is shown in Table XXX. 
The role played by parking meter revenue in San Jose has been 
discussed above in Chapter VI. It should be mentioned that in one way 
or another the Municipality derives almost $200,000--about five per-
cent of its income--from various fees and charges on the manufacture, 
import and sale of liquor. 
The absolutely critical contribution of the real property tax 
51 
to San Jose municipal coffers, then, is evident from the table. 
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Almost 50 percent of its total income (73 percent of its tax revenue) 
is derived from this source. Moreover, the collection costs are nil. 
The Central Bank does the collecting and pays San Jose the Municipa1-
ity's share off the top, even before subtracting its administration 
fee. 
TABLE XXX 
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, PROJECTED REVENUE, 1974 ($C.A.) 
Source 
Property tax a 
License fees 
Other taxes 
Total tax revenue 
Rental of market space 
User charges 
Subsidies b 
Fines 
Other non tax revenue c 
Total non tax revenue 
Total revenue 
Amount 
$2,185,298 
439,245 
284,528 
$2,909,071 
205,087 
909,665 
163,900 
128,429 
64,906 
$1,471,986 
$4,381,057 
Percent 
49.9 
10.0 
6.5 
66.4 
4.7 
20.8 
3.7 
2.9 
1.5 
33.6 
100.0 
(Note: a, almost 98 percent of this amount is from the real property 
tax, the remainder is from a real estate transfer tax and the tax on 
vacant land; b, almost 99 percent of this amount is from IFAM; c, a 
franchise fee of five percent of gross revenue is levied on the elec-
tric company.) 
SOURCE: 
,.. 
Municipa1idad de San Jose, Presupuesto Ordinaria del 1974. 
One other point merits inclusion here. Despite the ruling of 
the Comptroller General and the drawn out fight for its approval as 
an impuesto, parking meter revenue is classified in the budget as a 
user charge, not as a tax. 
Table XXXI presents the expenditure side of the budget by na-
ture of expenditure and by program. As was the case for San Salvador, 
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Wages and Salaries account for most of the Municipality's expenses. 
More specific comparisons between the two cities will be made below in 
a subsequent part of this chapter. Before ending our consideration of 
San Jose and its budgetary and financial practices, it is worth exam-
ining the administrative shortcomings identified by Kalnins, along 
52 
with some of his suggestions for improvement. 
TABLE XXXI 
PROPOSED SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES, 1974 ($C.A.) 
By Expenditure Category 
Category 
Wages and Salaries 
Services 
Supplies 
Equipment 
Acquisition of Real Estate 
Transfer Payments 
Debt Service 
Total 
Amount 
$2,433,323 
497,907 
747,548 
51,943 
16,906 
560,561 
72,869 
$4,381,057 
By Program Category 
Policy Development and 
Planning 
General Administration a 
Municipal Health 
Education and Culture 
Economic and Social Services 
Public Works 
Capital Investment 
Total 
$ 378,231 
1,090,290 
855,195 
223,890 
414,000 
578,190 
841,261 
$4,381,057 
Percent 
55.5 
11.4 
17.1 
1.2 
0.4 
12.8 
1.7 
100.0 
8.6 
24.9 
19.5 
5.1 
9.4 
13.2 
19.2 
100.0 
(Note: a, financial services account for $779,957 of this amount.) 
SOURCE: Municipa1idad de San Jose, Presupuesto Ordinario del 1974. 
The most basic deficiency Kalnins found to be the "complete ab-
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sence of recent and valid technical studies about the administrative, 
juridical, financial and fiscal situation of the municipalities of 
53 
Costa Rica." 
Many of the conditions he criticized have been improved. His 
criticisms were, in some cases, instrumental in bringing about needed 
change. He complained, for example, that there existed no Municipal 
Code, that there was a hodgepodge of tax sources shared between munic-
ipalities and the Central Government, and that there was no central 
clearing house or course for technical or financial aid or advice to 
the municipalities. All of these have changed for the better. 
Some conditions, however, have not changed. Kalnins found, as 
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did Castro Carvajal, that municipalities paid insufficient attention 
to budgeting and were constantly plaguing the Comptroller General with 
requests for modifications, as often as 15 times a year for some mu-
nicipalities. Municipalities continue to overspend their budgets, 
user charges remain unrealistically low and the Comptroller General 
persists in impeding fiscal planning with his rigid insistence on in-
55 
variable line-item budgets from the municipalities. 
Kalnins offered a rather radical solution to the administrative 
and financial problems of the subnational units of government in Costa 
Rica. These units should be abolished and the country divided into 14 
56 
departments. Each department was to be purely an administrative arm 
of the Central Government. In this suggestion his French background 
comes to the fore. Provinces and cantons have not been abolished in 
Costa They continue to exist, to have severe administrative 
57 
difficulties and to grapple with financial problems. San Jose is 
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not exempt from the municipal maladies. 
Summary 
In this section San Jos~ and San Salvador are briefly compared 
on four points: actual size of municipal government, revenue sources 
and collection, expenditure patterns, and quality of tax system ac-
cording to de Moraes. 
Size of budget is often used as a measure of scope of municipal 
activity. San Jose's budget is larger than San Salvador's, about 40 
percent larger. This is so despite the fact that San Jose serves ap-
58 
proximately 20 percent fewer people. Municipal government in San 
Jose, then, is considerably more expensive on a per capita basis--
about 11 dollars as compared with six dollars per capita in San Salva-
dor. As befits the more populous city, San Salvador has the larger 
59 
municipal workforce--l,805 employees to San Jose's 1,376. In both 
municipalities there are roughly 3.5 municipal employees for every 
1,000 inhabitants. Municipal employees are better paid in San Jose 
where they earn an average (mean) of $1,768 per year than in San Sal-
60 
vador where $1,074 is the mean annual income. 
Tables XXVIII and XXX above indicate the sources of revenue for 
the two municipalities. Several factors are immediately evident. 
Both cities have very low revenues, total and per capita, by North 
American standards, and San S~lvador is considerably lower than San 
Jose. Most of this difference is accounted for by the property tax 
which generates half of San Jose's revenue and nothing in San Salva-
dor. Another factor, already mentioned, is the availability of park-
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ing meter revenue in San Jose. Closely tied to this is the productiv-
ity of fines. Fines, almost half of which are parking fines, provide 
almost three percent of San Jose's revenue but only one-tenth of one 
percent in San Salvador. 
The difference in the level of central government support is ob-
vious. Less than one-tenth of one percent of San Salvador's income 
comes from subsidies while San Jose receives almost four percent from 
this source. Moreover, the turnover of the property tax to the munic-
ipalities by the Costa Rican government can almost be regarded as a 
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massive subsidy. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that San Jose's more careful 
estimate of revenue from the various sources allows the preparation of 
a more realistic budget. Revenues due from a particular source may be 
more accurately assessed and remedial action taken more quickly should 
they drop unexplainedly below estimates. This is not to suggest that 
San Jose's monitoring and revenue collection practices are effective 
and efficient. Far from it--San Jose like other Costa Rican munici-
62 
palities is inexcusably lax in the collection of user charges. But 
as woeful as the quality of revenue collection is, it is still better 
than in San Salvador. 
Meaningful comparison of the expenditure patterns of the two mu-
nicipalities is rendered difficult by the different package of ser-
vices each offers its citizens. The most obvious differences are that 
San Jose constructs and maintains roads while San Salvador does not, 
and that San Salvador maintains a municipal police force whereas San 
Jose has none. 
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Nonetheless, a few useful comparisons may be made. Both cities 
spend about the same portion of their income on General Administration 
and in safeguarding the health of their citizens. Both are required 
to transfer about ten percent of their funds to other agencies such as 
school boards. 
The largest single difference between the two is that while San 
Jose puts almost one-fifth of its income into Capital Investment, less 
than three percent of San Salvador's income is directed to new con-
struction. Interestingly enough, San Salvador, which does not build 
or maintain roads, spends more of its revenues on Public Works than 
San Jose, which does build and maintain roads. Finally, Culture and 
Economic and Social Services use up about 15 percent of San Jose's in-
come while the closest comparable category in San Salvador, Community 
Action, gets only three percent. This is explained in large part by 
the more centralized and activist role of FOCCO when compared to 
DINADECO. Municipal expenditure patterns, then, like so many other 
facets of municipal activity in the two countries, are heavily in-
fluenced by the nature of national-municipal relations. 
These relations are reflected, among other considerations, is 
the relative standings of San Jos'e and San Salvador vis-a-vis de 
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Moraes' developmental paradigm. De Moraes, it will be remembered, 
classifies municipal tax systems as current, transitional and future. 
Characteristics of the current system include utilization of patri-
monial natural resources, taxes and charges on things and persons, 
and imposition ad speciem. Consequences of this system are a static 
economy, deficient public services and a strong tendency to centrali-
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zation. 
The next developmental stage he labeled transitional. This step 
is characterized by prevalence of taxes and user charges, income ac-
cording to the concepts of increased rates and earmarking, some cases 
of double imposition, charges as a function of capacity to contribute, 
and imposition ad valorem. De Moraes suggested the consequences of 
moving to this stage would be augmentation of financial capacity, im-
provement in service delivery and a tendency to decentralization. His 
future stage is well beyond the reach of either San Jose or San Salva-
dor and will not be considered further here. 
One point de Moraes might profitably have included in his devel-
opmental scheme was administrative progress in tax collection from the 
current hit-or-miss approach toward some future system characterized 
by efficiency, equity and impossibility of evasion. It may well be 
that improved administration procedures could do more than any modi-
fication of the tax structure itself to aid the municipalities fis-
cally. We see below some steps toward improving the nature of rev-
enue policies; no such steps in improving administration can be de-
tected. However brilliantly designed a revenue system may be, un-
collected tax monies cannot pay for any services. 
In a very real sense, then, all the attempted municipal revenue 
policymaking we have examined has been an effort to move from current 
to transitional systems. San Jos~'s parking meter law, for example, 
64 
did impose a tax or user charge and did augment the Municipality's 
financial capacity. It also improved service delivery in two ways: 
directly, through provision of more orderly parking arrangements, and 
indirectly, through provision of more money to the City Treasury to 
pay for other services. 
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San Salvador's attempted tax reform was a broad front effort to 
move from ad speciem to ad valorem levies and very specifically, to 
make charges a function of capacity to contribute. As de Moraes sug-
gested, some cases of double imposition would have resulted. 
Nonetheless, both municipalities today have tax systems that 
are classified as current. In both cases, there remains a strong 
tendency toward centralization. We would have to disagree with 
de Moraes, however, in his contention that this tendency is a conse-
quence of the current tax system; rather, we submit, it is a contri-
buting factor thereto. This tendency, moreover, is not as strong in 
San Jose as in San Salvador. According to any of de Moraes' criteria, 
San Jose is farther along the road to a transitional, hence better, 
tax system than is San Salvador. 
The greatest financial boon to San Jose in recent years has un-
doubtedly been the transfer of the real property tax. This was, how-
ever, an act of the Central Government. There is no evidence that 
the Mllilicipality initiated any action to effect this transfer. 
A major difference in style can be noted in practices, parti-
cularly intergovernmental fiscal relations, in Costa Rica and El Sal-
vador. In El Salvador the Central Government aims to keep the capi-
tal both politically and financially weak. There are two proper 
places for money to be concentrated, it feels--in its own hands or 
in the private sector. Costa Rica makes no such attempt to keep its 
municipalities either politically impotent or destitute. The Central 
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Government has shown itself willing to provide the municipalities with 
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money. Ultimately, however, it maintains control of this money. 
Taxing capacity has not passed to the municipalities. The Costa Rican 
government does not keep San Jose broke. It does keep it, rhetoric 
to the contrary, financially dependent. In the final analysis we must 
question just how much, if any, difference these two styles actually 
make to San Jose and San Salvador in their attempts to develop ra-
tional, adequate, equitable local government revenue systems. 
This chapter, then, has examined the current practices and pro-
grams in the fields of municipal revenue and public housing provision 
in San Salvador and San Jose. Chapter VIII will consider the broader 
nature of policymaking in these fields and relate this back to both 
the political, economic, and social background factors and to our or-
iginal hypotheses and models for analysis. 
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CHAPTER VII NOTES 
1. Costa Rica 7 Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanism (INVU), El 
INVU: Organizacibn, Objectivos, El Problema de Vivienda, Rea1~ 
zaciones Fisicas, El P1aneamiento Urbano, San Jos~, 1973, p. 3. 
2. Costa Rica, Law Establishing the National Institute of Housing 
and Urbanism, Article 6c. 
3. Many banana growers on the Caribbean slopes abandoned their land 
when Sigitoka and Panama disease blighted their crops. Unused 
portions of large landholdings owned by multinational corpora-
tions are often taken over by squatters. The Colonization In-
stitute (ITCO) has legalized this use and sometimes makes parcels 
of land available to INVU for housing lots. Squatters have use 
of the land and after successfully working it for a number of 
years may get title to it. Many squatters, however, sell land to 
which they have no title to North Americans, who are subsequently 
dispossessed. 
4. INVU, El INVU, p. 5. 
5. INVU, Memoria 1972, San Jose, 1973, p. 31. Wynia, however, re-
ports that 70 percent of INVU's clients were at least three months 
behind on their mortgage payments in 1967 (Politics and Planners, 
p.160). 
6. INVU, Memoria 1972, p. 32. 
7. Ibid., p. 28. 
8. INVU, El INVU, p. 8. 
9. In addition to INVU, other housing finance agencies are Banco 
Credito Agricola de Cartago (loans for rural housing construction 
only), Banco Anglo Costarricense, Banco de Costa Rica, Banco 
Nacional de Costa Rica, Instituto Nacional de Seguros, Banco Pop-
ular y de Desarollo Comuna1, and Caja Costarricense de Seguro 
Social. Caja's policy changes unpredictably. Some years it makes 
low-cost, subsidized loans fairly widely available, other years 
it finances only housing for its own employees. 
10. Unofficial estimate by various staff members of IVU. 
11. El Salvador, Instituto de Vivienda Urbana (IVU), Memoria de 
Actividades 1972-1973, San Salvador, 1973, unpaged. 
12. Oscar Rene Salegio, Analisis de la Situaci~n y del Plan Habita-
ciona1, San Salvador, IVU, 1968, pp. 47-80 passim. 
13. Ibid., p. 70. 
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14. Sean M. Elliot, Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Sav-
ings Mobilization and U.S. Assistance Policy (New York: Freder-
ick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 144. 
15. Salegio, ATIa1isis, p. 71. 
16. A thorough perusal of the Salvadorean Constitution failed to iden-
tify the applicable articles. 
17. San Salvador (El Salvador) La Prensa Gr~fica, 22 April 1974, p. 33. 
18. IVU, Memoria 1972-1973. 
19. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 162. 
20. Salegio, Analisis, p. 79. 
21. In the mid-1960s the Legislative Assembly recommended that IVU 
build very low-cost rental units for tugurio dwellers. IVU ig-
nored this recommendation as being totally unrealistic and fis-
cally irresponsible. 
22. In one press release, for example, IVU announced construction of 
60 single-family dwellings for teachers, nurses and employees in 
the 27th of September Colony in Zacatecoluca at a total cost of 
¢292,5l5. Each dwelling would contain 128 square meters of floor 
space, more than twice the size of minimum housing units (La 
Prensa Grafica, 28 January 1974, p. 44). --
23. Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarollo y Vivienda Minima (FUNDASAL), 
~ ~ El Carre ton de los Suenos, San Salvador, Moderna Noble & Aso-
ciados, 1973, p. 21. 
24. Ibid., p. 25. 
25. La Prensa Grafica, 19 April 1974, p. 7. 
26. La Prensa Grafica, 26 February 1974, p. 3. 
27. For exrunple, La Prensa Grafica, 4 April 1974, p. 23, carried an 
article on the donation of ¢15,000 worth of electrical wiring 
materials by Phelps Dodge of Central America. 
28. It is an interesting anomaly that IVU, an agency of a secular 
government, generally insists that its tenants be formally mar-
ried, while FUNDASAL with a Roman Catholic priest as executive 
director, asks only that there be some evidence of stability in 
the relationship. 
29. Interview with Antonio Ibanez, 19 April 1974. 
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30. While exact figures are not available on the distribution of the 
90 percent of the votes not cast for PCN they did not all go to 
PDC. MNR received a larger share of the votes than its share in 
the country as a whole. Much of the information in this section 
was gathered in March, April and May, 1974 from informants who did 
not care to be identified. 
31. Time, 24 July 1978, p. 72. 
32. For example, projections of the urban housing deficit in El Sal-
vador for 1980 range from 140,000 to 697,500 units. 
33. White, El Salvador, p. 247. 
34. Jorge Ricardo Riba, La Vivienda en Centroamerica, San Salvador, 
Secretaria General del Organizaci6n de Estados Centroamericanos, 
1969, p. 35. 
35. Riba's estimates of total deficit are very close to those in 
UNICEF, Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales. Riba, however, 
bases his projections on a growth rate of 3.8 percent for Costa 
Rica and 3.3 percent for El Salvador when the most recent figures 
show El Salvador at 3.9 percent and Costa Rica at around two per-
cent. To be consistent his estimates for El Salvador would have 
to be increased and those for Costa Rica decreased. 
36. Koth, Housing in Latin America, p. 38. 
37. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 178. 
38. One set of optimistic figures, however, does suggest that the ac-
cumulated deficit is being successfully attacked in the San Jose 
area. Antonini, Public Policy, p. 67, offers the following: 
1963 
1970 
Change 
% change 
Total Housing Deficit 
San Jose Province 
25,938 
19,200 
-6,738 
-26% 
San Jose Urban Area 
9,729 
5,958 
-3,751 
-39% 
39. There is a persistent rumor in San Salvador that the Central Gov-
ernment suppressed a report on the progress of public housing 
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because it documented the embarrassing failure of IVU to even ap-
proach its goals. 
40. Wynia, Politics and Planners, p. 180. 
41. United Nations Office of Technical Cooperation, Evaluacion del 
Desarol10 del Programa Sobre 1a ReorganizacionAdrninistrativa y 
Financiera de R~gimen Municipal de Costa Rica, prepared by Arvids 
Kalnins, San Jos~, 1972. 
42. Municipality of San Salvador, Presupuesto Municipal 1973, San Sal-
vador, 1973. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to budget 
in this section are to this document. 
43. See above, p. 222. 
44. As detailed and rational as the Municipality's proposed tax re-
form was, it did not estimate total revenues from particular 
sources either. 
45. At the time PDC had adopted as a slogan: "So he who has more, 
pays more and he who has less, pays less." CACI suggested that 
the slogan should read: "Who pays his taxes on time has the 
capacity to be taxed twice as heavily." 
46. E1 Salvador, City of San Salvador Markets Law (1969). 
47. San Salvador, with E1 Salvador acting through CONAPLAN as guar-
antor, borrowed $6,300,000 in 1969 to construct seven new munic-
ipal markets. The City Markets Law was passed primarily to make 
this possible. 
48. The City of Portland, by contrast, had in 1977-1978 a general 
fund budget of $104,700,000 for a city of 400,000 population. 
49. Costa Rica, Law Number 4340, 30 May 1969. 
50. Costa Rica, Ministerio de Gobernaci~n, Nuestro Gobierno y El 
Regimen Municipal, San Jose, Imprenta Naciona1, 1972, p. 24. 
51. It can readily be seen why Vargas in "Adrninistracion del Sistema 
Municipal" ascribes much of the strengthening of Costa Rican mu-
nicipalities to Law 4340. See p. 34 above and Chapter II, notes 
57-59. 
52. Kalnins, Reorganizacion Adrninistrativa y Financiera del Regimen 
Municipal en Costa Rica, San Jos~, Oficina de P1anificaci~n, 1968. 
53. Ibid., p. 2. 
54. Castro Carvajal, "Evaluacibn del Sistema Presupuestaria." 
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55. Kalnins also criticized the 14-year 'gestation period' of the Ur-
ban Planning Law. See the discussion above, Chapter VI, of the--
time required for the Parking Meter Law. 
56. Kalnins, Reorganizacion Administrativa, p. 64. 
57. The Comptroller General regularly condems individual municipali-
ties for profligacy and other financial sins. On one day in 1973 
for example, he declared 83 municipalities "financial disasters" 
for cumulative overspending of some ¢300,000,000 (La Nacion, 21 
November 1973, p. 4A). 
58. It will be remembered that population figures are not gathered 
for the municipalities but for the urban areas of the respective 
provinces. For comparative purposes here San Salvador is assumed 
to have a population of 500,000 and San Jose of 400,000. See 
above, Chapter V, for actual head count figures for the urban 
areas. 
59. Both figures are obtained by adding departmental figures listed in 
the respective budgets. The San Jose budget goes so far as to 
list the name and salary of employees paid on a monthly or annual 
basis. 
60. These figures compare very favorably with general per capita in-
come in the two countries. In 1970, per capita income was $469 
in Costa Rica and $298 in El Salvador. See above, p. 174. 
61. If the Salvadorean government followed the lead of Costa Rican 
and gave the capital 29.4 percent of the property tax, San Salva-
dor's share (1972) would amount to $1,074,570. Compare this to 
the actual municipal revenue in 1973 of $3,075,194. 
62. The Central Government's record in property tax collection is not 
much better. 
63. See above, pp. 90 and 91. 
64. Again, it is still unresolved whether the parking fee is a tax or 
a user charge. 
65. IFAM, for example, may take off from the top of any municipality's 
share of the property tax, any amount owed to IFAM by the munici-
pality. 
CHAPTER VI II 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis has shown that for our first general premise the 
null hypothesis held (p. 11). That is, we found no significant dif-
ference in policymaking and policy outcomes between San Jos~ and San 
Salvador in the fields of revenue raising and public provision of 
housing. We do not conclude from this, however, that the political, 
social and economic background factors considered are irrelevant, only 
that they need be more carefully examined. Our focus in this section, 
then, is on those background factors that are similar in the two cit-
ies. We will attempt to determine the extent to which these similar 
factors explain the similarities in policy. 
The broadest and most important of the policy similarities are 
the paucity of revenue decisionmaking and the absence of public hous-
ing decisionmaking in both San Salvador and San Jos~. As this condi-
tion is more readily explained for housing, this will be done first. 
Stated simply, in both cases the central government has reserved 
to itself the provision of public housing. It might be recalled here 
that the Salvadorean Municipal Act did not mention housing provision 
but Article 41-5 of the Costa Rican Municipal Code requires munici-
palities to "establish • . . housing programs of social interest" in 
the urban areas. Despite this statutory difference, the two coun-
tries' public housing practice closely parallel one another. Major 
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reasons for national rather than municipal (or cooperative national-
municipal) provision are iterated briefly below. 
In the first place, housing in El Salvador and Costa Rica is not 
primarily an urban problem. Estimates of the exact size of the hous-
ing problem vary according to whose data and projections are used so 
definitive figures are almost impossible to obtain. Nonetheless, 
there is considerable evidence that housing shortfall and substandard 
housing, both in absolute numbers and as percentages, are greater in 
the rural areas of Costa Rica and El Salvador than in the urban areas. 
The national and rural dimensions of the need for the public provision 
of housing therefore make it a concern of the central and not of the 
municipal governments. As shown in Chapter VII, however, most of the 
housing provided by the national governments agencies, INVU and IVU, 
is provided in urban areas. The greatest concentration, moreover, is 
in the metropolitan regions of the capital cities. 
In most places and for most issues problem areas and political 
boundaries do not coincide. This is particularly true of urban hous-
ing problems in Costa Rica and El Salvador. Unlike the United States 
where urban housing decay and shortfall are associated generally with 
the central city, the segments of the urban population most in need 
of housing assistance in Central American are found on the fringes of 
the city. Thus the problem, and the housing-short population, spills 
over from one jurisdiction into another. The problem is, then, at 
least metropolitan in scope. Lacking both effective intermediate 
government units and intermunicipal cooperation, the central govern-
ments are required almost by default to do whatever is to be done 
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about the provision of publicly assisted housing in urban as well as 
in rural areas. 
Cost and financing considerations also lead to centralization. 
The municipalities simply do not have the fiscal capacity (partly for 
reasons offered in the section on revenue raising) to provide the 
amounts of publicly assisted housing required within their own bound-
aries. But for that matter neither do the national governments. It 
is necessary, therefore, to seek external financing. External donors 
may, in some cases, be willing to deal directly with the cities. 
Lenders, however, provide the overwhelming bulk of external financing, 
and external lenders, whether private financial institutions, other 
nations, or international agencies, insist upon the partic.ipation of 
the central governments. Since national governments, then, are re-
quired to guarantee loans and back the municipalities with full faith 
and credit, they simply go the one step further and do it themselves. 
For the central governments to assume the ultimate financial responsi-
bility for public housing without taking direct control, makes very 
little sense to them. 
Yet other reasons for direct central government provision of 
housing lie in the fact that housing is not provided in a policy vac-
uum. Housing policies are related to other national policies, and 
often have aims and goals beyond the mere provision of shelter. Na-
tional governments obviously need pay more attention to externalities, 
positive and negative, than municipal cOlporations. Housing policy is 
logically connected to industrial location and may be used to dis-
courage migration to larger cities and to encourage settlement 
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elsewhere. Construction of public housing may spur local building 
materials industries and result in the creation or upgrading of mar-
ketable skills among the workers. Moreover, housing may be used for 
political purposes. Among these are providing low-cost housing to 
civil servants and building projects in areas where the populace seems 
most ready and able to engage in disruptive and destabilizing politi-
cal activity. Surely it is in the best interests of the national gov-
ernments to control public housing and hence maximize their influence 
over these various occurrences. 
Nor have the municipalities given the central governments much 
reason for faith in local abilities to set and administer housing pol-
icy. In neither San Jose nor San Salvador is there any evidence of 
past efforts to alleviate the housing problem. Part of this inactiv-
ity is of course due to lack of funds but part of it must be attri-
buted to lack of will or interest or both. The head of the engineer-
ing department of IVU, speaking of public sector participation in the 
provision of housing in urban El Salvador, states: 
The Central Government has taken charge of all the public 
housing programs and projects in the country and the partici-
pation at the level of the local Governments or Municipali-
ties has been to date practically nil. l 
In looking at revenue raising we will see that this suspicion of mu-
nicipal administrative competence is not totally unjustified. 
Yet another impetus to central government takeover of urban 
housing provision is structural. Both Costa Rica and EI Salvador 
have used autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies of the national gov-
ernment to provide what are usually regarded as urban services. Both 
countries have such agencies in the field of electricity, water and 
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sewage, public health aud urban planning, to mention a few. Thus 
there is a tradition, and a style, of national government involvement 
in local services and the extrapolation to urban housing provision is 
an easy and obvious one. 
These, then, are some of the explanations for the central gov-
ernments' assumption of urban public housing policy. But what have 
the central governments done in this field, what has been their policy 
response? In both cases the basic activity, as might be expected, has 
been the establishment of a national authority. In neither case does 
this authority, INVU in Costa Rica and IVU in El Salvador, include a 
representative fTom the municipal sector. 
The various construction policies of these agencies have been 
detailed above; they need not be elaborated further here. One very 
important policy decision as to clientele, however, deserves emphasis. 
In both cases the conscious and overt decision has been made to pro-
vide housing primarily for the middle to lower-middle class, those 
who can almost but not quite compete in the private housing market. 
A variety of reasons is offered for this. One is the purely finan-
cial. Because this clientele can and presumably does pay their rent 
and repay their loans, the drain on the treasury is less and in the 
long run, more housing can be provided for the same amount of govern-
ment money. Another reason is that many of the people so helped are 
relatively skilled personnel, e.g., nurses, teachers, technicians, 
and the governments find it desirable to keep them as satisfied as 
possible. 
Yet another explanation may be found in the governments' 
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conviction that providing housing alone to the very lowest classes 
does as much harm as good. The result of this would be a still unem-
ployed, poor, hungry, sick and generally hopeless population living in 
a different place. Experiences such as those with the superbloques in 
Caracas indicate that this attitude may not be as callous as it first 
seems. 
In all of the above we have examined commonalities in urban pub-
lic housing policy between El Salvador and Costa Rica. There do exist 
a few differences, however. The partisan political animus between San 
Salvador and the central government does not exist in Costa Rica. 
This difference may be felt more than specified or explained in hous-
ing policies and practices. In addition there exists in El Salvador a 
private, non-profit agency known as the Salvadorean Foundation for De-
velopment and Minimum Housing (FUNDASAL). This agency tackles the en-
tire problem area of 'marginality,' part of which is the provision of 
housing. FUNDASAL builds housing for sectors of the population unable 
to meet the minimum income requirements of IVU. It estimates that 
more than 90 percent of the Salvadorean population can afford, on a 
long-term basis, the housing it provides. There is a good deal of 
cooperation between FUNDASAL and the Municipality of San Salvador; 
the Municipality, for example, donated the land upon which FUNDASAL 
built one of its housing projects. It should be noted that the cen-
tral government has also aided, with cash payments, FUNDASAL projects. 
No parallel organization exists in Costa Rica. The closest is 
yet another autonomous agency of the national government, the Mixed 
Institute for Social Aid (IMAS). Like FUNDASAL it is headed up by a 
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Catholic priest and receives some donations from the private sector. 
lMAS does engage in limited slum clearance and housing rehabilitation. 
Unlike FUNDASAL, lMAS is primarily a social work agency and has a pre-
dominantly nlral, not urban, orientation. When approached by a poor 
migrant to the city for help, lMAS' first inclination is to help him 
back to the countryside; FUNDASAL's is to integrate him into the urban 
community. Also unlike FUNDASAL, lMAS has no ties to or cooperative 
agreements with the municipality. lMAS provices a minimal amount of 
urban housing as a last resort; FUNDASAL sees the provision of housing 
to the urban poor as a prime responsibility. 
One further difference between Costa Rica and EI Salvador lies 
in the institutional arrangement of their housing agencies. INVU is 
not a part of any Ministry but an "autonomous organism of the State, 
endowed with its own funding, legal personality and administrative and 
technical independence." In El Salvador, on the other hand, IVU is 
but one of five agencies under the Technical and Coordination Direc-
torate of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanization. INVU, then, is 
free to pursue its aims with minimal control or interference from any 
other agency. IVU lacks this freedom but is more likely to find its 
efforts integrated in and subsidiary to a broader overall national 
plan for urban development. 
Finally, the Municipality of San Jos~ has begun a study of the 
possibility of providing cheap housing for the lowest paid municipal 
employees. No such moves have been undertaken by San Salvador. 
In furthering our study of housing policies, it might prove in-
structive to compare Costa Rica and El Salvador on each of the 
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thirteen objectives suggested by Abrams (above, p. 101). 
The first suggested objective is priority in housing for lower-
income families. Both governments' housing policies adhere to this to 
some extent. For reasons stated above, briefly in this conclusion and 
more fulling in the body of the paper, neither government concentrates 
on housing for the lowest income families. Costa Rica, however, aims 
at a clientele whose poorest members have lower incomes than the poor-
est members of the target group in EI Salvador. 
Opportunities for homeowners hip by low-income families at low 
costs are provided for in both countries' policies. Again, Costa Rica 
tries to minimize the costs more than does EI Salvador. Both coun-
tries concentrate more on housing ownership than on rental opportuni-
ties. 
Choices of environment provided by government housing projects 
are somewhat constrained in each of the two countries. Both offer 
choices in the 'stage-of-construction' realm--furnished houses, shells 
2 
and urbanized lots are available. Not all types are available in all 
projects however. The important difference here is that some rental 
housing is provided in EI Salvador, none in Costa Rica. 
Both countries' housing policies include reasonable financing 
policies. EI Salvador provides financing for both single-family 
dwellings and low-income condominiums. Costa Rica makes financing 
available for the purchase of government-assisted housing, paying off 
high interest rate mortgages, purchase of building lots, and buying 
land in cases where a homeowner has built his home or someone else's 
property. 
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Savings are encouraged within government housing policy in both 
cases. In El Salvador the government chooses to work through the pri-
vate sector with FNV aiding in the establishment of savings and loan 
associations. The Costa Rican government has opted for building the 
savings incentive~ and the facilitative mechanism~ right into the 
housing agency. 
Subsidies are more difficult to compare cross-nationally~ but in 
neither case can they be regarded as adequate. The central government 
in El Salvador was asked to provide IVU with a guaranteed annual sub-
sidy. It refused. The Costa Rican government, on the other hand~ is 
required by law to provide INVU with an annual subsidy. However~ its 
failure to honor this legal mandate has been mentioned above. An in-
teresting point of comparison here is that the Salvadorean government 
has provided a subsidy for the private FUNDASAL while the Costa Rican 
government has made no such grant to a non-government agency. 
A more effective building industry does not seem to have devel-
oped in either country. Costa Rica has accepted whatever state of 
technology exists in the private firms with which it contracts. El 
Salvador, on the other hand~ has actively sought and encouraged exper-
imental proposals from its contractors and has originated and tested 
some products in IVU's own material technology section. El Salvador 
has~ therefore, made more of an effort in this direction than has 
Costa Rica but no effective results have been seen to date. Conse-
quently~ in neither country has there been any significant reduction 
in home construction costs due to government housing policy. 
Placement of industry where a minimum of housing needs to be 
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built is not a particularly relevant objective in either Costa Rica or 
El Salvador. Costa Rica has encouraged decentralization of industry 
to a greater extent than El Salvador, but not by much. There is lit-
erally nowhere in either country a labor intensive industry could lo-
cate with sufficient housing for its work force. This, therefore, has 
not been a prime factor for industrial location or housing policy in 
either country. 
Rehousing of squatters per se has not been a major priority of 
housing policy in either case. Neither Costa Rica nOT El Salvador 
has adopted a policy of trying to move an entire colony of squatters 
to government-assisted housing on a fixed schedule. Squatter reset-
tlement has been carried out on a piecemeal basis and in neither coun-
try has it been an activity of the housing agency. 
Little has been done to prevent squatting in either Costa Rica 
or El Salvador. This is the case despite a very different 'squatting 
environment'; squatting is not a critical problem in Costa Rica 
whereas it accounts for some two-thirds of the urban growth in El Sal-
vador. Moreover, squatting is no longer regarded as an unmixed evil. 
Current thinking is that squatting is to be guided, not eliminated. 
Formal housing cooperatives in the European tradition are un-
known in the two Central American countries, and no government poli-
cies exist to foster them. Cooperation in housing construction, how-
ever, is not unknown as overnight erection of large shantytowns de-
monstrates. Salvadorean government housing policies encourage mutual 
aid by tenants-to-be in the construction of some housing projects. 
This practice was also tried by INVU in Costa Rica but was not found 
viable and has been abandoned. Neither government has adopted rent 
control policies. 
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In summary, then, the two national governments have a very simi-
lar set of housing policies. In neither case do they regard housing 
as a strictly urban policy area. Costa Rican housing policy, set by 
INVU, has its particular strengths in its wider financing provisions 
and consideration of the needs of a lower-income group than in El Sal-
vador. This latter nation, however, is stronger in its provision of 
low-income rental housing and its efforts to develop cheaper and more 
efficient building materials. 
With the unreliability of statistics and differences in program 
operation, it is difficult to state that one country's set of policies 
has been the more effective in the provision of shelter to those un-
able to compete in the private housing market. It is even more diffi-
cult to tie a measure of success back to the set of political, social 
and economic factors examined. To the extent possible, however, this 
has been done above in the body of the paper. 
It is fair to say, nevertheless, that neither El Salvador nor 
Costa Rica has made any substantial progress in housing its lower-
class urban population. It is not fair to concentrate attention 
solely on the shortcomings of national housing policy. In the face of 
severe financial and political difficulties, each nation has provided 
some housing. And, it should be repeated, Costa Rica and El Salvador 
are far ahead of the other Central American nations in this respect. 
Both countries' housing programs suffer from the twin handicaps 
of scarce capital and surplus clientele. Both countries found it 
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necessary to seek external financial aid, and international funding 
agencies, with some recent and partial exceptions, have subscribed to 
the "devil take housing" theory: 
According to this theory, housing merits low priority in na-
tional and international spending schemes because it is a dur-
able form of investment requiring substantial outlays but pay-
ing off little per year. In addition, it generates no foreign 
exchange, competes with industry and agriculture for capital, 
draws off needed labor and materials, and may even be infla-
tionary.3 
Internally, problems with national housing programs have been pri-
marily problems related to the overall national political milieux more 
than to IVU or INVU shortcomings. 
International funding agencies, it seems, expect little from 
housing programs. In fact, they seem to anticipate failure. These 
gloomy predictions tend to become self-fulfilling. 
In the final analysis, as long as Costa Rica and El Salvador de-
pend on external sources of capital, the attitudes and practices of 
these outside actors are going to affect the public provision of urban 
housing more than will any internal political, social or economic con-
ditions or the nature of the policymaking process in the two countries 
and any of their local governments. 
In examining the revenue policies of San Jos~ and San Salvador, 
similarities rather than differences come to the fore. In both munic-
ipalities many initial attempts were made to broaden the revenue base; 
few were successful. Our difficulty in finding specific examples to 
follow through the process is symptomatic of this. In both cities, 
the major snags came in the legitimation phase; that is, the problem 
arose of obtaining needed central government approval. The successful 
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case examined, parking meters in San Jos~, indicates the complexities 
in getting the national government's Vo.Bo. for a project of no appar-
ent possible conflict with national policy. In the unsuccessful case 
looked at, overall tax reform in San Salvador, the same sorts of dif-
ficulty were found, exacerbated by the active and effective opposition 
of the business community. 
Where, then, and to what background factors do we look to ex-
plain the similarity in, and paucity of, municipal revenue policy? 
Foremost among the political factors we must consider national control 
of the municipal fisc. In both cases we saw this manifested in two 
overarching legal requirements: one, that the municipal budget be ap-
proved by a central government agency; and two, that local taxes be 
enacted as laws by the Legislative Assembly before coming into effect. 
Both San Salvador and San Jose exhibited severe problems in the 
administration of their revenue policies, particularly unsure and er-
ratic tax collection, a condition not likely to encourage the national 
governments to grant further taxing powers. 
National governments in EI Salvador and Costa Rica have been 
stable for over 25 years. This has given them time to concern them-
selves with municipal problems; they have not had to devote large per-
centages of governmental energy imposing internal order. As a result 
they may feel less inclined, and less compelled, to assign the munic-
ipalities more responsibilities and concomitant revenue sources. 
Another relevant similarity is that of style in administrative 
decentralization. Certain services, local in nature, are viewed as 
not appropriate for direct central government provision, yet are too 
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expensive for the cities to handle. Instead of providing revenues, or 
at least enabling legislation for increased local revenue raising, the 
governments create autonomous agencies. With the provision of these 
services thus out of the hands of local government, so allegedly, are 
the needs for increased revenue. 
In both countries, elections, contested by recognizable parties, 
determine control of national and municipal governments. Policy pre-
ferences of local government leaders, therefore, are not purely per-
sonal and idiosyncratic but are ideological as well as pragmatic. 
Despite differences in partisan make-up of the municipal council, 
both San Jose and San Salvador have sought changes in local revenue 
policy. Both have been rebuffed by their central governments. 
Non-governmental groups have played a part in shaping local rev-
enue policy in the two cities. In both cases this role has been pri-
marily obstructionist. And in both case these external actors have 
met with success by intervening with the national government at the 
legitimation stage of the process more than by influencing the local 
government during the policy formulation phase. 
Not all the similarities in background factors affecting the 
similarity in policy output, however, are political; some are eco-
nomic. Perhaps the most important of these is the similarity we have 
observed in national tax structures. Both concentrate heavily on in-
direct taxes. The failure of the central governments to make wide-
spread use of direct taxes may somehow lead to a reluctance to approve 
additional local taxes which are for the most part direct. 
General structures of the national economies, as measured by 
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the structure of the Gross Domestic Product, parallel one another very 
closely in Costa Rica and EI Salvador. The same is true of the mix of 
public and private economic activities in the generating of the gross 
domestic products. A direct link between these factors, however, and 
the policy outcomes we have observed, does not lirnnediately suggest it-
self. 
A further economic similarity is income distribution. Since 
groups of one income level tend to support increased municipal reve-
nues (and expenditures) and those of another income level tend to op-
pose such increases, the similarity in income distribution may account 
for the closely matched patterns--that is, the patterns of attempted 
increases at the local level in both countries and the blocking of 
these attempts at the national level. 
Two demographic factors look very much alike in San Jose and San 
Salvador--the age structure of the population and the numerical pre-
ponderance of women. A link between these factors and the policy 
statements of the municipal governments could be posited if it could 
be shown that women and/or the dominant age groups held a consensus 
opinion on the need for more municipal revenue, and that one or both 
of these groups were especially active politically. But there is no 
such evidence, and thus nothing to support speculation as to the 
existence of such a linkage. 
This, then, is a brief listing of the background factors that 
are similar in-the two polities and hence likely to lead to similar-
ities in policy outputs. But not all political, economic and social 
conditions are this similar in the two countries. Here we will 
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consider briefly the ones that vary significantly, the ones we orig-
inally hypothesized would account for expected differences in policy. 
Several of these characteristics are economic. It was shown 
above in the section on economic background factors that the Costa 
Rican economy was growing faster, had a greater percentage of its 
workforce in manufacturing, and a considerably lower unemployment 
rate. Per capita productivity was also higher in Costa Rica. El Sal-
vador, it was noted, endured a much smaller rate of inflation. None 
of these major differences, however, led to the expected variation in 
policy output, even in local government revenue raising where they 
were expected to have the most influence. 
Among the demographic and social dissimilarities we note the 
greater urba~ population growth in El Salvador. And, although the 
data are in~omplete and even suspect, this country shows a higher rate 
of internal rural to urban migration. Some differences in community 
structure have also been examined. 
Political diversities were expected to result in and explain the 
largest part of our mlticipated variation in policy output. One of 
these diversities is the greater degree of openness of the Costa Rican 
political system; though this openness is difficult to measure and 
document, it is nonetheless very real. Another is the divergence, 
legislatively and administratively, between the two municipal govern-
ment organizations. 
The single set of political differences expected to generate the 
most variety in policy product is the set of relationships between lo-
cal and national governments. Three aspects vary significantly. In 
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Salvador there are virtually no subsidies paid the local government in 
San Salvador by the nation; in Costa Rica these subventions are con-
siderable. The Costa Rican government assigns a major and important, 
if undefined, role in national development to local governments. No 
such posture is assumed by the Salvadorean government. In Costa Rica 
the same spectrum of political parties is found in the National Assem-
bly as in the San Jose council. In El Salvador the capital is pitted 
in total partisan political opposition to the national government. 
Nonetheless, San Jose has had as little success in obtaining national 
approval for tax changes as has San Salvador. We must conclude that 
ultimately it makes no differences in this particular policy area 
whether national government practice is to keep the city financially 
dependent as in Costa Rica or politically weak as in EI Salvador. 
Finally, the existence of a comprehensive plan for the develop-
ment of metropolitan San Salvador was expected to have an effect on 
policy in that municipality. No such effect is in evidence, among 
other reasons because the plan assigned local government no role in 
the development process. 
In our discussion of the current municipal tax systems of San 
Jose and San Salvador we compared them not only with one ~~other but 
also with de Moraes' evolutionary model. Having examined the policy-
making process, we note attempts on the part of both municipalities 
to move closer to his developmental paradigm, attempts that have been 
frustrated by the national governments. San Jose continues to l1ave, 
vis-a-vis de Moraes' criteria, a better tax system than San Salvador. 
De Moraes' model, however, cannot be accepted uncritically. It 
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appears, for example, to confuse cause and effect in claiming a tend-
ency to centralization as a consequence of the current municipal tax 
system rather than a contributing factor thereto. Nonetheless the 
model does provide a useful summary of the present state of the art 
and possible alternatives thereto, and remains a convenient backdrop 
against which to make comparisons. 
The policy products and the contributions of the various back-
ground factors thereto have been analyzed for San Jose and San Salva-
dor. It is appropriate at this point to offer some conclusions on 
their policymaking structure. It is particularly useful to compare 
them against the tableau of Wynia's seven characteristics, to deter-
mine to what extent his national-level stereotypes in Central America 
4 
are mirrored at the local level. 
Wynia's first characteristic is "paternalistic and often charis-
matic leadership juxtaposed with a lack of institutional, especially 
constitutional, legitimacy." This type of leadership is definitely 
found in San Salvador; it is totally absent in San Jose. Both munic-
ipal policymaking structures, however, possess institutional legiti-
macy. 
Expanding political participation yet underrepresentation of 
the masses is found in both cities. Both, however, are trying to 
broaden the base of mass participation. The motivating force behind 
these attempts vary significantly. In Costa Rica the national govern-
ment has mandated the opening of the local political structure to com-
munity residents. In San Salvador the municipality itself has tried 
to encourage the participation of the hoi polloi, largely to provide 
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votes and workers to aid UNO-CD national political aspirations. 
The extensive patronage ascribed to administrative structures is 
found in both cities, as are the intricate formal rules. In neither 
case, however, does there appear to be as widespread an informal dis-
regard for these rules as is found at the national levels. One char-
acteristic of the local administration deserving mention here is the 
difficulty, in both cases, of attracting qualified personnel to fill 
upper-level administrative and technical positions. 
Obscured and obstructed communications within the public sector 
/ 
are to be found in San Jose and San Salvador. This is more true of 
national-local government relations than of intra municipal contacts. 
Each polity exhibits its own special case of this. In San Jose the 
breakdown seems to occur due more to weak information or functional 
area rivalries between local government and autonomous agencies; in 
San Salvador it is another manifestation of the political-ideological 
conflict between the municipality and the national government. Com-
munication problems between municipalities and the private sector in 
both circumstances have two bases: a tendency of the sectors to talk 
past one another and a preference on the part of the private sector 
for political contacts at the national rather than the local level. 
Neither heavy reliance on the private sector for managing but 
not financing economic growth nor slow economic growth and moderniza-
tion due to structural and institutional rigidities have any direct 
relevance to local policymaking. Rigidities built into national gov-
ernment, however, do affect the localities. There seems to be no less 
of this in the one situation than in the other despite a rhetoric of 
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flexibility on the part of the Costa Rican government. 
Again, economic dependence on foreign markets and consequent 
vulnerability to external economic and financial conditions do not im-
pinge as directly upon the local as on the national policymaking 
structures. A closely related condition, however, is found in exter-
nal lending agency controls on the structure of public housing provi-
sion. Since the rules promulgated by the external agencies are gen-
eral, there are no differences in their applicability between El Sal-
vador and Costa Rica. 
Wynia has suggested further that associated with the particular 
Central American decisionmaking structure will be found one of two 
kinds of policymaker--the overcautious, underinformed, hesitant in-
crementalist, and the utopian of infinite goodwill but minimal under-
standing of complex policy problems. We did not find municipal policy-
makers in either city at these extremes. We did find, however, the 
policymakers in San .Jose to be more incremental and realistic in ap-
proach while those in San Salvador were somewhat more holistic, and 
even idealistic. 
In Chapter I it was suggested that we might expect to find a 
'consensual elite' situation in San Salvador and a 'competitive mass' 
5 
in San Jose. A 'consensual elite' structure is characterized by a 
narrow distribution of political power among the citizens and a con-
6 
vergence of political ideology among political leaders. San Salvador 
definitely exhibits a concentration of political power but does not 
manifest any unity of ideology among political leaders, particularly 
when the actual roles of economic notables and the national govern-
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ment in local politics are considered. More accurately then, its 
power structure should be labeled 'competitive elite.' San Jos~ also 
shows a divergence among ideologies of political leaders but in its 
more open system, power is more widely dispersed among a larger pro-
portion of the citizenry. Our supposition as to a 'competitive mass' 
in San Jos~, then, holds true but our expectation of a 'consensual 
elite' in San Salvador does not. 
Finally, it remains to comment briefly on the suitability of our 
policymaking model. It has worked. Not only the policy approach but 
our scheme in particular have proved compatible with comparative in-
quiry. Our model is not, however, beyond needing improvement. 
One modification that would improve its usefulness is the in-
clusion of a legitimation phase between adoption and application. Ob-
viously we have not ignored legitimation in the sense of approval of 
policy by the national government, but the inclusion of a formal le-
gitimation stage in the model would serve two purposes. First, it 
would make the model more consistent with the reality of the policy-
making process in the Central American republics, and likely else-
where. Second, it would alert other potential users of the model to 
the importance of formal legitimation in the creation of municipal 
policy. 
Another necessary alteration to our model would provide for 
cases where demands originate within the political system. Tradition-
ally a major argument in policy analysis has been whether needs or de-
mands entered the political system. In response the individual ana-
lyst has simply shifted the boundaries of the formal political system 
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backward or forward along the policy process stream. This practice, 
we have found, pr.)duces an inadequate model for comparative purposes. 
A more complete model must allow for the inclusion of demands genera-
ted in the private sector and presented as such to the political sys-
tem and also for demands generated within the political system. This 
is particularly true in those polities where government, local or 
national, functions as patron. 
TIle third improvement to our model would be to build in a mech-
anism to take cognizance of the roles played by informal actors. 
Traditional models stress the boundaries of the political system, sug-
gesting that after a certain stage in the process outsiders, those not 
formally part of the system, take no further part in decisionmaking. 
This is even less an accurate reflection of reality in Central Amer-
ica than in the 'developed' countries. We emphasize again the role 
played by private interests in the legitimation phase, a better model 
would deal more directly with them. 
We do not imply that the model usedin this study, modified as 
above would be perfect. Nonetheless it could provide a useful start-
ing point for those who would do further research in this field. 
Hopefully, they can and will use it in search of more complete infor-
mation and fuller explanations. 
If our model, with some modifications, served us well, our basic 
hypothesis did not. We expected to find the differing sociopolitical 
cultures, acting both directly and through the policymaking activi-
ties, leading to substantive differences in both process and product. 
These differences in process and product did not materialize. 
~7 
A variety of possible explanations for this absence offer them-
selves. The background factors chosen may, in fact, not affect signifi-
cantly the policy output -- or, they may affect the policy output 
only in the Anglo-American situation and not in the Central Anlerican 
cases. We are not prepared to accept this radical an explantion 
without further study. 
The background factors may not influence policy and policymaking 
in the chosen policy areas of public housing and municipal revenue but 
may have an effect in other policy areas not examined. Unfortunately 
there are no known studies of this kind on other policy areas which could 
either support or refute this contention. 
It may be that one particular phase of the policymaking process, 
the administration/application phase, is of such overarching importance 
that similarities therein overwhelm more subtle differences due to 
the differing background factors. Of particular importance here might 
be two elements: the administrative structure itself, and the shortage 
of qualified and motivated individuals serving in critical municipal 
administration positions. We suggest that this is very likely and 
offer this particular hypothesis as a base for further examination. 
Finally, there is a nagging suspicion that city size actually 
plays a more important role than assigned it in this study. There may 
be some threshold size, e.g.,a population of 1,000,000, below which 
our hypotheses do not hold but above which they can be verified. Two 
lines of further research, therefore, suggest themselves. First, a 
study along the lines of the current one could be carried out, but 
with city size adopted as an independent variable. Thus, for example, 
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~ San Salvador might be compared with Caracas or Bogota. Second, a sim-
ilar study could be conducted using two large cities with differing 
social, economic, and political milieux. Bogota or Caracas, for exam-
pIe, might be compared with Santiago or Buenos Aires. 
As stated earlier, one important end of comparative research is 
the discovery of empirical generalizations that can be verified and 
eventually become part of an overall explanatory structure. This study 
is one small step in that direction. Its results were not as ex-
pected, and some suggestions have been offered as to why this may be 
so. Possible modifications and directions for future research have 
been recommended. 
In conclusion, we do not regard studies such as this, in which 
the initial hypotheses could not be proved, to be fruitless. We main-
tain that political, economic, and social background factors do affect 
the nature of both the policymaking process and the outputs therefrom. 
It is confidently expected that further investigations of this type, 
with the tools and approaches perhaps refined a~ ~ugg~st~d above, will 
be able to verify these hypotheses and provide valid generalizations 
as to the relations among environmental conditions, political struc-
tures and processes, and policy products both in Latin America in 
particular and third world urban settings in general. 
CHAPTER VIII NOTES 
1. Salegio, An'lisis, p. 57. 
2. Or, more accurately, did offer this choice. INVU no longer pro-
vides urbanized lots. 
3. Wynia, Planners and Politics, p. 155. 
4. See above, p. 20. 
5. See above, p. 10. 
6. Agger, Rulers and the Ruled, pp. 73-78 passim. 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
There exists in Central America a large number of government 
agencies~ political parties, international organizations and miscella-
neous groups that are universally known by the acronyms for their Span-
ish names. Below are the most cornmon, with English equivalents. Full 
Spanish names have been provided above when first encountered in the 
text. 
Costa Rica 
Political Parties 
AD 
CD 
PASO 
PLN 
PNI 
PRD 
PRN 
PUAC 
PUCR 
PUN 
Other Agencies 
CIN 
DIGAMS 
DINADECO 
ICE 
IFAM 
lMAS 
INS 
INVU 
OFIPLAN 
Democratic Action Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Socialist Action Party 
National Liberation Party 
National Independence Party 
Democratic Renovation Party 
National Republican Party 
Cartagenan Agricultural Union Party 
Civic Revolutionary Union Party 
National Unification Party 
Interinstitutional Commission on Nomenclature 
General Office for Medical and Social Assistance 
General Office for Community Development 
Costa Rican Electrical Institute 
Institute for Strengthening and Assisting Munic-
ipalities 
Consolidated Institute for Social Assistance 
National Insurance Institute 
National Housing and Urbanization Institute 
National Planning Office (attached to the Presi-
dency) 
SNAA 
TSE 
ANFE 
AN DE 
FECR 
ANEP 
JUDECA 
ITCO 
El Salvador 
National Sewer and Water Administration 
Supreme Election Tribunal 
National Association for Economic Development 
National Teachers Association 
Federation of Costa Rican University Students 
National Association of Public Employees 
Coffee Growers Federation 
Colonization (Rural Resettlement) Institute 
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Political Parties 
FUDI 
MNR 
PCN 
PCD 
PPS 
PRUD 
UDN 
UNO 
Other Agencies 
ANDA 
CAESS 
CCE 
CONAPLAN 
DUA 
FINAMUN 
FOCCO 
FNV 
FUNDASAL 
ICR 
IVU 
MOPT 
TEGEFEM 
FUSS 
FESTIAVSCES 
CGS 
UNOC 
AGEUS 
COSDEC 
ANDES 
ANEP 
CAC! 
ANTEL 
ASI 
United Democratic Independent Front Party 
National Revolutionary Movement Party 
National Conciliation Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Salvadorean Popular Party 
Revolutionary Democratic Unity Party 
Democratic Nationalist Union Party 
United Opposition Party 
National Sewer and Water Administration 
San Salvador Electric Streetlighting Company 
Central Election Commission 
National Council for Planning and Economic Coordi-
nation 
Directorate of Urbanism and Architecture 
Municipal Development Bank 
Office for Community Development and Self Help 
National Housing Finance Administration 
Salvadorean Foundation for Development and Minimum 
Housing 
Institute for Rural Colonization 
Institute for Urban Housing 
Ministry of Public Works and Transportation 
General Treasury for Municipal Funds 
United Trade Union Federation 
Federation of Food, Clothing and Related Trade 
Unions 
General Confederation of Trade Unions 
National Union of Christian Workers 
General Association of University Students 
National Coffee Marketing Association 
National Teachers Association 
National Association of Private Enterprises 
El Salvador Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
National Telecommunications Administration 
Association of Salvadorean Industrialists 
Other 
APRA 
BCIE 
BID 
CESPO 
CIAT 
CICAP 
CIET 
ESAPAC 
ICAP 
ODECA 
OEA 
OIT 
ONU 
SIECA 
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Popular American Revolutionary Alliance (fore-
runner of all Latin American Christian Demo-
cratic parties) 
Central American Economic Integration Bank 
Interamerican Development Bank 
Center for Social and Population Studies 
Interamerican Center for Tax Administrators 
Interamerican Center for the Strengthening of Pub-
lic Administration 
Interamerican Center for Tax Studies 
Central American Advanced School for Public Admin-
istration 
Central American Institute for Public Administra-
tion 
Organization of Central American States 
Organization of American States 
International Labor Organization 
United Nations 
Permanent Secretary of the General Movement for 
Central American Economic Integration 
APPENDIX B 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
The Gini cOefficient (or ratio) is a measure showing how closely 
an actual distribution approaches absolute equality or inequality. Es-
sentially, it is a measure of concentration. Most often it is used to 
describe income distribution but may also be used, as shown above, for 
distribution of land and political power. Gini coefficients are named 
for their developer, Corrado Gini, an early twentieth-century Italian 
1 
statistician and economist. 
curve. 
The Gini coefficient as it is known today is based on the Lorenz 
2 
The Lorenz curve is a simple graphic device plotting cumulated 
percents of the commodity under discussion against cumulated percents 
of persons sharing in the distribution of that commodity. Figure 16 
below provides an example, using income as the subject. 
Absolute equality is indicated by the 45-degree st!aight line. 
Curve a indicates a slightly unequal distribution and curve b an even 
less equal distribution of income. It may readily be seen, for exam-
pIe, that: 1) in the perfectly equal situation, the bottom 50 percent 
of income recipients receive 50 percent of the total income; 2) in the 
situation represented by curve a, the bottom 50 percent of recipients 
receive 33 percent of the total income; and 3) in the situation repre-
sented by curve b, the bottom 50 percent of recipients receive only 11 
percent of the total income. 
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Figure 16. Sample Lorenz curves. 
The Lorenz curve, then, provides an easily understood and simply 
constructed visual picture of a distribution. It may be used to com-
pare several polities, regions or groups and to compare the same pol-
ity, region or group at different times. 
By itself, however, the Lorenz curve suffers from three short-
comings: 1) it requires the drawing of a graph; 2) this graph may be-
come unwieldy if a large number of cases are included; and 3) it 
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presents only ordinal, not cardinal comparisons, i.e., one can deter-
mine that a commodity is more c.Qncentrated in one situation than in 
another, but not how much more. 
In an effort to alleviate these shortcomings and allow more pre-
cision in expressing comparative distributions, Gini developed his co-
efficient. It is, simply, the ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45-degree line to the total area of the triangle bounded 
by the X axis, the Y axis, and the 45-degree line. 
The more unequal and concentrated the distribution, the farther 
from the 45-degree line will be the Lorenz curve and the greater will 
be the Gini coefficient. At the extremes, absolute equality of dis-
tribution would result in a Gini ratio of zero and absolute concentra-
tion in one individual would result in a Gini coeffecient of one. 
In our example (Figure 16), the Gini coefficient for the situa-
tion represented by Lorenz curve a is obviously less than that for 
Lorenz curve b. Actual coefficient for a in this example is approxi-
imately 0.23 and for b it is about 0.58. 
In essence, then, Gini coefficients are simple arithmetic ratios 
indicating degree of concentration or dispersion of a particular com-
modity. As dimensionless numbers, Gini coefficients allow for uncom-
plicated, systematic cardinal comparisons among a variety of groups, 
polities or regions. Although only one of a number of such meas-
3 
sures, it is the one most widely used by economists and social sci-
entists. 
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APPENDIX B NOTES 
1. A thorough account may be found in Corrado Gini, "Indici di concen-
trazione e di dipendenza," Biblioteca dell' Economista, 5a serie, 
20 (1922):39-40. 
2. M.C. Lorenz, "Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth," 
Publications of the American Statistical Association 9 (1905) :209-
219. 
3. For a more detailed discussion of several of these, see Mary Jean 
Bowman, "A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in 
the United States," American Economic Review 35 (1945) :607-628. 
APPENDIX C 
ELECTION PROCEDURE IN THE QUOTIENT OR MODIFIED D'HONDT SYSTEM 
Both municipal and national elections in Costa Rica are carried 
out under the quotient or modified d'Hondt system of proportional re-
presentation. This system is perhaps best illustrated by a simple 
model. Assume a municipality with an electorate of 100,000 voters, 
five parties and ten seats at stake. The quotient for an election is 
a numerical reckoning of the number of votes necessary to fill one 
position. In our example there are 100,000 voters and ten seats so 
the quotient equals 100,000/10 = 10,000 votes. The quotient natu-
rally varies with each election for each office and is based on the 
number of votes actually cast. It cannot, therefore, be determined 
until after the election has been held and the votes counted. 
Let us assume further that the election results in our model mu-
nicipality show the following: 
Party 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Number of votes 
34,921 
34,636 
5,526 
19,923 
4,994 
The first step is to determine how many seats are awarded by full 
quotient. (In this election we determined a full quotient to be 
10,000 votes.) Examination of the results show Parties A and B to 
each have three of these quotients and Party D to have one. Seats 
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are assigned and residual votes calculated. The situation now appears 
thus: 
Party Number of seats Residual 
by quotient votes 
A 3 4,921 
B 3 4,636 
C 0 5,526 
D 1 9,923 
E 0 4,994 
The next step is to determine semi quotients and assign seats accord-
ingly. As the name indicates, a semiquotient is equal to half a quo-
tient, in this case 5,000 votes. Semiquotient seats are assigned 
first to any party having a semiquotient and not having a quotient 
seat. If there is more than one party in this situation, the party 
with the largest number of residual votes gets the first seat, and so 
on down the line. Next, seats are assigned in the same manner to 
parties that do have a seat through quotient but have a number of 
residual votes greater than the semiquotient. In our example semi-
quotient seats would go first to Party C and second to Party D. Note 
again that Party C receives its seat first, even though it has fewer 
residual votes than Party D. After the allocation of the semiquotient 
seats, the distribution appears thus: 
Party Quotient Semiquotient Residual 
seats seats votes 
A 3 0 4,921 
B 3 
° 
4,636 
C 
° 
1 526 
D 1 1 4,923 
E 
° ° 
4,994 
At this point, there remains one seat and it goes to Party E which now 
has the largest number of residual votes. The complete distribution 
of seats based on election results appears thus: 
Party Votes Quotient 
seats 
A 34,921 3 
B 34,636 3 
C 5,526 0 
D 19,923 1 
E 4,994 0 
Total 100,000 7 
Semiquotient Residual 
seats seats 
o 0 
o 0 
1 0 
1 0 
o 1 
2 1 
Total % of 
seats votes 
3 34.9 
3 34.6 
1 5.5 
2 19.9 
1 5.0 
10 100.0 
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% of 
seats 
30 
30 
10 
20 
10 
100 
The actual individuals constituting our model city council are 
the first three candidates listed on Party A's slate, the first three 
candidates on Party B's slated, the first two on Party D's slate and 
the single candidates heading the slates of Parties C and E. 
Two major political considerations are immediately apparent from 
this example: the importance to the individual candidate of position 
on the party's slate, and the advantages to very small minority par-
ties of this electoral system. 
APPENDIX D 
SAN SALVADOR ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
Actual delivery of services to the citizenry and related fiscal 
operations are carried out by 12 line departments: Current Accounts, 
Treasury, Finance, Registration, Urban Development, Community Action, 
Special Projects, Engineering, Sanitation, Livestock, Markets and 
Cemeteries. Briefly, the activities of each department are: 
1. Current Accounts acts exactly as the name implies. It is 
concerned with keeping track of addresses, verifying commercial loca-
tions, and noticing which firms have gone out of business. This De-
partment also physically examines sites, checking for vacant lots with 
or without squatters. In short, it keeps the rota of the ratepayers 
current. 
2. The Treasury Department is charged with safekeeping mu-
nicipal funds and paying bills. It is the city's collection agency. 
Salvadorean law requires municipal funds collected to be immediately 
deposited in the Central Reserve Bank of EI Salvador. 
3. Finance has primary responsibility for developing the bud-
get. It also determines the ability-to-pay of potential ratepayers. 
General bookkeeping and inven~r~;r of municipal real and moveable prop-
erty are also carried out here. Finance is, in addition, required to 
make monthly reports to the council on the state of the municipal 
fisc. 
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4. Registration has one of the most varied sets of activities 
to perform. It is required to maintain a register, in books of a size 
and form and with wording specified in the Municipal Act, of births, 
deaths, marriages, divorces and adoptions. This information must be 
supplied to the Director General of Statistics and Census. The de-
partment also issues certificates of marriage and singleness (never 
married) and is in charge of all photocopying for the municipality. 
Perhaps the most important function of Registration in the eyes 
of the population is the issuing of the cedula, the identity card 
without which the individual Salvadorean (and Costa Rican) is very 
much a nonperson, unable to vote, enter business, marry or apply for 
a passport. The Department is, in addition, the licensing agency for 
a variety of activities and professions, among them being market 
stalls, cattle, loudspeakers, man- and animal-powered push carts, 
firearms, printers, bootblacks and vendors of lottery tickets. Fi-
nally, it serves as well as notary public. 
5. Urban Development might be regarded most accurately as a 
control agency. It issues building permits and determines the physi-
cal state of existing structures, ordering repair or demolition where 
appropriate. It reviews building plans both as to siting and to ma-
terials to be used in construction, and registers these plans. The 
Department represents municipal interests at planning hearings and 
the like before various central government agencies. It also pro-
vides some technical assistance to builders and collects statistics 
on construction activities. 
Two related matters ought be mentioned here. One, builders 
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need permits from the central government as well as the municipality 
before beginning any construction. Two, the Department of Urban De-
velopment does not engage in land use planning. It may suggest and 
advise but planning is a function of the national government. 
6. The Department of Community Action is charged broadly with 
the channeling of various municipal and other services to the urban, 
suburban and rural communities of San Salvador. It is to foster com-
munity organizations. Regulation and improvement of the municipal 
dormitories and juvenile home fall in its purview. 
It is also the cultural agency, required to coordinate and plan 
cultural activities and administer the theater, municipal gallery, and 
traveling theater. Moreover, in its role as patron of the arts it is 
"to create in Salvadoreans artistic and cultural capabilities through 
the media of theater, dance, painting, chorus, ceramics, music, etc." 
A wide variety of extension-type services are also mandated. 
For the farmer, the usual sorts of agricultural extension aid and in-
formation are to be supplied. Housewives are to be taught nutrition, 
budgeting, child care and the general range of skills usually labeled 
home economics. Finally, the agency is to serve, in U.S. terms, as a 
giant municipal 4-H club for the youth of San Salvador. 
7. Special Projects is a very small department, an offshoot 
of Engineering. Because of its nature, no formal description of its 
activities is listed. At the time of the fieldwork in San Salvador 
it appeared to exist only on paper. 
8. Engineering carries out a variety of functions, some of 
which would most probably be assigned to a Parks agency in most North 
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American municipalities. Among these are tree planting, maintenance 
of public parks, lawns and gardens, and removal of fallen trees and 
other similar nuisances. 
Other activities include topographic surveys, plan approval for 
drainage worksmd subsurface construction in general and the usual 
maintenance and repair of streets, bridges, sidewalks and culverts. 
9. Sanitation is charged with garbage collection and dis-
posal, construction of public latrines, and cleaning of streets and 
sewers. It also has a number of responsibilities related to vermin 
control including fumigation and vector control and the municipality's 
role in the national anti-rabies campaign. 
10. Livestock is required to issue permits to those wishing 
to deal in animals or carcasses within the city limits and to license 
and inspect livestock handlers. It is responsible for checking 
brands, verifying ownership and keeping records of all transactions. 
One unit provides both ante- and post-mortem veterinary services. San 
Salvador also operates, under this Department, a municipal slaughter-
house. 
11. Markets is a large Department but one with a relatively 
simple and straightforward mandate. It assigns (but does not issue 
licenses for) stalls and floor space, maintains order, discipline and 
decorum in the markets, carries out cleaning and physical maintenanc~~ 
and most important, collects the fees from the vendors. 
12. Cemeteries is responsible for carrying out all burials 
and exhwnations within the municipality, and for the usual graveyard 
maintenance. The Department keeps track of location and occupance of 
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plots, crypts, niches and vaults, and collects the appropriate fees. 
In a radical departure from usual North American practice, it is this 
agency that issues death certificates. 
Again, the above description of the administrative structure of 
San Salvador is cursory. But it does provide a general picture of the 
organization, and a take-off point for comparison with the structure 
and practices in San Jos~. 
APPENDIX E 
SAN JOSE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
The remaining mWlicipal activities are classified into seven 
fWlctional categories: General Administration, MWlicipal Health, Edu-
cation and Culture, Economic and Social Services, Maintenance, New 
Construction and Urban Development. Briefly, the components of each 
of these categories follow. 
1. General Administration includes most of the support and 
financial services. Among the latter are budget, accounting, treas-
ury, property assessment and rate collection. Debt management and 
handling of subventions from the central government are also included 
here. Support services include personnel, purchasing, supplies, and 
stores. In addition, janitors, watchmen and guards for mWlicipal fa-
cilities are provided in this activity. 
2. Municipal Health provides a wide range of services. 
Sweeping of streets and public squares and care of wells and other 
water supplies are included. Collection of residential and commercial 
solid waste and its treatment at a site outside the city op~rated 
jointly by San Jose and neighboring municipalities is another func-
tion. Finally, cemetery maintenance, gravedigging, and the like are 
the responsibility of this function. 
3. Education and Culture differs somewhat from other activi-
ties in that its main function is the provision of money rather than 
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services. Some of this money goe:: to local school boards, some in the 
form of scholarships to needy a},d worthy students. Funds are also 
provided here to ad hoc groups in charge of celebrations for national 
and municipal holidays. Employees from various agencies are pressed 
into service temporarily for these festivities. The only service qua 
service provided here is the oP( :: :.:ion of the Municipal Children's 
Library. 
4. Economic and Social Services is more economic than social. 
Its chief function is operating the city's four markets and the bus 
station attached to one of these. It is the only operation to 'show 
a profit' as it includes the parking meters. Streetlighting is in-
cluded here. However, since the actual lighting service is provided 
by a private enterprise, compania Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, S.A., ac-
tivities are limited to contract negotiation and ensuring of compli-
ance. 
5. Maintenance performs three main functions. First is the 
repair of streets and roads and the cleaning of storm sewers. Second 
is general maintenance, but not janitorial service, to municipal 
buildings. Third is keeping in good order the various public parks, 
playgrounds, forests, gardens and other open spaces of the municipal-
ity. 
6. New Construction deals primarily with roads. While new 
buildings and major repairs and additions are handled here, none were 
ongoing or planned at the time of the field work in San Jose. All 
phases of new construction are involved--initial planning and engi-
neering, land assembly, allocation of costs (e.g., for heavy 
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equipment used on more than one job) to various projects and the ac-
tual physical construction. The operation of the municipal garage is 
also included. 
7. Planning and Control of Urban Development is the formal 
title of the last function but it is concerned more with control than 
with planning. Two major activities are carried out: examination 
and approval of plans as to both technical specifications and conform-
ity to the municipal general plan, and on-site inspection of new con-
struction. 
APPENDIX F 
NOTE ON DATA SOURCES 
At various places in the body of the paper, as appropriate, com-
ments are made on the sources of numerical data. In this Appendix a 
general description of data sources, data handling and difficulties 
with the data is presented. 
In Costa Rica five major data sources were used. These were the 
Central Bank, the Comptroller General, the Office of Census and Sta-
tistics, the National Planning Office and the Municipality of San 
Jose. References to specific figures used are indicat~d in the text. 
The Central Bank provided most of the data on the national economy, 
while figures on government revenues and expenditures came from the 
Comptroller General. Population measurements and estimates came from 
the Office of Census and Statistics. Planning Office data applied to 
specific activities; these data did not fit into any particular clas-
sification. The Municipality supplied much of the data on its own 
financial activities. Some of these data, however, were available 
only from the Comptroller General. 
In El Salvador, four major data sources were consulted. These 
were CONAP LAN , the Central Reserve Bank, the Office of Census and 
Statistics, and the Municipality of San Salvador. CONAPLAN provided 
broad data on the national economy and on government revenues and ex-
penditures. More specific data, such as the details of a particular 
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bond sale, were obtained from the Central Reserve Bank. Figures on 
population and some on housing were supplied by the Office oi Census 
and Statistics. The Municipality made data on its own activities 
available to the best of its limited ability. In both El Salvador and 
Costa Rica, of course, most of the housing data came from the involved 
agencies, IVU, INVU and Ful~DASAL. 
Comparative data on the two countries were presented by a number 
of organizations, among them the Inter-American Development Bank, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, Organization of Central American 
State, and various divisions of the United Nations. The single most 
valuable source of comparative data was the oft-cited UNICEF publica-
tion Las Sociedades Centroamericanas Actuales. 
In virtually all cases, financial data as obtained were ex-
pressed in the national currencies of the respective countries. For 
purposes of comparison, these were converted by the writer into Cen-
tral American pesos. The Central American peso is an artifical cur-
rency, like the Eurodollar, widely used in international bookkeeping 
among members of the Central American Common Market. This peso is 
pegged at par with the U.S. dollar. Conversions were calculated at 
the rate of $1.00 C.A. = ¢6.62 (Costa Rican) = ¢2.50 (Salvadorean). 
Use of the Central American peso eliminated a great deal of confusion 
due to the designation of the colon as the national currency unit in 
both countries. 
CONAPLAN provided economic data in both current and fixed (1962) 
colones for San Salvador. The writer calculated the necessary adjust-
ments to Costa Rican current figures to assign them constant (1962) 
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equivalents. 
Except as otherwise noted in the text, percentages, percentage 
changes, per capita amounts, ratios and similar numerical expressions 
were calculated by the writer from the raw data. Parenthetically, it 
should be mentioned that all Spanish-to-English translations and in-
terpretations in the paper are the work of the writer alone. 
Data gathering for this paper was a far more arduous and time-
consuming task in Costa Rica than in EI Salvador. In the latter coun-
try CONAPLAN's quarterly Indicadores Economicos y Sociales provides a 
wealth of information on EI Salvador's demography, national accounts, 
economic activity, public finance, money and banking, and human re-
sources. Not only is current data supplied but each issue contains 
data for at least the five most recent years. Comparisons over time 
are thus quite straightforward. In addition, the Central Reserve Bank 
publishes a monthly review covering all important public and private 
sector financial transaction, changes in the money supply and similar 
matters. All this information is readily available. 
Securing such data in Costa Rica, however, involves poring over 
the Comptroller's massive annual report for each year and extracting 
bits and pieces of sought-after data wherever they may be found. With 
the exception of one study by the~ntral Bank, data for more than one 
year are not compiled in any single location. Much of the needed 
data, moreover, is simply not published. Obtaining it, therefore, 
means days of searching records in the Comptroller's office and hand 
copying whatever is needed. 
In fairness, though, it should be noted that in two cases data 
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were more readily available in Costa Rica than in EI Salvador. INVU 
provided, generally, a more complete set of data than did IVU; San 
Jose Municipality was able to present a far more thorough picture of 
its financial situation than was its Salvadorean counterpart. 
A number of difficulties arose in obtaining and comparing data. 
Several of these have been referred to above as they cropped up in the 
text. Nonetheless it is appropriate to assemble them here. One of 
the major problems was that in neither country is the municipality 
the unit for which statistics are gathered. It was necessary, then, 
to use proxies, i.e., the urban area of San Jose Province and Metro-
politan San Salvador. Another problem was that the format in which 
data were assembled was not necessarily the format most convenient in 
the preparation of this paper. A related difficulty occurred when 
formats changed from year to year as, for example, when categories 
were expanded or collapsed into one another. 
Occasionally, different sources provided different data on the 
same phenomenon. When this occurred it was necessary to seek some 
external verification, some reason for choosing one data set over an-
other. A particular subgroup of this problem was found when inter-
national agencies gave different figures than the national government 
1 
for phenomena within its boundaries. 
Yet another difficulty arose from Costa Rica holding its na-
tional census in 1973 an~ EI Salvador in 1971. In the one case the 
figures werenvre recent but still preliminary; in the other, older 
but revised. 
Finally, there is the possibility of suppression or modification 
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of particular data that reflect adversely on government policy. The 
one specific case where this was suspected was identified in the text. 
The ultimate questions arising from all these considerations are, 
of course: How much faith can be placed in the data for the two poli-
ties?; and, How comparable are these data? We admit that there are 
enough uncertainties about the data to precluc~ sophisticated statis-
tical analysis. But then, we question the appropriateness of such 
analysis to this particular paper, holding with Wassily Leontief that 
uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation tends 
often to concel the ephemeral substantive content of the argu-
ment behind the formidable front of algebraic signs. 2 
The usual caveats in using our data have been invoked throughout the 
paper. Special care has been taken when comparing changes between 
censuses to point out to the reader the different dates involved. 
More information is provided in this fashion than is lost or distorted 
through lack of perfect coincidence. In short, while care and cau-
tion, even suspicion, must be used in assembling, analyzing, and com-
paring the data, we have to do as much with them as we can because, 
after all, they are all the data that exist. 
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